Deeds v. State


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Docket Number: 2008-KA-00146-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-00146-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-03-2009
Opinion Author: Lamar, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: DUI - Double jeopardy - Blood alcohol test results - Section 63-11-9 - M.R.E. 1103 - M.R.E. 901(a)
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Dickinson, Randolph and Pierce, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J., and Chandler, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-17-2007
Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert P. Chamberlin
Disposition: Conviction of Driving Under the Influence Causing Injury and Sentence of Fifteen (15) Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with Eight (8) Years of Post-Release Supervision, and Five (5) of Those Years Reporting to a Probation Officer Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 47-7-34, with Conditions, and Pay a Fine of $1,000, and $100 to the Mississippi Crime Victim's Compensation Fund.
District Attorney: John W. Champion
Case Number: CR2005-815-C(D)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: JOHN DEEDS




T. SWAYZE ALFORD, HOLLIE M. MILLER



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE B. WOOD  

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    Topic: DUI - Double jeopardy - Blood alcohol test results - Section 63-11-9 - M.R.E. 1103 - M.R.E. 901(a)

    Summary of the Facts: John Deeds was convicted of driving under the influence with resulting injury. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Double jeopardy Deeds argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy. He argues that jeopardy attached on June 23, 2005 – the original trial date – when the municipal court dismissed the charge of DUI first offense, barring the subsequent prosecution in circuit court. Protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated only when the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy. This state of jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled or sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to receive evidence. Here, jeopardy had not attached when the municipal court dismissed Deeds’s DUI charge in the Olive Branch Municipal Court. It is undisputed that the municipal judge received no evidence and heard no witnesses before dismissing the DUI charge. The judge’s comments on the order relative to the DUI charge do not contain any findings of the court; rather, the court merely recorded the reasons that the prosecutor gave for not proceeding to trial on the DUI charge. These notations in the order do not constitute either an aquittal or an adjudication, such that the subsequent indictment or trial of Deeds would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Issue 2: Blood alcohol test results Deeds argues that the results of the blood alcohol test were inadmissible because the State failed to establish the first link in the chain of custody when it failed to identify the individual who took his blood sample, failed to establish that the individual who took the blood sample was qualified to perform the procedure, and failed to establish the specific procedure utilized to take the blood sample. Deeds’s argument that the blood test results were inadmissible due to failure to comply with section 63-11-9 is misplaced. Admissibility of evidence is governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence as provided by M.R.E. 1103, not by statutory enactment. Admissibility of the results is governed by M.R.E. 901(a). The defendant has the burden of proving tampering or substitution of the evidence, and a mere suggestion that substitution could possibly have occurred does not meet the burden of showing probable substitution. Deeds has not attempted to prove that such tampering or substitution occurred. Deeds argues that, because the State never identified the person who drew his blood, and because he was consequently unable to cross-examine that individual, his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated. Gaps in the chain of custody normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live. Here, the admission of the results of the blood test did not violate Deeds’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against him. Deeds argues that taking his blood sample constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and circumstances in this case evince more than a mere or reasonable suspicion that evidence material to the criminal investigation, an illegal blood alcohol level, would be found. Thus, the officer had probable cause to obtain a blood sample from Deeds.


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