Pace v. Pace


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-00380-COA
Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-24-2009
Opinion Author: ISHEE, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED
Additional Case Information: Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - Arrearage - Ambiguity of judgment
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): IRVING, J.
Dissenting Author : CARLTON, J., with separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-25-2008
Appealed from: Jackson County Chancery Court
Judge: Randy Grant Pierce
Disposition: APPELLANT FOUND TO BE IN ARREARS IN PAYMENTS DUE UNDER AGREED JUDGMENT
Case Number: 2002-2170RP
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: SIDNEY KELTON PACE




 DAVID A. ROBERTS



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
    		•
    Appellee: MELANIE JEAN PACE MARK H. WATTS, RAY T. PRICE  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - Arrearage - Ambiguity of judgment
    Summary of the Facts: Sidney Pace and Melanie Pace were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Thereafter, Melanie filed a complaint for contempt, alleging that Sidney was in arrears on his agreed payments. Sidney asked the chancery court to find the couple's property settlement agreement unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court refused to find Sidney in contempt. The court modified some provisions of the agreement but, for the most part, left it intact. Sidney appeals.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Property settlement agreement Sidney argues that the Agreement that he and Melanie signed was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and ambiguous. Generally, a chancery court may modify an award of periodic alimony if there has been a material change of circumstances that occurred as a result of after-arising circumstances not reasonably anticipated at the time of agreement. However, property settlement agreements are fixed and final, and may not be modified absent fraud or contractual provision allowing modification. While Sidney did not hire an attorney before signing the Agreement, he was a successful doctor who certainly had the financial means to hire an attorney. The chancellor also found that Sidney had the intelligence to fully read and understand the Agreement before signing it. The fact that he “was in the unfortunate position of having a pregnant girlfriend and a hostile wife” affords Sidney little sympathy or grounds to constitute overreaching. Since there is no evidence of fraud or overreaching, the Agreement will be enforced. Issue 2: Arrearage Sidney argues that he should only be obligated to pay $1,500 per month in alimony instead of the $4,500 per month that Melanie alleges he owes. Under Sidney’s reasoning, he was not in arrears on any payments because he had been paying $6,000 per month, which included $1,500 for child support, $1,500 for alimony, and $3,000 for other expenses such as the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the former marital home. The amount of the arrearage totaled $87,889.33, which included the following expenses for the former marital home: $62,466 for the mortgage, $10,633.33 for taxes, and $14,790 for insurance. These amounts were documented by Melanie at trial. The chancellor found that Sidney was able to pay the amount of alimony that he agreed to pay and further found that his income had actually increased since the time he signed the Agreement. Sidney agreed that he would pay $4,500 per month in alimony to Melanie if she was no longer working for him. There was no abuse of discretion or manifest error in the chancellor’s ruling that Sidney was responsible for the arrearage claimed by Melanie. Issue 3: Ambiguity of judgment Sidney argues that the chancellor’s judgment was vague in that it did not take into consideration the fact that Melanie had refinanced the mortgage. Sidney’s argument is contradicted by the chancellor’s judgment, which clearly provides that Sidney is only responsible for the amount of the mortgage outstanding at the time he signed the Agreement.


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