Renfrow v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-KA-00786-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-00786-COA ; 2008-CT-00786-SCT ; 2008-CT-00786-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-10-2009 Opinion Author: ROBERTS, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Child pornography - Dismissal of indictment - Section 97-5-33(5) - Suppression of evidence - Suppression of statement - Continuance - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-02-2008 Appealed from: SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Robert G. Evans Disposition: CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Eddie H. Bowen Case Number: 2007-174K |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | RUBIN RENFROW |
W. TERRELL STUBBS,
REEVES JONES |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Child pornography - Dismissal of indictment - Section 97-5-33(5) - Suppression of evidence - Suppression of statement - Continuance - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Rubin Renfrow was convicted of one count of possession of child pornography. The circuit court sentenced Renfrow to fifteen years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Dismissal of indictment Renfrow argues that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that section 97-5-33(5) is unconstitutionally vague. In such a case, the appropriate test is to determine whether the statute defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness such that a person of ordinary intelligence has fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. Renfrow notes that section 97-5-33(1), (3), (6), and (7) contain a mens rea aspect, but section 97-5-33(5) does not contain a mens rea aspect. He also argues that section 97-5-33(5), as written, punishes people who have unintentionally or unknowingly had child pornography placed on their computers through computer viruses or computer hackers. A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague solely because it does not contain a mens rea element. The Legislature may define a crime which depends on no mental element and consists only of forbidden acts or omissions. In any case, it is irrelevant that section 97-5-33(5) does not include a mens rea element. The State charged Renfrow with willful possession of child pornography. By including that language, the State imposed a mens rea requirement, and it was obligated to prove that aspect of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Suppression of evidence Renfrow argues that the court erred in failing to suppress any and all evidence that the State obtained from his computer. He first argues that there was no probable cause for the search warrant, because according to the two children central to this case, the alleged inappropriate touching occurred nine or ten months before the investigator sought to obtain the search warrant. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision based on all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information. The probable cause for the search warrant was not rendered stale simply because the investigator first discovered the allegations nine or ten months after the alleged incident occurred. This is especially true in the context of allegations by small children. Based on the totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial basis for the issuance of the search warrant. Additionally, it was reasonable for the judge who issued the search warrant to conclude that images on a computer could still be recovered by forensic methods nine or ten months after the children saw them. Renfrow also argues that the State failed to protect the integrity of Renfrow’s original hard drive. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that either the original or one of the forensic duplicate copies of Renfrow’s hard drive were ever exposed to computer virus contamination while in the State’s custody, as he claims. He also claims the Cyber Crime Center did not have adequate failsafe systems to protect the integrity of his original hard drive. However, every step of the State’s procedure to gather evidence from the original hard drive was designed to protect the integrity of the evidence. He also makes a claim about a discrepancy in the serial number of his computer. However, he provides no argument to suggest that the circuit court erred when it found that the discrepancy in recording the computer’s serial number was anything more than a clerical error involved with omitting one repetitive digit in the serial number. Renfrow also claims that the State failed to demonstrate a proper chain of custody regarding his computer. Renfrow does not claim that any specific portion of the chain of custody was insufficient. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to discuss the entire chain of custody when the argument for suppression is based on such a broad allegation. In addition, the State presented an adequate chain of custody. Renfrow argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the introduction of the copy of the hard drive as opposed to the original. However, to maintain the integrity of the original hard drive, it was necessary to create a forensic duplicate of the original hard drive and then conduct all examinations on the forensic duplicate. Issue 3: Suppression of statement Renfrow argues that the circuit court erred when it did not suppress the investigator’s statement regarding his recollection of his interview of Renfrow. As for Renfrow’s claim that the investigator enticed him to go to the sheriff’s department, there is no evidence that the investigator or anyone else promised Renfrow anything in exchange for his agreeing to be interviewed. In addition, his claim that the circuit court erred when it declined to suppress the investigator’s recollection statement based on the fact that it was the investigator’s recollection of the interview and Renfrow did not sign the statement is without merit. Those matters pertained to the weight and credibility of the statement, and those matters are for the jury to consider. Also, Renfrow suffered no prejudice because the investigator’s recollection of Renfrow’s statements corroborated Renfrow’s defense at trial. Issue 4: Continuance Renfrow argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for continuance. A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance is not reversible unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from the denial. Renfrow does not indicate what his attorney or his expert might have discovered if the circuit court would have granted his motion for a continuance. Renfrow’s attorney presented no proof as to how he could have been better prepared to defend Renfrow if he would have had additional time to prepare for trial. Under the circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Renfrow’s second motion for a continuance. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Renfrow argues that the evidence against him was insufficient to convict him of possession of child pornography, because he did not know those files were on his computer; he never sent the files to anyone; and he was a novice with using computers. It was undisputed that several images depicting child pornography were found on Renfrow’s computer. There was no evidence that any of the computer viruses or other programs that Renfrow's expert described actually transferred any of the images of child pornography. In addition, this testimony was in stark contrast to that of the State's expert witnesses. Reasonable and fair-minded jurors could have found that the State proved each element of the offense as stated in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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