Hoskins v. Hoskins


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Docket Number: 2008-CA-01369-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-10-2009
Opinion Author: CARLTON, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Cruel and inhuman treatment - Constructive desertion
Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-23-2008
Appealed from: PANOLA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Mitchell M. Lundy, Jr.
Disposition: PETITION FOR DIVORCE DISMISSED
Case Number: B-07-05-218-ML

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: MARY (SMITH) HOSKINS




DARRIN JAY WESTFAUL



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: RONALD HOSKINS JOHN STANNARD FARESE  

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    Topic: Divorce: Cruel and inhuman treatment - Constructive desertion

    Summary of the Facts: Mary Hoskins filed a petition for divorce against her husband, Ronald Hoskins, on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and desertion. The chancellor dismissed Mary’s divorce action for failing to meet the burden of proof. Mary appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Mary argues that the chancellor erred in his application of the law regarding corroboration of cruel and inhuman treatment and “constructive desertion” as well as in his evaluation of the facts in evidence. Conduct that evinces habitual cruel and inhuman treatment must be such that it either endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief or is so unnatural and infamous” as to make the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. A divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment will not be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. In some cases, however, the plaintiff may not need to provide corroborating evidence. There is an exception in a case where, in its nature or owing to the isolation of the parties, no corroborating proof is reasonably possible. To support her allegations of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, Mary testified that she left the marital home after Ronald told her that he hated and despised her and demanded that she leave the home. Mary further testified that Ronald regularly made accusations that she committed adultery. Mary testified that Ronald once threatened to rape her. She also testified that Ronald exhibited controlling behavior toward her. Additionally, Mary testified that she experienced health problems while living with Ronald that subsided after the couple’s separation. The chancellor found that Mary failed to meet her burden of proof because her allegations were uncorroborated. The chancellor applied the appropriate legal standard in denying Mary a divorce on ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. While Mary alleges that Ronald threatened her in private, she does not address the lack of corroboration for her other claims. Further, Mary and Ronald did not live in isolation. Mary worked outside the home and visited family members throughout the marriage. Ronald and Mary shared their home with their two adult children and a grandchild who was in Mary’s custody. Neither of the couple’s children, who should have known of Ronald’s cruel and inhuman treatment of Mary, testified at the trial. To corroborate her claims, Mary called her sister to testify. She failed to provide corroboration of Mary’s claims that Ronald treated Mary cruelly. Though Mary claimed she sought medical attention during the marriage for conditions that improved after she and Ronald separated, she presented no medical evidence. Mary also relied on the doctrine of constructive desertion, alleging that Ronald’s behavior drove her away from the marital home. Mary’s allegations under the constructive-desertion theory are essentially the same as her allegations that Ronald’s behavior constituted habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The line between the heretofore seldom used ground of constructive desertion and the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is blurred with the only distinction being that in the former, the non-complaining party is compelled to leave and the objectionable conduct continues for one year. The chancellor found that Mary failed to corroborate her claim of cruel and inhuman treatment. Thus, it follows, she failed to corroborate her claim of constructive desertion.


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