Elliott v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00948-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-00948-COA ; 2008-CT-00948-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-03-2009 Opinion Author: BARNES, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) & (c) - Voluntariness of plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Evidentiary hearing Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, ISHEE, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: ROBERTS, J. (SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE, P.J., AND GRIFFIS, J.) Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-24-2008 Appealed from: MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: R. I. Prichard, III Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED Case Number: 2007-0260 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | CHRISTOPHER WADE ELLIOTT |
A. RANDALL HARRIS |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Timeliness of appeal - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.A.P. 4(a) - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) & (c) - Voluntariness of plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Evidentiary hearing |
| Summary of the Facts: | Christopher Elliott pled guilty to sexual battery and was sentenced to twenty years. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was dismissed as untimely filed because it was filed one day after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Alternatively, the circuit court denied the motion on the merits. Elliott filed a motion to reconsider. The circuit court entered an “Amended Order of Dismissal.” The court did not specifically state Elliott’s motion to reconsider was time-barred and deleted the portion of the opinion pertaining to the motion for post-conviction relief’s untimeliness. Making no substantive changes to its initial order, the circuit court again found no merit to Elliott’s claims. Elliott appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction Elliott’s motion to reconsider, filed April 7, 2008, was not filed within ten days of the circuit court’s entry of judgment on March 26, 2008, as required by M.R.C.P. 59(e). Elliott represented to the circuit court that he had not received the order of dismissal until April 2, when he contacted the clerk’s office. The comment to Rule 59, however, expressly states that “the court is not permitted to extend” the time for filing a motion to alter or amend judgment. Accordingly, it is questionable whether the circuit court had authority to enter an amended order more than ten days after the order of judgment. Elliott filed his notice of appeal on May 9, 2008, within thirty days of the amended order of dismissal, but not of the original order. M.R.A.P. 4(a) requires the notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. M.R.A.P. 2(a)(1) provides that the appeal shall be dismissed unless the notice is timely filed pursuant to M.R.A.P. 4 or 5. However, an appeal of post-conviction relief petitions are governed by M.R.A.P. 2(c), which allows the appellate court to suspend the requirements of the appellate rules in the interest of justice. The Court thus suspends the requirements of Rule 4(a) under the unique circumstances of this case. Issue 2: Voluntariness of plea Elliott argues that his plea was not voluntary or intelligent, because he was induced by deception by his attorney at the time, who promised that if Elliott pleaded guilty, he would only receive a suspended sentence and because at the time of the plea hearing, he was under the influence of prescribed pain medications. In order to determine whether a plea is voluntary, the appellate court examines whether the defendant knows what the elements are of the charge against him including an understanding of the charge and its relation to him, what effect the plea will have, and what the possible sentence might be because of his plea. The plea hearing transcript shows Elliott was fully advised by the circuit court judge of his charge, the effect of the plea on his rights, and the possible sentence. Elliott agreed with the judge that no one had informed him he would receive a particular sentence, coerced him, made promises to him, and that his guilty plea was freely and voluntarily entered. Furthermore, Elliott signed a petition to enter a guilty plea to the same effect. Accordingly, the record does not indicate Elliott was deceived or coerced by his attorney to plead guilty. Regarding Elliott’s contention that he was under prescription pain medicine at the hearing and, therefore, confused about his plea, Elliott did tell the judge he was on medication, but he stated that it did not impair his comprehension. Elliott’s signed plea petition also denies he was under the influence of any drugs or intoxicants when he pleaded guilty. Therefore, the record reflects that while Elliott was indeed on pain medication at the time of his plea colloquy, he convinced the circuit court judge that it did not impair his comprehension. Elliott also argues that his guilty plea could not be voluntary and intelligent because he was not informed he would have to register as a sex offender. While Elliott is correct that the record is silent pertaining to the court’s giving him notice of the sex offender registration requirements and his receipt of such, his argument is without merit. The requirement to register as a sex offender is not a direct or material consequence of a guilty plea but a collateral consequence, and as such, the trial court will not be put in error for failing to advise the defendant of the registration requirement before accepting his guilty plea. Issue 3: Ineffective assistance of counsel Elliott argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in pleading guilty because his attorney did not discuss the merits of the case with him, did not independently investigate the crime, and did not bring forward possible mitigating and exculpatory evidence during the plea hearing. Elliott’s testimony at the plea hearing contradicts his contentions. He stated under oath that he had met with, conferred, and discussed his case thoroughly with his attorney. Elliott affirmed that he was “totally satisfied” with his counsel’s legal representation. Moreover, Elliott has not presented any specific evidence that, but for his counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he would not have pleaded guilty. Instead, he supports his contentions of deficient counsel with mere assertions in the form of his own affidavit. Accordingly, the circuit court properly found no merit to Elliott’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Issue 4: Evidentiary hearing Elliott argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Not every motion for post-conviction relief must be afforded a full adversarial hearing by the trial court. The movant must demonstrate, through affidavits or otherwise, the potential existence of facts that, if proven at the hearing, would entitle the movant to relief. Elliott makes no such showing. |
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