Vaughn v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr.
| Docket Number: | 2008-CA-00987-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-29-2009 Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Negligence - Proximate causation - Expert testimony - Striking of expert witness - M.R.E. 702 - Motion to amend - M.R.C.P. 56(f) Judge(s) Concurring: Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, C.J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Kitchens, J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Graves, P.J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-28-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi Baptist Medical Center. Case Number: 251-06-988 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | PAULA LEE VAUGHN |
BILL WALLER, SR. |
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| Appellee: | MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER | GAYE NELL LOTT CURRIE, EUGENE RANDOLPH NAYLOR | ||
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| Topic: | Negligence - Proximate causation - Expert testimony - Striking of expert witness - M.R.E. 702 - Motion to amend - M.R.C.P. 56(f) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Paula Vaughn filed an action against Mississippi Baptist Medical Center; Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; and John and Jane Does 1-20. Vaughn’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that Baptist, by and through its agents and employees, failed to use due or reasonable care in her examination, care, diagnosis, and/or treatment. Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, later settled with Vaughn and was dismissed with prejudice by Agreed Order. The court granted Baptist's motion for summary judgment. Vaughn appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Proximate cause The trial court found that the evidence before the court showed Vaughn’s infection did not proximately result from any acts or omissions of Baptist. Moreover, the trial court found that Vaughn had presented no proof from a medical expert, as required by law, that Baptist proximately caused any infection. The trial court struck Vaughn’s expert, an R.N., finding that nurses could not properly offer expert testimony as to medical causation. The general rule in Mississippi is that medical negligence may be established only by expert medical testimony, with an exception for instances where a layman can observe and understand the negligence as a matter of common sense and practical experience. Although Vaughn designated four experts, only the nurse was designated to testify as to standard of care, breach of standard of care, the causal nexus between the alleged negligent acts of the Baptist nursing staff, and the resulting staph infection incurred by Vaughn. There is no dispute between the parties that a staph infection developed in the surgical wounds. There is a dispute, however, as to when the infection developed, more specifically, whether it developed during Vaughn’s initial hospitalization. Since medical diagnosis is outside a nurse’s scope of practice, logically it would follow that a nurse should not be permitted to testify as to his/her diagnostic impressions or as to the cause of a particular infectious disease or illness. This is in keeping with the majority rule that nursing experts cannot opine as to medical causation and are unable to establish the necessary element of proximate cause. Accordingly, because Vaughn failed to establish the requisite element of proximate cause, Baptist was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Vaughn also argues that her adult children, who attended her bedside during her hospitalizations, can attest to the fact that the nurses deviated from the standard of nursing care during the course of Vaughn’s treatment at Baptist. A medical expert is not necessary in instances in which a layman can observe and understand the negligence as a matter of common sense and practical experience. However, diagnosing symptoms has been explicitly held to be outside of the realm of a lay person and an activity that requires a medical expert. Thus, a lay witness cannot render an opinion as to whether the symptoms exhibited by Vaughn were associated with infection. Issue 2: Expert witness Vaughn argues that the court erred in striking one of her expert witnesses. Under M.R.E. 702, factors used by the court in considering whether to admit an expert's testimony include whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential rate of error; whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation; and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. It is clear from the record that the nurse possessed the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education to be qualified as an expert in the field of nursing and was qualified to testify concerning the standard of care and any deviations on the part of Baptist nursing staff from that standard of care. While the trial court did err in barring the nurse’s testimony outright and striking the portion of the affidavit regarding the elements of standard of care and deviations from the nursing standard of care, this assignment of error is moot, given that summary judgment in this case was properly granted. Issue 3: Motion to amend Vaughn filed a Motion to Amend, arguing that if the trial court should strike the nurse as an expert, it should grant Vaughn more time to offer a second expert. Baptist Hospital argued that Vaughn had not met the requirements of M.R.C.P. 56(f) in that Vaughn had failed to articulate justification for failure to designate a legally sufficient expert. In order to reap the benefit of Rule 56(f), the party resisting summary judgment must present specific facts why he cannot oppose the motion and must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Vaughn’s request for more time contained only vague assertions that further discovery would enable her to survive summary judgment. A period of one-and-one-half years was more than ample time for Vaughn to obtain expert testimony in an effort to avoid a grant of summary judgment against her. |
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