In re Estate of Hart v. Steverson


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2007-CA-00384-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-27-2009
Opinion Author: KING, C.J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Validity of inter vivos transfers - Presumption of undue influence - Court appointed expert fees - M.R.E. 706(b)
Judge(s) Concurring: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-30-2006
Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: William Joseph Lutz
Disposition: PETITION CONTESTING CERTAIN TRANSFERS AND GIFTS DENIED
Case Number: 2002-0569

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LUCILLE H. HART, DECEASED: CONNIE ELDRIDGE AND POLLY WEAVER




WILLIAM CHARLES BELL



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: DEBORAH H. STEVERSON DONALD A. MCGRAW  

    Synopsis provided by:

    If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
    hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

    Topic: Wills & estates - Validity of inter vivos transfers - Presumption of undue influence - Court appointed expert fees - M.R.E. 706(b)

    Summary of the Facts: Lucille Hart executed a will naming her daughters, Deborah Steverson, Connie Eldridge and Polly Weaver as the beneficiaries. Steverson was named as the executrix. After Hart died, Steverson filed a petition to probate Hart’s will. The will was admitted to probate. Eldridge and Weaver filed a complaint which alleged that Steverson misappropriated and mismanaged Hart’s assets and requested an accounting from the date Hart gave Steverson power of attorney until her death. They also requested that the chancellor order Hart’s estate to be kept open until a full accounting had been conducted. Steverson filed her first and final accounting of all receipts and disbursements made during the course of her administration of Hart’s estate. The appellants filed an objection to the accounting submitted by Steverson. The chancellor directed Steverson to provide a complete accounting of her actions under the power of attorney from Hart from when it was granted until the time of Hart’s death. In addition, the chancellor appointed an accounting firm as an independent auditor to conduct a forensic investigation of Hart’s finances prior to and after her death. After trial, the chancellor denied the objection to the final accounting and denied the claims of heirs. Eldridge and Weaver appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Validity of transfers The contested transfers and transactions in this case are as follows: (1) the $48,338.20 to pay off Steverson’s mortgage; (2) three $20,000 gifts transferred to Steverson dated April 2001, June 2001, and January 2002; (3) several cash withdrawals between December 2000 and January 2002, totaling $4,330 from an account bearing Hart’s and Steverson’s names with no known purpose; and (4) two transfers totaling $7,700, to Steverson’s personal account in December 2002 as reimbursements for Hart’s funeral expenses. The appellants argue that these contested transactions violated the fiduciary and confidential relationship that Steverson had with her mother. Where a confidential relationship exists, there is a presumption of undue influence concerning an inter vivos gift. Such gifts are presumed invalid. To overcome the presumption of undue influence, the proponents must show the following: good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary; grantor’s/testator’s full knowledge and deliberation of her actions and their consequences; and independent consent and action by the grantor/testator. Hart’s beneficiaries and other family members were aware of Hart’s generosity in sharing her money and the proceeds from the sale of her real property. Moreover, the record indicates that Hart relied on Steverson to assist her in transacting self-initiated personal activities. The appellants provided no evidence to indicate that Steverson did not act in good faith as to the sale of Steverson’s home and the other contested transactions. The record indicates that Hart had full knowledge of her assets, her natural inheritors and who controlled her finances. The record indicates that Hart had full knowledge of her finances and business. Witness testimony indicates that Hart may have needed some assistance with writing checks for her daily needs, paying for home improvements and repairs, giving gifts, withdrawing funds, and balancing her accounts; and she would solicit the help of Steverson, Smith, Weaver, and Eldridge to perform those tasks. However, the evidence clearly indicates that Hart was fully aware of her assets and her heirs. Testimonial evidence indicates that Hart was a competent person who was fully aware of her assets. Evidence reveals that all possible beneficiaries of Hart were aware of the inter vivos gifts to her children and their spouses and boyfriend and grandchildren, and that Hart initiated these gifts without any direction. Hart was aware of her assets and relied on Steverson to assist her in conducting her financial transactions. The record supports the chancellor’s finding that Steverson overcame the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. Issue 2: Court appointed expert The appellants argue that the chancellor abused his discretion and committed manifest error by not directing Steverson to pay any and all charges incurred by and for the court appointed expert. M.R.E. 706(b) provides that compensation for the court appointed expert shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs. The assessment of court costs is within a chancellor’s sound discretion; however, as a general rule, the costs of court should be assessed against the losing party. Thus, the chancellor did not err in ordering the appellants to pay all the incurred charges by the court-appointed auditor.


    Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court