Windmon, et al. v. Marshall, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-00528-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-13-2006 Opinion Author: Smith, C.J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Entry of default - M.R.C.P. 55 - Bad faith - Arguable reason - Punitive damages - Consequential damages - Expert testimony Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ. Dissenting Author : Easley and Graves, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-21-2003 Appealed from: Claiborne County Circuit Court Judge: Lamar Pickard Disposition: In the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Windmon & Marshall equally at fault in the car accident. In the second phase of the trial, the court granted Appellee's Motion for a Directed Verdict. Case Number: 2001-243 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | OLLIE WINDMON AND ROBERT JOE
WINDMON |
ANITA M. STAMPS |
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| Appellee: | STEPHANIE WARD MARSHALL AND MISSISSIPPI FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY | JUSTIN STRAUSS CLUCK, KENT E. SMITH, J. TUCKER MITCHELL , ANDY LOWRY, JAMES R. MOORE |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Entry of default - M.R.C.P. 55 - Bad faith - Arguable reason - Punitive damages - Consequential damages - Expert testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Ollie and Robert Windmon filed suit against Stephanie Marshall and Mississippi Farm Bureau Insurance Company after Ollie Windmon was seriously injured when her vehicle ran off of the highway and struck a tree. Ollie Windmon claimed her injuries were due to Marshall’s negligent act of failing to properly yield. Also, the Windmons claimed Farm Bureau was liable for committing alleged acts of bad faith in the investigation of their claim. The trial court ordered a bifurcation of this matter. In the first phase, the jury returned a verdict finding Windmon and Marshall equally at fault for the accident. During the second phase of the trial, after all of the evidence was presented, the court granted Farm Bureau’s motion for a directed verdict. The Windmons appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Entry of default After the Windmons had filed suit in this case, they filed an application for entry of default judgment and supporting affidavit. Entry of default was subsequently entered and docketed by the circuit court clerk. Marshall filed a motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default and for leave of court to file responsive pleadings. The trial court set aside the entry of default. The Windmons argue the trial court abused its discretion when it set aside the clerk’s entry of default against Marshall without a hearing on the grounds for setting it aside. It is undisputed that the Windmons obtained an entry of default against Marshall prior to the hearing; however, the Windmons had not obtained a final judgment of default at that juncture. The trial court determined that its discretion would best be served by setting aside the entry of default. M.R.C.P. 55(b) clearly enables that discretion and states that judgment by default may be entered by the court on the day the case is set for trial. M.R.C.P. 55(c) draws a clear distinction between setting aside an entry of default and setting aside a judgment of default. In accordance with M.R.C.P. 55(c), the court was permitted to set aside the entry of default for good cause shown. Although the trial court does not expressly enumerate good cause for setting aside the entry of default, the record reflects that good cause existed. Even if the trial court had granted the default judgment, for the Windmons to proceed on their claim against Farm Bureau, the issue of Marshall’s liability would still have had to be tried. It is apparent that in order to preserve the sanctity of justice, the trial court judiciously allowed Marshall the opportunity to defend herself in court. The Windmons were not prejudiced by undue delay, as Marshall was present and ready to proceed at the initial hearing. Issue 2: Directed verdict The Windmons argue that the court erred by not adhering to the correct legal standard of review in this case because the evidence presented did in fact create a question upon which reasonable jurors could disagree. They argue they established bad faith due to Farm Bureau’s failure to investigate the accident. If there is a finding that there was a reasonable arguable basis to deny the claim then the appellant is not entitled to have the jury consider any bad faith award against the insurance company. Farm Bureau’s conduct was not bad faith because there was a valid and arguable reason to deny the uninsured motorist claim. The facts demonstrate Farm Bureau initially denied the uninsured motorist claim because after reasonable efforts Marshall’s identity had not been discovered. This is an arguable reason. In addition, Farm Bureau correctly points out that even had they been able to quickly identify Marshall after the accident, they would have adopted Marshall’s account of disputed liability, which still justifies denial of the uninsured motorist claim. Issue 3: Punitive damages The Windmons argue that this matter should have been submitted to the jury for a determination of punitive damages. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Farm Bureau delayed any of the Windmons’ claims in bad faith. Farm Bureau’s adjuster was at most simply negligent in her handling of certain aspects of the Windmons’ claims. Therefore, Farm Bureau’s conduct does not rise to a level requiring punitive damages to be considered. Issue 4: Consequential damages The Windmons argue that even if they cannot show bad faith on behalf of Farm Bureau for an award of punitive damages, they may still be entitled to consequential or extra-contractual damages for lack of a reasonably arguable basis. However, Farm Bureau had a reasonably arguable basis for denying the claim. Farm Bureau remained in contact with the Windmons and never mistakenly denied their uninsured motorist claim. Once Marshall’s identity was revealed, Farm Bureau adopted her account of the accident. Moreover, because Farm Bureau then contended the accident was due to Ollie Windmon’s negligence, denial of the claim was proper. Issue 5: Expert testimony The Windmons argue they were prejudiced by the trial court’s dismissal of their witnesses regarding insurance and hedonic damages. At the hearing the Windmons were anticipating the trial court would grant a default judgment in their favor against Marshall. However, they were ready to proceed on the bad faith claim against Farm Bureau. When the trial court attempted to proceed to trial on the issue of Marshall’s liability, the Windmons asserted they would be prejudiced in that aspect. Hence, the court judiciously granted a continuance solely on the issue of liability in an attempt to appease the Windmons’ concerns. Before the trial was continued, the Windmons designated two experts as witnesses. The court disallowed these witnesses based on the premise that the continuance was granted to allow the Windmons the opportunity to further prepare a case on the liability aspect only, not to strengthen their case against Farm Bureau. The Windmons maintain that Farm Bureau would have suffered no prejudice by admittance of the testimony of their experts. Prejudice certainly would have occurred had the trial court allowed the experts at issue to testify. It is apparent the court barred the experts’ testimony in the interests of justice. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion. |
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