Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Williams
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-01249-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-01249-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-20-2006 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: On Direct Appeal: Reversed and Remanded. On Cross-Appeal: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Insurance - Post-trial motions - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Exceptional circumstances - Motion to bifurcate - Section 11-1-65 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ. and Dickinson, J. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ. Dissenting Author : Easley and Graves, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - INSURANCE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-09-2004 Appealed from: Washington County Circuit Court Judge: W. Ashley Hines Disposition: Jury returned a verdict of $150,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. Case Number: 2002-223 |
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| Note: | Motion to Strike filed by the appellant/cross appellee, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, is denied. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company |
JUSTIN L. MATHENY, JOHN P. SNEED, NEIL LLOYD, ERIKA L. CSICSILA, MARCI A. EISENSTEIN,
CATHERINE M. MASTERS |
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| Appellee: | Shirley B. Williams | R. BRITTAIN VIRDEN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Insurance - Post-trial motions - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Exceptional circumstances - Motion to bifurcate - Section 11-1-65 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Shirley Williams’ truck collided with Kenneth Amos’ tractor. Their versions of what occurred differed. The collision crumpled the front left fender of Williams’ vehicle; however, no injuries were recorded, and no emergency vehicles were called. However, Williams was subsequently taken to the Delta Regional Medical Center where she was treated for soreness in her neck, shoulder, back and legs. Williams later received therapy at the Metro Physical Clinic for persistent pain associated with the accident. Her medical bills totaled $8,779.71. Following the accident, Williams filed multiple claims with Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, her auto insurance carrier, for medical expenses, collision damage to her truck, rental car expenses, and ultimately, uninsured motorist coverage because Amos had no liability insurance coverage on his tractor. Hartford asserted that it immediately began adjusting Williams’ claims and cited the $5,000 maximum medical payment it made to Williams, the total loss value paid to her for the value of her truck, and the $439.32 of the $600.00 maximum it paid to her for rental car expenses. On April 30, 2002, Hartford denied Williams’ UM claim. On May 14, 2002, Williams submitted to Hartford evidence of a default judgment rendered against Amos and urged Hartford to reconsider its decision to deny her claim. Shortly thereafter, Hartford again denied Williams’ UM claim. Williams then filed suit against Hartford, alleging that Hartford breached its contract with her regarding her uninsured motorist coverage and that her uninsured motorist claim was denied in bad faith. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in Williams’ favor, awarding her both compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000, and punitive damages in the amount of $1.5 million. Hartford, who missed its deadline to file post-trial motions, filed a Rule 60(b) motion to have the final judgment vacated due to exceptional circumstances. Hartford’s motion was granted, and Hartford subsequently filed its post-trial motions, which were denied on their merits. Hartford appeals, and Williams cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Post-trial motions A threshold issue that must be determined is whether Hartford’s post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial and for remittitur were timely filed. This issue is pivotal, because the trial judge afforded Hartford the opportunity to file its post-trial motions pursuant to the provisions of Rules 50 and 59. Rule 60(b) provides a trial judge the discretionary capacity to right the unforeseeable wrong without having to undermine important procedural mandates. While Rule 60(b) should only be activated with a scrupulous regard for the aims of finality, when exceptional circumstances are deemed to exist, trial courts retain the discretionary authority to vacate judgments whenever that action is appropriate to accomplish justice. Hartford failed to file its post-trial motions for JNOV, new trial and remittitur within the ten-day limitations period following the entry of final judgment. Under Rules 50 and 59, a party must file post-trial motions not later than ten days after judgment. Importantly, the evidence before the circuit court indicates that Hartford did not receive notice of judgment until May 28, 2004. Even more important is evidence that Hartford made several inquiries to the circuit clerk before and after the entry of judgment and was informed each time that no judgment had been entered. The trial judge found exceptional circumstances because Hartford did not receive written notice of the entry of judgment as required by M.R.C.P. 77(d), and Hartford was misinformed upon verbal inquiry to the circuit clerk’s office. To this end, the trial judge appropriately found excusable neglect. Therefore, this issue, as raised by Williams in her cross-appeal, is without merit. Issue 2: Motion to bifurcate Hartford argues that when the trial court denied its pre-trial motion to bifurcate and separate the contract claim issues from the bad faith issues, it committed reversible error. Hartford, in filing its motion to bifurcate, correctly recognized that in cases involving a claim for punitive damages, evidence regarding such damages must be presented in a separate phase of the trial. A bad faith refusal claim is an “independent tort” separable in both law and fact from the contract claim asserted by an insured under the terms of the policy. In clear terms, section 11-1-65 mandates that all evidence regarding the punitive damages issue be tried in a separate evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact, if but only if, the jury has awarded some measure of compensatory damages. As such, the clear intent of the legislature was to prevent issue confusion and to create a barrier between testimony regarding the fundamental issue of liability and the inflammatory issue of egregious conduct. Only if the jury has determined that compensatory damages are appropriate, may the jury hear the evidence concerning the issue of punitive damages. By allowing all issues to be tried in a single phase of the trial in this case, the trial court allowed the jury to hear inflammatory evidence regarding alleged abuses committed by Hartford in handling and ultimately denying Williams’ UM claim. Thus, the case is remanded for a new trial. |
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