Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher


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Docket Number: 2005-IA-00586-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-20-2006
Opinion Author: Carlson, J.
Holding: REVERSED AND RENDERED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Amendment of complaint - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15 - Fictitious parties - M.R.C.P. 9(h)
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ. and Dickinson, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Easley and Graves, JJ.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-01-2005
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: Denied Appellant's Motion to Dismiss
Case Number: 251-02-390-CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: RALPH WALKER, INC.




ROBERT R. STEPHENSON



 

Appellee: MICHAEL E. GALLAGHER WENDY SCHENIQUE WILSON, WILLIE T. ABSTON  

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Topic: Personal injury - Amendment of complaint - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15 - Fictitious parties - M.R.C.P. 9(h)

Summary of the Facts: Michael Gallagher was struck by an eighteen-wheeler tractor and trailer rig driven by Dwayne Anders, an employee of Randy Hunt Trucking, Inc., which was a corporation owned and operated by Randy Hunt. Anders allegedly ran a red light. Gallagher filed suit two years and ten months after the collision, but within the three-year statute of limitations. In his original complaint, which contained allegations of negligence, Gallagher named as defendants Dwayne Anders, Randy Hunt, and Randy Hunt Trucking, Inc. During discovery, Gallagher became aware of the existence of Ralph Walker, Inc., which owned the trailer that Anders was pulling at the time of the accident. At that time, Anders was primarily hauling loads under Walker’s direction. Gallagher filed a motion requesting the trial court’s permission to file his first amended complaint, which would include Walker in the lawsuit. The judge granted Gallagher’s motion to amend the complaint, and almost five years after the collision, Gallagher filed his first amended complaint, adding Ralph Walker, Inc. as a defendant. Walker later filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that because the first amended complaint had been filed outside the three-year period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations, it was time barred and should be dismissed. The judge denied Walker’s motion to dismiss, and Walker filed a motion for certification for interlocutory appeal, which the trial judge also denied. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: M.R.C.P. 15(a) allows a party to amend a pleading subject to certain timeliness requirements, or otherwise, by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. An amended pleading which is changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original pleading under section (c) when certain requirements are met. Walker first argues that because no party was actually changed here, and instead Walker’s name was added later, the rule does not apply. Rule 15 applies here as it clearly contemplates a new party to be added by the amendment, as one can easily see in the comment to the rule. The three requirements of a complaint that changes a named defendant are: the claim in the amended complaint must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that set forth in the original complaint; the newly-named defendant must have received notice of the action within the 120 days; and the newly-named defendant must have or should have known that an action would be brought against him within the 120 days unless a mistake existed as to the parties’ identities. The first “same conduct, transaction, or occurrence” requirement is clearly met in this case, as both complaints refer to the May 18, 1999, collision. Walker did not receive notice of the institution of the action within 120 days after the filing of the complaint. The original complaint was filed on March 21, 2002, and during the next 120 days after the filing of the original complaint, only two events occurred. On April 18, 2002, the original three defendants were served with a copy of the complaint and summons and the plaintiff’s first discovery requests. On May 6, 2002, those defendants filed their answers to the complaint and their discovery requests. Walker was not even named as a defendant until April 2004. Gallagher offers no proof or evidence outside of speculative theories that Walker had notice sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1). Gallagher puts forward several theories that Walker must in some way have been given knowledge of the suit within the 120 days. However, the litigation did not begin until almost three years after the accident, and the existence of damage to Walker’s trailer is simply insufficient to prove Walker’s knowledge of litigation. A delay in delivery and the existence of a business relationship also do not automatically rise to the level of putting Walker on notice of the existence of a lawsuit, particularly when Walker was not brought into the proceedings until almost two years after the complaint was filed. The exception for fictitious parties under M.R.C.P. 9(h) do not apply, since there must be a substitution of a true party name for a fictitious one, which is not the case today. Gallagher did not have knowledge of Walker or name any fictitious party to determine Walker’s identity.


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