Wilner v. White, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2003-CT-01733-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-01733-COA ; 2003-CA-01733-COA ; 2003-CT-01733-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-18-2006 Opinion Author: CARLSON, J. Holding: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Medical malpractice - Amended complaint - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2) Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): DIAZ, J. Dissenting Author : EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-16-2003 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Kathy King Jackson Disposition: Granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment Case Number: CI-98-0054(1) |
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| Note: | This case is before us on writ of certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Appellees/Petitioners, M. Neil White, M.D., and Gulf Coast OB/GYN, P. A., were added as parties to this action in the Circuit Court of Jackson County by an amended complaint; however, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the doctor and his clinic, finding the applicable statute of limitations had expired by the time the amended complaint was filed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Finding here that the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | IRIS M. WILNER
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JACK C. PICKETT, HENRI M. SAUNDERS |
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| Appellee: | M. NEIL WHITE, M.D., AND GULF COAST OB/GYN, P.A. | JOHN A. BANAHAN, MATTHEW FLOYD JONES, MELINDA OWEN JOHNSON |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Medical malpractice - Amended complaint - M.R.C.P. 9(h) - Relation back - M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Iris Wilner underwent diagnostic laparoscopy, performed by Dr. Neil White at Singing River Hospital. She was later diagnosed with compression neuropathy after experiencing weeks of pain, weakness, and numbness in her left leg. Wilner filed suit naming Singing River Hospital, a nurse, and John Does 1-4 as the defendants. Exactly two years after the laparascopy, and nearly one year after the the named defendants filed responsive pleadings, Wilner, without leave of court, filed an amended complaint naming four additional defendants, including Dr. White and Gulf Coast OB/GYN, P.A. The same day she filed her amended complaint, Wilner also filed a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint. White later filed a motion to dismiss because no leave of court had been granted to amend the complaint before the two-year statute of limitations expired. The trial court denied Wilner’s motion for leave to amend, finding the motion to be a nullity, and dismissed the putative amended complaint, because there were never any proceedings to allow the amendment, nor was consent of the adverse party given. The trial court also found the amendment could not relate back to the original complaint. Wilner appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint and remanded the case with instructions that the amendment be allowed and that the case proceed. Following remand, White filed a motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court granted White’s summary judgment motion, finding that, because the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(c), the amended complaint was time-barred. Wilner again appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Wilner filed a motion for rehearing which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in King v. American RV Centers, Inc., 862 So. 2d 558 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) to prevent Wilner from losing her day in court. In King, the Court held that that the trial court erred in dismissing an amended complaint, which was filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, although the plaintiff could not technically file an amended complaint because there was no original complaint to amend. The Court found that at the time the plaintiff filed the amended complaint he could have filed an original complaint; therefore, he should not lose his day in court because of the technicality. In Wilner’s case, the Court of Appeals held that she not be denied the opportunity to proceed even though she filed suit against the new parties before the statute of limitations ran and had a summons and a complaint (although designated as an amended complaint) served on the new parties within the period of time required by M.R.C.P. 4(h). The Court of Appeals is mistaken in its assumption that Wilner could have properly named the new parties in a separate complaint. Had Wilner done this, she would have offended the long-standing principal of law in Mississippi prohibiting a party from splitting a cause of action into the subject of two different actions. To the extent that King could be interpreted to allow a party to split causes of action, King is expressly overruled. Wilner appears to be utilizing M.R.C.P. 9(h) in this case to amend her complaint. Rule 9(h) pleadings are not considered amendments changing a party against whom a claim is asserted and are allowed under M.R.C.P. 15(c) to relate back to the date of the original pleading. In order for Rule 9(h) to apply, there must be a substitution of a true party name for a fictitious one. This is not the case here. Wilner did name four “John Doe” defendants in his original complaint, but did not substitute White’s name for a “John Doe,” but simply added White’s name. The four “John Does” remained as named defendants in the amended complaint. This is an improper substitution of parties under Rule 9(h). Wilner can seek no shelter from Rule 9(h), and her amended complaint cannot relate back under Rule 15(c)(2). Thus, the only way for the claims in the amended complaint against White to relate back to the original complaint would be if Wilner can meet the other requirements of Rule 15(c). When an amended complaint changes or adds a party, those requirements are: the claim in the amended complaint must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that set forth in the original complaint; the newly-named defendant must have received notice of the action within the period provided by M.R.C.P. 4(h) such that the party will not be prejudiced; and the newly-named defendant must have or should have known that an action would be brought against him but for a mistake existing as to the parties’ identities. Both complaints refer to the January 27, 1997, laparoscopy. The second requirement is also met. There is no doubt that White knew enough within 120 days of the original complaint that he would have suffered no prejudice to be named a party to the action. White’s name was mentioned in the body of the original complaint, and White was deposed months before trial. However, Wilner fails to meet the test in M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2) which essentially asks whether, because of the existence of a mistake as to the parties’ identities on the part of the movant or complainant, the newly-named defendant did not know that an action would be brought against him within the prescribed time. There can be no attempt to assert that a mistake was made concerning White’s identity. White’s name actually appears in the body of the original complaint itself. Wilner admits that months before she filed her motion to amend, she was well aware of the possibility of a claim she might have against White. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the putative amended complaint. |
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