Owens Corning v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2001-CA-01285-SCT Linked Case(s): 2001-CA-01285-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-18-2004 Opinion Author: Cobb, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Indemnity - Remoteness - Proximate cause - Unjust enrichment/restitution - Fraud - Antitrust violations Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Smith, P.J., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, P.J., Diaz and Graves, JJ. Dissenting Author : Easley, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-17-2001 Appealed from: Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge: Lamar Pickard Disposition: Entered summary judgment in favor of R.J. Reynolds based on the "remoteness doctrine" and directed entry of final judgment against all of Owens Corning’s claims pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b). Case Number: 96-0065 |
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| Note: | nature of case: filed suit against, among others, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, complaining that smoking Salem cigarettes damaged his health. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Owens Corning |
WALTER GARNER WATKINS, JR.
ALEXANDRA FRANCOISE MARKOV
NATHANIEL ALANDAS ARMISTAD
TIM D. GRAY
THOMAS GERRY BUFKIN
DANIEL J. MULHOLLAND
CARROLL RHODES
RICHARD L. FORMAN
WALTER G. WATKINS, III
MATTHEW S. STEFFEY
RICHARD A. BROWN |
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| Appellee: | R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited, f/k/a British American Tobacco Company Limited; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Individually and as Successor by Merger to the American Tobacco Company; Philip Morris USA Inc., f/k/a Philip Morris Incorporated; Altria Group, Inc., f/k/a Philip Morris Companies, Inc.; Liggett Group, Inc.; Liggett & Myers, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company; BATUS Holdings, Inc., f/k/a BATUS, Inc.; RJR Nabisco, Inc.; Brooke Group, Ltd.; American Brands; Fortune Brands, Inc.; Loews Corporation; Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A, Inc., f/k/a The Tobacco Industry Research Committee; and The Tobacco Institute, Inc. | MICHAEL B. WALLACE REBECCA L. HAWKINS WALKER (BILL) JONES, III STUART G. KRUGER TIFFANEE N. WADE JAMES L. SHANNON WILLIE JAMES PERKINS BRUCE R. TEPIKIAN CRAIG E. PROCTOR BRIAN A. JACKSON STEPHEN E. SCHEVE MARK C. CARROLL JAMES E. UPSHAW LONNIE D. BAILEY WILLIAM F. RILEY KEITH W. VAUGHAN KURT D. WEAVER MICHAEL W. ULMER LEWIS W. BELL ROBERT L. GIBBS CHRISTOPHER A. SHAPLEY ANDREA LA’VERNE FORD EDNEY S. JONATHAN SILVERMAN JAMES LAWTON ROBERTSON MARK P. CARAWAY PATRICK S. DAVIES MARK E. LOWES BROOKE FERRIS, III VINCENT T. CHANG THOMAS A. COOK JESSE LEE HOWELL DAVID L. WALLACE SUSAN ST. DENIS WILLIAM E. HOFFMANN WILLIAM L. DURHAM, II JON MARK WEATHERS RICK NOTON TRENT L. WALKER JAMES LAWRENCE WILSON ALEX A. ALSTON JEFFREY P. HUBBARD EDWARD BLACKMON JOE R. COLINGO RICHARD O. BURSON RICHARD MARION TRULY BRYAN HOWARD CALLAWAY JOHN VANDERSTAR PAUL TAYLOR |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Indemnity - Remoteness - Proximate cause - Unjust enrichment/restitution - Fraud - Antitrust violations |
| Summary of the Facts: | This case was originally filed in 1996 by Ezell Thomas in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Thomas, an admitted lifelong smoker, filed suit against, among others, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, complaining that smoking Salem cigarettes damaged his health. In October of 1998, the court granted Thomas’s motion to amend his complaint to join 25 individuals and a corporation, Owens Corning, as plaintiffs, and additional tobacco companies and asbestos companies as defendants. The 26 individuals complained that smoking and asbestos exposure damaged their health; Owens Corning, a former producer of asbestos materials, complained that the tobacco companies were liable for its expenditures on past and future asbestos claims where the asbestos claimants also smoked. Owens Corning had reached a settlement agreement with the individual plaintiffs on their asbestos personal injury claims in which it agreed to pay Thomas and each Jefferson County resident asbestos claimant with whom it had settled, an additional $80,000 if it was successful in its action against the tobacco defendants. Owens Corning now states that it has been required to pay compensatory damages, both by way of judgment and settlement, which ought to have been borne by Tobacco Defendants. The trial court granted tobacco defendants’ motion for partial summary as to Owens Corning’s indemnity claim and entered summary judgment in favor of tobacco defendants based on the “remoteness doctrine” and directed entry of the judgment against all Owens Corning’s claims. Owens Corning appeals, and the tobacco defendants cross-appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Remoteness Owens Corning argues that the tobacco defendants knowingly and intentionally engaged in fraudulent and tortious conduct designed to defraud the public, including companies such as Owens Corning, about the health risks of smoking and the true cause of lung disease and that by effectively shifting liability for smoking related disease to it, tobacco defendants have been unjustly enriched at Owens Corning’s expense. Nine federal courts of appeals and several state appellate courts have rejected claims similar to Owens Corning’s. Regardless of the theory of liability, the courts have determined that injuries to these provider plaintiffs were either too remote to be compensable or were not proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. Owens Corning’s claims hinge on the payment of damage awards to thousands of smoking asbestos claimants and are thus indirect. In light of the recent decision Lane v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 853 So.2d 1144 (Miss. 2003), which holds that the Mississippi Product Liability Act precludes all tobacco cases based on products liability, a claim that smoking caused the damage to the asbestos claimants would fail. Issue 2: Proximate cause Owens Corning argues that there is well-established Mississippi law demonstrating that summary judgment based on proximate cause principles was clear error. However, the issue of proximate causation, as opposed to actual causation, is generally a matter of law, which should be left in the hands of the court. Owens Corning also argues that its claims of unjust enrichment, fraud, and state antitrust violations should be decided using existing principles of proximate cause under Mississippi law and not be decided based on the never before used “remoteness doctrine.” Foreseeability and direct injury are distinct concepts, and substituting the foreseeability test in place of finding the existence of a direct injury is error. Issue 3: Unjust enrichment/restitution Owens Corning argues summary judgment denying its claims of unjust enrichment/restitution was plainly wrong. Owens Corning would have to prove that Tobacco Defendants were liable for injuries suffered by the asbestos claimants, for which the claimants have been compensated by Owens Corning. As stated previously, Tobacco Defendants could not be held liable under the decision of Lane v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 853 So.2d 1144 (Miss. 2003). Issue 4: Fraud Owens Corning argues that the court’s grant of summary judgment on its fraud claim was based solely on its belief that Owens Corning could not satisfy the causation requirement. The elements of fraud include a representation; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; his reliance on the truth; his right to rely thereon; and his consequent and proximate injury. The summary judgment was determined based on remoteness of injury, not egregiousness of conduct. Owens Corning fails to supply any Mississippi cases that support its claim that Mississippi law would prevent summary judgment based on these facts. Therefore, Owens Corning’s claims must fail based on remoteness of injury. Issue 5: Antitrust claims Owens Corning argues that Mississippi’s antitrust statute expressly provides recovery for their indirect injuries and that the remoteness doctrine has never been invoked in reference to an antitrust case. Antitrust injury is narrowly defined by the legislative purpose of preventing anticompetitive conduct -- i.e., conduct that restrains the trade of buyers or sellers within a particular market. There has been no showing of antitrust injuries here. |
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