Columbia Land Dev., LLC v. Sec'y. of State of Miss.
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-02025-SCT | |
| Oral Argument: | 01-20-2004 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-25-2004 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Gaming - Public trust tidelands - Authority of Secretary of State - Section 7-11-11 - Section 29-1-107(2) Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Smith and Waller, P.JJ., Cobb and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Graves, JJ. Dissenting Author : Easley, J. Procedural History: Admin / Agency Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-14-2001 Appealed from: Harrison County Chancery Court Judge: Thomas Wright Teel Disposition: Denied the petition for declaratory action and the subsequent motion to reconsider, for a new trial, or entry of judgment as a matter of law. Case Number: 97-00128 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Columbia Land Development, LLC, Columbia Marketplace, Ltd and Columbia Golf Resort & Casino Corporation |
PAUL J. DELCAMBRE, JR.
BEN HARRY STONE
SCOTT E. ANDRESS
PATRICIA ANN BAILEY |
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| Appellee: | The Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, Eric Clark | DANIEL L. SINGLETARY DAVID M. McMULLAN, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Gaming - Public trust tidelands - Authority of Secretary of State - Section 7-11-11 - Section 29-1-107(2) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Two corporate entities, Columbia Land Development, LLC and Columbia Marketplace, LTD collectively own approximately four hundred acres of real property fronting the Bay of St. Louis. The property is leased to Columbia Golf Resort & Casino Corporation for purposes of developing a resort, including a golf course, hotel, and gaming vessel. Columbia LLC filed an “Application for Standard Lease of Public Trust Tidelands” with the Secretary of State for the purpose of construction of a marina and a gaming vessel. The tidelands where the proposed casino gaming vessel would be located carry a “commercial” designation under the Coastal Wetlands Use Plan. The Secretary of State required a ruling from the Mississippi Gaming Commission that the site was on the Bay of St. Louis and not on a river or bayou leading into the Bay. Columbia GR&C filed an application with the Mississippi Gaming Commission for a license to conduct gaming. The Gaming Commission unanimously voted to grant site approval, and there was no challenge to the Gaming Commission’s action. Despite the approval from the Gaming Commission, the Secretary of State denied the lease and stated that the site did not satisfy the geographical requirements of the Mississippi Gaming Control Act of 1990. Columbia LLC filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Mandatory Injunction. The Secretary of State filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied, and a Renewed Motion to Dismiss which was also denied. After a trial was held, the chancellor denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. Columbia appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The question in this case is who has authority to act as the trustee of the public trust tidelands. Columbia argues that the responsibility falls upon the Legislature and is nondelegable, while the Secretary of State asserts that he is the trustee for all public lands in Mississippi, including the public trust tidelands. The tidelands are a part of the public trust. The State of Mississippi is the trustee of the public trust tidelands and may, by statute, vest in others the authority to do acts which the trustee cannot practicably be expected to perform. The Legislature, in section 7-11-11, has given the Secretary of State charge of the swamp and the overflowed lands and indemnity lands in lieu thereof, the internal improvement lands, the lands forfeited to the state for nonpayment of taxes after the time allowed by law for redemption shall have expired, and of all other public lands belonging to or under the control of the state. In addition, the Secretary of State has been given, in section 29-1-107(2), the discretion to enter into leases involving the public tideland property. Columbia argues that once the Mississippi Gaming Commission approved the site for gaming, the Secretary of State was required to enter into a lease of the public trust tidelands. However, it is the Secretary of State’s constitutional duty to exercise discretion in a manner consistent with the public policy as stated in the Tidelands Act. There is no statutory or constitutional provision or common law pronouncement directing the Secretary of State to consider any specific criteria in making a determination as to whether to lease the public trust tidelands. Absent a higher public interest, the natural state of the public trust tidelands is paramount. Columbia argues that the Secretary of State’s concerns (environmental, economical, and opposition from constituents) fall within the purview of the various agencies which have been given statutory authority to make these determinations. However, the Secretary’s role as trustee is much broader in scope than that of these various agencies regarding the public trust tidelands. Columbia also argues that section 29-1-107(2) is unconstitutional because it is vague and an ordinary person of common intelligence upon reading the statute cannot understand what actions are permissible. The Tidelands Act does not guarantee a lease for gaming. Only where, in the discretion of the Secretary of State, with approval from the Governor, it is determined that the granting of a lease would serve a higher purpose than to preserve the natural state of the tidelands, may the littoral landowner be granted a lease. Merely because the discretion may be interpreted in different lights does not automatically render it vague. |
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