Webb v. Braswell, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-01438-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-25-2006 Opinion Author: CARLSON, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Malpractice - Misrepresentation - Amendment of pleadings - M.R.C.P. 15 - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley and Dickinson, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: RANDOLPH, J. CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRIT Non Participating Judge(s): COBB, P.J., AND DIAZ, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Randolph, J., Without Separate Written Opinion Concurs in Result Only: GRAVES, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-01-2004 Appealed from: Bolivar County Circuit Court Judge: Al Smith Disposition: Granted Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees Case Number: 98-0095 |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2004-IA-01566-SCT Robert W. Webb, Jr. and Senora B. Webb v. First National Bank of Rosedale; Bolivar Circuit Court 1st District; LC Case #: 98-0095; Ruling Date: 07/26/2004; Ruling Judge: Albert Smith, III | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ROBERT W. WEBB, JR. AND SENORA B. WEBB |
TALBOT O. McCAIN |
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| Appellee: | CHRIS BRASWELL, JACKSON AND BRASWELL, P.A. AND FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROSEDALE | S. DAVID NORQUIST, GERALD H. JACKS, KATHY R. CLARK |
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| Topic: | Malpractice - Misrepresentation - Amendment of pleadings - M.R.C.P. 15 - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Robert and Senora Webb farmed 1,600 acres of farmland. During these years of farming, the Webbs had secured crop production loans by hiring accountant Chris Braswell of the Cleveland Certified Public Accounting firm of Jackson and Braswell, P.A. Braswell was able to secure loans from Valley Bank in Greenwood on behalf of the Webbs. In the early spring of 1997, Braswell informed the Webbs that Valley Bank would not make a loan to them that year to fund their farming operation; however, Braswell felt he could obtain that year’s loan from First National Bank of Rosedale. First National required numerous conditions to be met prior to approving the loan, such as a requirement that the Webbs file for bankruptcy. In May of 1997, Braswell informed the Webbs that First National would not provide them the loan. The Webbs filed this lawsuit against both First National Bank of Rosedale and the Braswell defendants, claiming various causes of action, including breach of contract and malpractice. The Braswell defendants filed a motion “to enforce agreement of plaintiffs to dismiss all claims against them with prejudice,” based on an alleged agreement between the lawyers to do so. The trial judge denied this motion because he was unable to determine if such an agreement actually existed. This is the basis for the Braswell defendants’ cross-appeal. The Webbs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, adding new claims against both First National and the Braswell defendants, and seeking damages for future lost profits in unplanted crops. Some of these claims included breach of implied contracts, breach of duty of good faith, fraud, estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Many of these claims were based on information the Webbs asserted they learned for the first time through discovery. First National filed a combined motion to exclude new expert testimony and for a partial summary judgment. The Braswell defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the same day. The court entered an order granting First National’s combined motion to exclude expert testimony and for a partial summary judgment. The court also entered an order denying the Webbs’ motion for leave to amend their pleadings because of untimeliness and the resulting undue delay and prejudice to the defendants. Additionally, the judge granted the Braswell defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As to the Braswell defendants, the judge entered a final judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b). As to the order granting First National’s motion for partial summary judgment, and the order denying their motion for leave to amend their complaint, the Webbs requested a certification from the trial court for interlocutory appeal and a stay of the proceedings, pending the outcome of that interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Webbs also appealed the final judgment as to the Braswell defendants on their motion for summary judgment. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Amendment of pleadings The Webbs argue that because M.R.C.P. 15 (a) requires leave shall be freely given when justice so requires, the trial court should have granted their motion for leave to amend the pleadings. While the trial court has discretion to allow an amendment and should do so freely under the proper circumstances, an amendment should not occur when to do so would prejudice the defendant. The Webbs characterize their motion as one for leave to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence as provided under Rule 15(b). The Webbs’ motion is simply not a 15(b) motion. The comment contemplates amending pleadings based on evidence already introduced. The Webbs are actually trying to amend the complaint to include allegations which require new evidence, namely expert testimony. No evidence has been introduced in court. Rule 15(b) exists for the most part for motions based on evidence at trial. The trial judge clearly did not abuse his discretion by denying the Webbs’ motion to amend the pleadings. Amending the complaint was easily possible at a much earlier stage in the litigation, and the Webbs give no good reason why this was not done. Amending the complaint at this stage, well after the discovery deadlines, would without doubt cause undue prejudice to the defendants in the form of delay and cost. Issue 2: Summary judgment Because the motion to amend the pleadings had been denied, the judge found that the only claims against the Braswell defendants which were properly before the court were those claims in the original complaint. Considering the facts and allegations in the light most favorable to the Webbs – that Braswell did actually give the advice as alleged in Count VI – the trial judge found no indication that such statements could give rise to liability, and therefore, the Braswell defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As to the allegations in Count VII, there was no credible or relevant evidence found by the trial judge to indicate that the statements were false at the time Braswell supposedly made them, assuming, arguendo, that Braswell indeed made the statements. Falsity of the statement, along with the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity, are two of the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. After the motion to amend was properly denied, the only counts of wrongdoing against the Braswell defendants before the trial court were the two counts in the original complaint alleging malpractice and misrepresentation. The other purported genuine issues of material fact now argued by the Webbs exist outside these two counts in the original complaint. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Webbs, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to those two counts. Summary judgment was proper, and this issue is without merit. Issue 3: Expert testimony The Webbs argue that the trial abused his discretion in granting the motion of First National to exclude the expert testimony of an agricultural economist whom the Webbs presented to testify to their claims of damages based on future lost profits for unplanted crops. For expert testimony to be admissible under M.R.E. 702, it must be both relevant and reliable. To be relevant and reliable, the testimony must be scientifically valid and capable of being applied to the facts at issue. In today’s case, the testimony was proffered for one purpose, to show damages of lost profits as a result of unplanted crops. The Webbs brought this testimony forward without ever establishing that they were profitable. Rather, the Webbs had been farming and operating at a loss in the years prior to the farming year which is the subject of this litigation. Therefore, the amount of damage allegedly resulting from the unplanted crops was not reasonably ascertainable based on the Webbs’ past experience, as the rule requires. Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in granting First National’s motion. Since the judge was correct in denying the Webbs any recovery from claims based on unplanted crops, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to those claims, and First National was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law concerning those claims. |
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