East Miss. State Hosp., et al. v. Callens
| Docket Number: | 2000-CT-00258-SCT Linked Case(s): 2000-CA-00258-COA ; 2000-CA-00258-COA ; 2000-CT-00258-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-15-2004 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part and Rendered in Part |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Section 1983 action - Administrative remedy - Whistleblower - Qualified immunity - Causation - Punitive damages - Tort Claims Act - Attorneys’ fees Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Dissenting Author : Easley, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: State Boards and Agencies |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-26-1999 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: L. Breland Hilburn Disposition: PLAINTIFF IS AWARDED A JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $289,569.14. Case Number: 251-96-969CIV |
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| Note: | The Judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed, and the Judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County is Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Rendered in Part. The Supreme Court held that a state employee could assert a Section 1983 claim in state court as a opposed to requiring that that claim be asserted to an administrative hearing. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | East Mississippi State Hospital, The Mississippi Department of Mental Health, Dr. Ramiro J. Martinez and Roger McMurtry |
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAWRENCE ARTHUR SCHEMMEL |
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| Appellee: | Jimmy B Callens | MARY MARVEL FYKE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Section 1983 action - Administrative remedy - Whistleblower - Qualified immunity - Causation - Punitive damages - Tort Claims Act - Attorneys’ fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jimmy Callens was terminated from his position as Program Director for the Adolescent Unit of the East Mississippi State Hospital prior to the end of his one-year probationary period. He sought relief first through his former employer and then through the Employee Appeals Board. Upon receiving an adverse decision from the EAB hearing officer, he did not appeal to the full Board but instead filed an original action in state court alleging his termination was due to the exercise of his First Amendment right to speak out on matters of public concern, such a claim being actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He was awarded damages by a jury plus an award by the judge of attorneys' fees and expenses, as well as damages under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Administrative remedy Callens argues that he should not have to litigate his § 1983 action through a state administrative remedy. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), the Supreme Court found that a person raising § 1983 claims was not required to first exhaust state administrative remedies. In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the Court found that a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute was preempted where there was an attempt to apply such a statute in a state court § 1983 action. The decision in the current case hinges on the official vs. individual capacities of the individual defendants. While state officials can be subject to personal liability in § 1983 actions, state agencies and state employees sued in their official capacities are not subject to liability in § 1983 actions. Factors to use in determining whether defendants have been sued in their personal (individual) or official capacities are allegations in the complaint, nature of relief sought, and nature of defenses pled. While Callens’s original complaint makes no reference to persons acting in their official or personal capacities, the first paragraph of his complaint shows that Callens sought § 1983 relief against only the individual defendants, Martinez and McMurtry. Federal-law complaints against persons in their individual capacities are not required to go through the Employee Appeals Board and therefore, the § 1983 claim against Martinez and McMurtry was properly before the circuit court. Martinez and McMurtry argue that their interest in protecting the workplace outweighed Callens’s interest in speaking out, because Callens stepped outside the chain of authority by going straight to McMurtry rather than through Martinez. The public has an interest in government employees’ freedom to blow the whistle on improper practices, as Callens did in his letter to McMurtry. Even if Callens’s speech were on a matter of public concern and led to his dismissal, the court must determine whether the government’s interests as an employer outweighed the plaintiff’s right as a citizen to speak out. Factors the court should consider include whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or harmony among co-workers; whether the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; whether the speech impeded the employee's ability to perform her responsibilities; the time, place, and manner of the speech; the context within which the underlying dispute arose; whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decision-making; and whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public. Even though Callens went over Martinez’s head to McMurtry, Callens was speaking on a matter of unquestionable public concern, the alleged odious abuse and neglect of minors in the State’s care; Callens did not call up the local television news channel or request an interview with a newspaper reporter but kept his complaints within the MDMH; and the defendants failed to show any serious disruption as a result of Callens’s letter. With regard to causation, the State argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find any causal connection between Callens’s letter and his firing. Considering all the evidence and the short interval between discovery of the letter by his superiors and his termination, a reasonable jury certainly could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that the letter was a motivating factor in the termination of Callens. However, while the facts are sufficient to uphold a jury verdict against Martinez, they will not suffice to uphold that verdict against McMurtry. There is no evidence to support a finding that McMurtry told Martinez to fire Callens, and there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Thus, McMurtry enjoyed qualified immunity. In addition, the jury had substantial evidence from which to infer that Callens’s work and professionalism were not found wanting by Martinez until he learned that Callens had gone over his head to McMurtry via the letter. Thus, the jury was justified in finding that Martinez had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination would have happened when and how it did, regardless of the letter. The State also argues that the jury instructions were faulty, because the instructions referred to ‘Defendant,’ ‘Defendants,’ ‘Defendants’,’ and ‘Defendant’s’ throughout, implying all named defendants. However, a review of the instructions shows that the only instructions that used the blanket term “Defendants” were those offered by the defense. Issue 2: Punitive damages Callens argues that the court erroneously denied a punitive damages instruction. Not only did counsel for Callens fail to seek to have the jury instructed on punitive damages after the verdict was returned, he failed to present to the trial court any post-trial motion alleging error on this point. Therefore, there is no basis on which to rule that state law impeded Callens’s substantive rights under federal law. Issue 3: Tort Claims Act The defendants offer nothing to indicate that the court was in error by awarding the sum of $50,000 under the Tort Claims Act. Consistent with the provisions of the Act, the award is affirmed against the state agencies, East Mississippi State Hospital and the Mississippi Department of Mental Health, and not against the individual defendants, Martinez and McMurtry. Issue 4: Attorneys’ fees Based on the totality of the record, the court was justified in its award of § 1988 attorney's fees and expenses in the amount of $114,569.14. This award was appropriate as against the state agency defendants and Martinez, but not as to McMurtry. |
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