Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. McDaniel, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00389-SCT Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00389-SCT ; 2005-CA-00389-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: |
Opinion Date: 06-15-2006 Opinion Author: Smith, C.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Settlement agreement - Motion to reconsider - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 - Releases - Statute of limitations - 45 U.S.C. § 56 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Diaz, Easley, Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Cobb, P.J. CONCURS IN PART Non Participating Judge(s): Randolph, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Cobb, P.J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part Without Separate Written Opinion Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-08-2004 Appealed from: Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge: Lamar Pickard Case Number: 2000-100 |
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| Note: | LINK INACTIVE | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Illinois Central Railroad Company |
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| Appellee: | Milton McDaniel and Bettye C. McWilliams, Executrix of the Estate of Larry McWilliams, Deceased AND Kelly C. Robinson v. Illinois Central Railroad Company; |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Settlement agreement - Motion to reconsider - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 - Releases - Statute of limitations - 45 U.S.C. § 56 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Plaintiffs filed suit against Illinois Central Railroad Company in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, asserting claims for asbestos related personal injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act. Prior to the commencement of trial in the matter, ICRR entered into a contingent settlement agreement with the remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed two separate motions with the circuit court to enforce the settlement agreement on behalf of a small number of the remaining plaintiffs, more than two years after the contingent settlement was agreed upon. After several hearings, the circuit court granted, in part, and denied, in part the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and overruled ICRR’s motion to dismiss, and to compel production, to allow further investigation and discovery, and for findings and conclusions of law. ICRR appeals, and plaintiffs’ counsel filed a cross-appeal on behalf of plaintiff Kelly Robinson. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Settlement agreement ICRR argues that the court committed reversible error by granting the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement and ordering ICRR to pay the requisite settlement amounts, in light of false affidavits submitted to ICRR by the plaintiffs. Specifically, ICRR claims two of the plaintiffs, McDaniel and McWilliams, excluded information from their affidavits regarding their status as named plaintiffs in separate and additional asbestos cases. There is no evidence in the record to indicate ICRR was prejudiced by the absence of two additional asbestos cases from the plaintiffs’ affidavits. The absence of the cases in the affidavits at issue was inadvertent, not willful and intentional as ICRR insists. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. All attorneys should nonetheless heed the circuit court’s warning that swearing to false or incorrect statements could result in a myriad of dire consequences. Issue 2: Motion to reconsider ICRR argues the circuit court abused its discretion when it failed to reconsider its findings in light of newly discovered evidence. The majority of ICRR’s argument on newly discovered evidence consisted of a rehash of ICRR’s previous arguments regarding the absence of the asbestos cases from the plaintiffs’ affidavits. Although the preference is for trial courts to make separate particularized findings of fact and conclusions of law, general findings of fact and conclusions of law do not require reversal, and they technically conform to the requirements of M.R.C.P. 52. In this case, the circuit court made several findings on the record regarding its decision to deny ICRR’s motion. In accordance with the circuit court’s on-the-record findings, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied ICRR’s motion. Issue 3: Releases ICRR argues it need not tender payment to either McDaniel or McWilliams because both previously released their asbestos claims against ICRR. In 1998, while employed by ICRR, McDaniel suffered a career ending back injury when he attempted to set a defective hand brake. As part of the back injury settlement, McDaniel signed a document titled Final Settlement Release and Agreement Not to Return to Work. The language of this document released ICRR for a number of ailments, including exposure to asbestos. To be valid, a release must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him. The only known injury at the time McDaniel signed the release was the severe back injury he suffered as a result of a defective hand brake. There is no evidence McDaniel was aware he may have a potential asbestos-related injury. Therefore, the release McDaniel signed would not bar him from settlement. McWilliams, a former ICRR employee, entered into settlement negotiations with ICRR after being diagnosed with asbestosis. In accordance with the settlement agreement, McWilliams submitted the requisite supporting documentation regarding his illness, and ICRR agreed to payment. Prior to tendering payment, ICRR forwarded a release to McWilliams for his asbestos related injuries. McWilliams signed the release and returned a copy of it to ICRR along with a letter explicitly stating “[t]he enclosed copies are not effective until such time as payment set forth above has been made by ICRR.” Approximately one week later McWilliams sent an additional letter notifying ICRR he had been diagnosed with cancer and would be withdrawing his claim, for which he had not been paid. Pursuant to the settlement agreement between the parties, McWilliams was allowed to change his type of claim because he notified ICRR of his change of diagnosis prior to payment. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its findings. Issue 4: Statute of limitations On cross-appeal, Robinson argues the circuit court erred in finding the applicable FELA three-year statute of limitations, under 45 U.S.C. § 56, had run as to his claim. In 1989, well over three years before this case was filed, Robinson was diagnosed with pulmonary fibrosis. There is nothing in the record demonstrating Robinson met his burden of proving he commenced his action within the three-year limitation period. |
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