Allen v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-01106-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-27-2006 Opinion Author: CARLSON, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - M.R.C.P. 37 - Bad faith - Due process Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., GRAVES, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Dissenting Author : DIAZ AND EASLEY, JJ. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-27-2005 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Dismissing Allen’s case pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(b), based on its finding that Allen willfully violated the discovery rules by repeatedly failing to disclose his 1993 back injury and claim during the discovery process. Case Number: 251-03-509 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | CRAIG ALLEN |
TERESA EARLEY HARVEY,
SAMUEL JAY ROSENTHAL |
||
| Appellee: | NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION | KENNETH DAVID McLEAN, GEORGE H. RITTER |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Personal injury - M.R.C.P. 37 - Bad faith - Due process |
| Summary of the Facts: | While working as an assistant conductor for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), Craig Allen suffered a spinal injury while unloading baggage on the job in Jackson. Allen sued Amtrak pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County. During discovery, Amtrak asked Allen if he had ever suffered a similar injury or filed a workers’ compensation claim. Allen denied that he had ever suffered a previous back injury or filed a workers’ compensation claim. Later, after the close of discovery, Amtrak learned that Allen not only had in fact previously suffered disc injuries to his lower back in the same location, but that Allen had also filed a claim and received a workers’ compensation award for that earlier injury. Because of Allen’s false responses, given under oath, Amtrak filed for sanctions in the form of a motion to dismiss under the provisions of M.R.C.P. 37. The trial court granted Amtrak’s motion and dismissed Allen’s case with prejudice. Allen appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Bad faith Allen argues that there was insufficient evidence of willfulness or bad faith on his part to justify a dismissal of his lawsuit, because he merely forgot about his earlier injury and workers’ compensation claim since this prior injury did not cause him much pain, did not cause him a significant loss of work, and did not diminish his ability to earn an income. In determining if a trial court has abused its discretion in dismissing a case with prejudice under Rule 37, the court should consider whether the failure to comply with the court’s order results from wilfulness or bad faith, whether the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions, whether the other party’s preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced, and whether neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client or a party’s simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court’s orders. During discovery, Allen had multiple opportunities to report the 1993 accident to Amtrak, but never did. When directly asked during his deposition, Allen denied ever having filed a workers’ compensation claim, ever having been involved in a car accident with the exception of an unrelated mid-1980s accident, and ever having received other medical treatment for his back. Looking at what specific details of his life Allen was able to remember easily, coupled with the 2000 medical records proving Allen told his doctor about the 1993 accident, the trial judge found that a pattern most definitely existed. Without question, on today’s record the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making his ruling. Allen’s argument that an accident occurring eight years earlier was far enough away in time to have been easily forgotten weakens when considering the undisputed fact that Allen told his family physician about the 1993 incident in 2000, only one year before the injury giving rise to this litigation, and seven years after the earlier injury occurred. In addition, Allen’s 2000 revelation to his physician about the 1993 accident was documented in a medical report which Allen failed to produce in response to Amtrak’s discovery request. Additionally, Amtrak’s preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Allen also argues that the trial court should have allowed credibility determinations to be made by the jury inasmuch as FELA states a preference for the fact-finder to do so. However, the trial judge did not consider the evidence to make a substantive determination of whether sufficient evidence existed to present a jury question of causation, but rather the trial judge examined evidence of Allen’s discovery violations to make a procedural determination whether his pretrial conduct was willful. The courts of this State may properly utilize the Mississippi procedural rules in hearing federal law claims, but look to the federal law at issue to adjudicate matters of substantive rights of the parties. The trial judge in this case did nothing more than apply Mississippi procedural law to a dismissal under Rule 37. Issue 2: Due process Allen argues that the trial court’s failure to allow him to testify on his own behalf at the hearing on the Rule 37 motion violated his due process rights. In reality, Allen’s counsel merely informed the trial court that Allen was present to testify if the court felt his live testimony would be helpful. The trial court did not find it necessary to hear from Allen in order to rule in the case. Once the trial court announced that it would not hear from Allen by way of sworn testimony from the witness stand, neither Allen nor his counsel raised a due process violation for the trial court to consider. Failure to preserve this issue for appeal purposes renders this issue procedurally barred. In addition, all that due process requires in cases of dismissal under Rule 37 is that the trial court make a finding of willfulness or bad faith on the part of the party whose claims were adversely affected, which the trial court in today’s case properly did. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
