Harrison County Dev. Comm'n v. Daniels Real Estate, Inc., et al.


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Docket Number: 2000-CA-00427-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2000-CA-00427-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Date: 06-10-2004
Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and Rendered

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Priority jurisdiction - Tort Claims Act - § 1982 claim
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Carlson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Dickinson, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Easley and Graves, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-03-2000
Appealed from: Harrison County Circuit Court
Judge: John H. Whitfield
Disposition: Entered a judgment finding the Commission negligent and, following a bench trial on damages only, awarded Daniels Real Estate and WJZD $647,260 in damages.
Case Number: A24019800081

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Harrison County Development Commission




DAVID W. CRANE



 

Appellee: Daniels Real Estate, Inc. and WJZD, Inc. FELICIA DUNN BURKES  

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Topic: Contract - Priority jurisdiction - Tort Claims Act - § 1982 claim

Summary of the Facts: Daniels Real Estate, Inc., purchased a tract of land in the Bernard Bayou Industrial District, which is one of the industrial parks created and maintained by the Harrison County Development Commission. A special warranty deed to Daniels, which contained a buy-back option or reverter clause, was signed by the Commission and approved by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors. The buy-back option provided that the Commission could buy back the parcel for $58,500 if construction was not commenced for the purposes specified in the deed within one year after the sale of the property. Shortly after the property purchase was complete, Daniels conveyed the property to WJZD, Inc., an entity for which Stanley J. Daniels was the CEO. The Commission notified Daniels that it was in breach of the deed's construction obligation and later sought to amend the deed by modifying the covenants to give Daniels additional time in which to comply with the construction requirements. Daniels filed an action in the Harrison County Chancery Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and asking the chancery court to resolve the disagreement over interpretation of the deed and to enjoin the Commission from recording an amendment to the deed. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment which the court denied. After filing a motion to transfer the action to the Harrison County Circuit Court, Daniels filed a complaint against the Commission in the Harrison County Circuit Court alleging that the special warranty deed was negligently drafted and asking for monetary damages. The Commission moved to dismiss the suit, and the court dismissed the suit. Daniels then served notice of the complaint on the Commission, and the court granted Daniels's motion to re-open the case and resume testimony. Daniels filed a second action in the Harrison County Circuit Court, this time naming both Daniels Real Estate and WJZD as plaintiffs and naming the Harrison County Development Commission and the Harrison County Board of Supervisors as defendants. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to consolidate and continue the actions. After consolidating the actions, the court entered a judgment finding the Commission negligent and, following a bench trial on damages only, awarded Daniels Real Estate and WJZD $647,260 in damages. The Commission appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Although the circuit court's consolidation order purports to consolidate the chancery court declaratory action with the two circuit court actions, there was no order in the record transferring the declaratory judgment action to the circuit court, or dismissing it. Therefore, the declaratory judgment action is still pending in the chancery court, the court of priority jurisdiction. The principle of priority jurisdiction is that where two suits between the same parties over the same controversy are brought in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over the whole controversy to the exclusion or abatement of the second suit. Priority of jurisdiction between courts of concurrent jurisdiction is determined by the date the initial pleading is filed. The fact that Daniels subsequently added WJZD, Inc. and the Harrison County Board of Supervisors in the second circuit court suit does not defeat the chancery court’s priority jurisdiction. The provisions of the Tort Claims Act have no application to a pure breach of contract action. Although Daniels and WJZD claim that the Commission negligently drafted the deed in question, the mere recitation of such words as "negligent" and “reckless disregard” in stating the cause of action does not automatically convert a breach of contract cause of action which arose from the sale and conveyance of real property, into a tort cause of action. In addition, Daniels fails to state a cause of action. Finally, the trial court erred in finding that the evidence supported a judgment that the Commission violated § 1982, since the record shows no evidence before the trial court from which it could conclude that the Commission’s conduct was in any way motivated by an intent to racially discriminate against the plaintiffs.


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