West v. West


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Docket Number: 2002-IA-01158-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2002-IA-01158-SCT ; 2002-IA-01158-SCT ; 2002-IA-01158-SCT ; 2002-IA-01158-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Date: 08-12-2004
Opinion Author: Waller, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Unconscionability - Escalation clause - Jurisdiction - Section 93-5-2(3) - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a)
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Cobb, P.J., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Easley, J.
Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J.

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-08-2002
Appealed from: Jones County Chancery Court
Judge: Franklin C. McKenzie, Jr.
Case Number: 94-0191

Note: Link inactive - Motion for Rehearing Granted and opinion found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/OPINIONS/CO22234.PDF .

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Deborah Gayle Thornton West








 

Appellee: Charles Timothy West  

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Topic: Contempt - Property settlement agreement - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Unconscionability - Escalation clause - Jurisdiction - Section 93-5-2(3) - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52(a)

Summary of the Facts: Charles West and Deborah West were divorced in November 1994, after filing a Joint Complaint for Divorce that incorporated a property settlement agreement. Nine years after the divorce, Charles stopped paying what was due pursuant to the agreement. Debbie filed a contempt proceeding. The chancery court found that the agreement was conflicting and confusing, that it was unable to resolve the differences, that there was no meeting of the minds between the Wests as to the alimony provision of the agreement, and that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the issue should be presented anew to the court. The Supreme Court granted Debbie's petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Settlement agreement Debbie argues that the attempt to avoid the alimony and division of marital property provisions is an attempt to void the judgment that became final in 1994 and that none of the limited circumstances providing for relief under M.R.C.P. 60(b) are present. Rule 60 is not applicable to the present case because the complaint was not a motion for relief from a judgment or order. Where ambiguities may be found in a property settlement agreement, it should be construed much as is done in the case of a contract, with the court seeking to gather the intent of the parties. Disagreement over the meaning of a provision of the contract does not make the contract ambiguous. The Wests’ agreement is unambiguous in terms of the amounts to be paid. At the time he executed the agreement, Charles intended to provide one-half of his employment and business income to Debbie, regardless of their marital status to each other or to a third party. The issue of whether the payments are lump-sum alimony, vesting at the time of the agreement, or periodic alimony, with each payment vesting when due, was not raised and is not before the Court. In the event the parties intended, and the chancellor finds, that the payments are periodic alimony, then the agreement should not be disturbed, absent a material change in circumstances. As to marital property, the agreement states that Debbie is entitled to one-half of all existing marital assets, including but not limited to stocks, limited partnerships and business assets. This provision clearly manifests an intent that Charles and Debbie equally share all marital assets. The chancellor found that the agreement was unconscionable but stated no reasons for this conclusion. The record shows that the parties negotiated the terms of the agreement for almost a year before it was submitted to the chancellor for approval. Charles is a sophisticated businessman who acknowledges that he read the agreement. Therefore, the agreement is not unconscionable. The chancellor also found that the agreement contained an illegal escalation clause. Escalation clauses are enforceable even though the agreement turns out to be a raw deal for one party as long as there is no fraud, overreaching, or mistake. A plain reading of the agreement states that it shall increase or decrease in accordance with Charles' salary. The chancellor erred in voiding the alimony and property settlement provisions of the agreement and in concluding that these provisions are ambiguous, unconscionable and contained illegal escalation clauses. Issue 2: Jurisdiction Citing section 93-5-2(3), Debbie argues that the chancellor lacked jurisdiction to try the issues on a complaint seeking an irreconcilable divorce, either initially or anew, in the absence of the parties' express written consent. Her interpretation of the consent requirement of the irreconcilable differences statute is misplaced. The written consent addressed in the statute pertains to the original action and is therefore not at issue here. Issue 3: Findings of fact Debbie argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to enter findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding its judgment and subsequent order. M.R.C.P. 52(a) provides that the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by rule, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. Debbie requested specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in her motion for entry of findings and conclusions, to alter or amend judgment, alternatively, for a new trial. When the court merely concluded that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to alimony and division of marital property, it erred in failing to make the findings Debbie requested.


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