Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, et al.


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2003-CA-00123-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-07-2004
Opinion Author: Carlson, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Jurisdiction of ecclesiastical matter - Breach of fiduciary duty - Fraudulent concealment - Negligence claims - Recusal of judge
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley and Randolph, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Dickinson, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Graves, JJ.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Dickinson, J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Cobb, P.J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-18-2002
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Bobby DeLaughter
Disposition: Granted motion for summary judgment on all counts as to all defendants with the exception of the fraudulent concealment claim against McBride, individually.
Case Number: 251-01-23CIV
  Consolidated: Consolidated with 2003-IA-00439-SCT Jerry McBride v. Julie Mabus; Hinds Circuit Court 1st District; LC Case #: 251-01-23CIV; Ruling Date: 01/06/2003; Ruling Judge: Bobby DeLaughter

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Julie Mabus




KATHRYN N. NESTER SHAWNA A. MURRELL



 

Appellee: St. James Episcopal Church, Episcopal Diocese of Mississippi, Inc., and Jerry McBride CHARLES EDWIN ROSS BRENDA CURRIE JONES DORRANCE AULTMAN CHRISTOPHER OWEN MASSENBURG  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Jurisdiction of ecclesiastical matter - Breach of fiduciary duty - Fraudulent concealment - Negligence claims - Recusal of judge

Summary of the Facts: Julie Mabus filed suit against St. James Episcopal Church, Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Mississippi, and Jerry McBride, a former priest at St. James. She asserted seven separate causes of action against the defendants: breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent retention/supervision, and clergy malpractice, based on McBride’s participation in the surreptitious tape recording of a conversation between Julie, McBride, and Julie’s then-husband, Ray Mabus. All defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, which was denied by the court. After denial of defendants’ Petition For Interlocutory Appeal and petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment based upon the breach of fiduciary duty claims. The court found that summary judgment was appropriate. Defendants then filed a second motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. Julie filed a motion requesting that the judge recuse himself. The motion to recuse was denied, and the motion for summary judgment was granted on all counts as to all defendants with the exception of the fraudulent concealment claim against McBride, individually. Julie appeals. The Court has also granted McBride’s petition for an interlocutory appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Jurisdiction Each defendant argues that this is an ecclesiastical matter and that the Court should abstain from jurisdiction over this matter. To the extent that this case can be considered without pressing into ecclesiastical matters, jurisdiction over the subject matter is not barred by the First Amendment. To invoke the protection of the First Amendment for conduct taking place within his counseling relationships with the plaintiffs, the pastor must assert that the specific conduct allegedly constituting a breach of his professional and fiduciary duties was rooted in religious belief. The transcript does not reveal marital counseling by McBride, but rather a confrontation initiated by Ray in an effort to get his wife to admit to an adulterous affair. Other than the fact that the third person present was a priest, there is no indication of any spiritual or other counseling occurring. Issue 2: Breach of fiduciary duty In a matter of first impression, the issue is whether a parishioner may maintain a cause of action against her priest and/or Church and/or Diocese for breach of fiduciary duty. A priest’s position alone is insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship. To define a reasonable duty standard and to evaluate McBride’s conduct compared to that standard would violate the First Amendment. The next question is whether under these facts, a person who happens to be a priest, can be in a fiduciary relationship with someone who happens to be one of his parishioners. Whether a fiduciary relationship exists depends upon factual circumstances, not upon professional standards of conduct for a reasonable member of the clergy. A fiduciary duty is established whenever there is a relation between two people in which one person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence upon the former, arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust. While Mississippi law does not require any “magic words,” there must be evidence that both parties understood that a special trust and confidence was being reposed. The evidence presented reveals that Julie was not dependent upon McBride, nor that she reposed any trust or confidence in him. When reviewing the transcript of the meeting as well as the entire record, there is no doubt that Julie has failed to prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship between McBride and her. Since McBride cannot be held liable under Julie’s claim of a fiduciary relationship, the Church and/or the Diocese likewise cannot be held liable. Issue 2: Fraudulent concealment McBride argues that the court erred in denying summary judgment as to the fraudulent concealment claim against him, because he did not have a duty to inform Julie that Ray was taping the conversation because it is not illegal or tortious to tape a conversation; Julie relied on a fiduciary relationship to establish a duty and conceded that if McBride was a neighbor next door, she would not have a claim and that she made a strategic decision to plead and allege the silence of McBride and not an affirmative act; that the court failed to follow M.R.C.P. 56 by permitting Julie to file an affidavit subsequent to the hearing; and that the court made unsupported factual and legal inferences concerning the outcome of the Mabus child custody matter thereby impeaching the chancellor’s decision in that case. In order to establish fraud, the plaintiff must prove a representation, its falsity, its materiality, the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, his intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, his reliance on its truth, his right to rely thereon, and his consequent and proximate injury. Clearly, McBride had prior knowledge that Ray was going to tape the conversation on the advice of Ray’s attorney. At all times, McBride was an active participant in obtaining Julie’s statements relating to the affair. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to the fraudulent concealment claim against McBride was proper. However, Julie has shown no facts to prove that the Church or Diocese authorized or ratified McBride’s actions in this case. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment on the fraudulent concealment claim against the Church and Diocese was proper. Issue 3: Negligence claims Julie asserted claims for negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, clergy malpractice, and negligent supervision and retention. While Julie concedes that clergy malpractice claims have been rejected across the country, she argues that courts have recognized the remaining negligence claims without violating the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. It is in the establishment of the duty of McBride, the Church, and the Diocese that would excessively entangle the Court into the investigation and evaluation of religious tenets. Therefore, the judge was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims against all defendants. Issue 4: Recusal of judge Julie argues that the judge erred in denying her recusal motion. Julie bases her claim on a statement by the judge in his memorandum opinion that “The Mabus children, two young girls, twelve and ten years of age, deserve some measure of privacy and this Court is not willing to even incidentally sacrifice that peace of mind upon the altar of their mother’s vain pursuit of lucre.” The test for recusal is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. The statement in the opinion is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the judge is qualified and unbiased.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court