Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2005-IA-00626-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-21-2006 Opinion Author: SMITH, C.J. Holding: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Want of prosecution - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - Action of record - Relief from judgment - M.R.C.P. 60 - M.R.C.P. 77(d) Judge(s) Concurring: WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., DIAZ, EASLEY CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ. Dissenting Author : DICKINSON, J. Dissent Joined By : RANDOLPH, J. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-10-2005 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Kathy King Jackson Disposition: Granted relief of dismissal for want of prosecution Case Number: CI-2000-00,191(2) |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | CUCOS, INC.
|
SIMPSON GRAY EDMONDSON,
FRANKLIN WILLIAMS |
||
| Appellee: | JERRY McDANIEL, AND SPOUSE LAURA McDANIEL | MARGARET P. ELLIS |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Personal injury - Want of prosecution - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - Action of record - Relief from judgment - M.R.C.P. 60 - M.R.C.P. 77(d) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jerry McDaniel and his wife, Laura McDaniel, filed a complaint alleging injuries sustained during a slip and fall accident at Cucos, Inc on June 8, 1997. Cucos timely filed its answer on July 13, 2000. The last action recorded by the clerk was a civil subpoena attested to by a deputy clerk on July 6, 2001. After two years void of action in the case, the clerk entered a Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution on October 16, 2002, and sent notice to each of the parties. On or about November 13, 2002, the McDaniels responded to the clerk with a letter, which was at the time a common and sufficient response in that circuit court district. The letter requested the case not be dismissed and asked for notification from the clerk if additional steps were necessary. The clerk failed to place the letter in the court file and never notified the judge of the letter or replied to the letter with notification of additional necessary steps. On November 22, 2002, the trial court entered an Order Dismissing Case for Want of Prosecution. The McDaniels sent a letter to Cucos on or about August 20, 2004, regarding settlement. The McDaniels were unaware of the dismissal, the clerk having failed to send notice of the Order and having placed the incorrect docket number on the Order, until Cucos responded on or about August 24, 2004, saying the case was dismissed. The McDaniels filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal asserting that the letter they sent should have been sufficient to prevent dismissal. The court granted the motion. Cucos requested an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | M.R.C.P. 41(d) calls for the clerk to mail notice to attorneys of civil cases identified as having an inactive record for twelve or more months. The case will be dismissed by the court for want of prosecution unless within thirty days following the mailing, action of record is taken or an application in writing is made to the court and good cause shown why it should be continued as a pending case. Cucos argues that the McDaniels’ letter was insufficient to constitute an action of record under Rule 41(d) and uses the “hasten the suit to judgment” analysis from other cases as the bases for this argument. However, that analysis is not mandatory for trial courts. These findings merely provide analytical options for trial courts. As dismissal for want of prosecution is within the trial court’s discretion, the trial court judge may find that the plaintiff has performed an action of record without that action being in accord with the “hasten the suit to judgment” analysis, and likewise, a trial court judge may, within his discretion, use those cases to support a decision to dismiss a case with similar facts, such as this one. Without an explicit definition or standard, what suffices as an action of record is left to the reasonable discretion of the trial court. In a situation, such as the one before us, where the only standard the Court has set forth is that in determining the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s action the trial court must do what is necessary for justice as well as what the trial court decides is appropriate in controlling its own docket, the Court will construe Rule 41(d) liberally. Dismissal should be considered as a last resort, and any dispute about satisfaction of the rule that can be resolved in favor of the plaintiff should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. In considering which cases should be pruned from the docket pursuant to Rule 41(d), the trial court in using its discretion should employ a balancing concept. The court must weigh the great social interest in provision of every litigant with his day in court and the attempt to not deprive the plaintiff of that opportunity for technical carelessness or unavoidable delay against the purpose of the Rule to achieve the orderly expedition of justice and control by the trial court of its own docket. When a plaintiff clearly abandons his case, the purpose of Rule 41(d) should be allowed to prevail, but in this situation where the plaintiffs sent a written request to the court that the case stay open, and the trial court held a hearing on the matter to determine if there was good cause, or, in other words, if reinstatement was just, and determined that it wanted to keep the case on its docket, the balance of policy interests favors allowing the McDaniels’ case to proceed. A letter in response to a Rule 41(d) motion for dismissal that simply requests that a case remain on the docket is an action of record when the letter is (1) timely sent within the thirty-day period which begins upon the filing of the motion, (2) found to be a sufficient action on the record and that finding is not in contradiction to an existing statute or decision of the Supreme Court, and (3) considered as part of a hearing where the trial court determined good cause existed for allowing the case to remain on its docket. Thus, the McDaniels’ letter in response to the clerk constituted an action of record such as would preclude a determination of dismissal under Rule 41(d). Cucos also argues that any relief due to McDaniels should be granted only under section (a) of M.R.C.P. 60. Section (a) applies specifically to clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission. The purpose of Rule 60(a) is simply to correct insubstantial clerical errors. The failure by the clerk to place the McDaniels’ letter in the record, where the trial court indicated it expected to see such a letter, resulted in a dismissal by the trial court which was unaware at the time of dismissal the that McDaniels had sent what the trial court deemed a sufficient response to prevent dismissal or at least justify holding a hearing in order to determine whether good cause existed. This erroneous result could not be overcome by a mere correction of the record. Relief from more substantial errors requires the use of Rule 60(b), and, specifically, Rule 60(b)(6) applies in this case. Rule 60(b)(6) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for any other reason justifying relief from judgment, and the motion shall be made within a reasonable time. The McDaniels acted quickly, filing a motion to obtain relief from the dismissal within six days upon learning of the judgment. Also, the movants showed good cause in that they did not receive notice of the Order to dismiss and were unable to reasonably find the dismissal themselves because it was labeled with the incorrect docket number. The clerk failed to comply with M.R.C.P. 77(d) in not notifying the McDaniels of the judgment and inhibiting his ability to respond to the dismissal more quickly. Also, incorrect information was provided by the clerk regarding the status of the case since the judgment was labeled with the incorrect docket number. The numerous errors made by the clerk constitute exceptional circumstances that justify relief for the McDaniels under Rule 60(b)(6). |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
