Univ. of Southern Miss., et al. Williams


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Docket Number: 2003-CA-00190-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-00190-SCT
Oral Argument: 05-19-2004
 

 

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Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-10-2004
Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part

Additional Case Information: Topic: Breach of contract - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing - Mental anguish - Tort Claims Act - Damages
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Smith, C.J. Easley, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, Graves and Randolph, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Easley, J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Smith, C.J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-30-2002
Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court
Judge: Richard W. McKenzie
Disposition: Denied JNOV after a jury verdict for Appellee in for $800,000
Case Number: CI-96-0125

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: University of Southern Mississippi, Dr. David Huffman, Dr. Glenn Harper, and Dr. Rex StamperWilliams




ALAN M. PURDIE LEE PARTEE GORE RICKY L. BOGGAN



 

Appellee: Davida Dawn Williams KIM T. CHAZE  

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Topic: Breach of contract - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing - Mental anguish - Tort Claims Act - Damages

Summary of the Facts: Davida Williams, a doctoral student at the University of Southern Mississippi, filed suit against USM, as well as USM professors Dr. David Huffman, Dr. Glenn Harper, Dr. Harry McCraw, and Dr. Rex Stamper, in their individual and official capacities. She sought actual damages in the sum of $10 million, punitive damages in the sum of $10 million, relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, and unspecified injunctive relief. The case was tried before a jury which returned an 11-1 general verdict for Williams, in the sum of $800,000 “actual damages.” The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. USM and three of the four professors appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: § 1983 claim Neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. USM moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Williams’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Although Williams appeared to abandon all § 1983 claims during the course of the trial, the court denied USM’s motion for JNOV regarding any claim Williams had based upon § 1983. Williams initially named as defendants USM, along with professors Huffman, Harper, McCraw, and Stamper in their individual and official capacities. Subsequently, Williams voluntarily and inexplicably dismissed Stamper in his individual capacity and also dismissed McCraw’s estate following his death. The circuit court, on motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of Williams’s case-in-chief, dismissed Harper and Huffman in their individual capacities. Thus, when the jury returned its verdict, there were no individual defendants left; only USM and the three professors in their official capacities remained. Accordingly, any § 1983 claims by Williams should have been dismissed as a matter of law. Issue 2: Contract claim Williams argues that USM breached the contract created by USM’s graduate catalog, by not providing her the educational opportunity for which she paid, by not giving her a fair hearing regarding her complaints about actions and inactions of the professors, and by not acting with “good faith” and “fair dealing.” The present case is one of first impression, involving a doctoral candidate’s pursuit of the Ph.D. degree and the unique dissertation committee/defense process utilized in doctoral programs in universities nationwide. Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement. The breach of good faith is bad faith characterized by some conduct which violates standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness. Based on the record, there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that USM and its employees breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing in their relationship with Williams. Although directly conflicting testimony was given, the documentary evidence is clearly supportive of many of Williams’s allegations. It is uncontested that Williams maintained close to a 4.0 grade point average in her doctoral course work, demonstrated proficiency in two foreign languages, passed her comprehensive exams, and obtained approval of her detailed prospectus. In addition to her success in the doctoral program, Williams was also entrusted by USM with teaching responsibilities. Williams claims that Stamper prevented her from defending her doctoral dissertation because she refused to engage in sexual relations and rebuffed his sexual advances, which he denies. Stamper claims that his refusal to allow Williams to defend her dissertation was based upon deficiencies in the dissertation itself. Assuming, arguendo, that is correct, the jury was still free to judge the credibility of the witnesses and consider what impact his other actions, and those of other USM professors and/or officials, might have had upon her efforts and ability to present a dissertation deemed worthy of defense. Plaintiffs may recover damages for mental anguish and emotional distress in breach of contract actions without proof of a physical manifestation. Expert testimony showing actual harm to prove mental injury is not always required, but the plaintiff must show that mental anguish was a foreseeable consequence of the particular breach of contract and that he or she actually suffered mental anguish. A plaintiff must show specific suffering during a specific time frame. Understanding the nature of the incident is essential in establishing whether emotional distress is foreseeable. In cases where the defendant’s conduct is more egregious, the plaintiff’s burden of establishing specific proof of suffering will decrease. Williams presented sufficient proof of emotional distress caused by USM’s failure to fulfill its contractual obligations. Furthermore, she was denied the fruits of her many years of academic labors. Williams testified about the assault by Stamper in her home and its effects on her mental and emotional well-being. She testified that later that evening, she actually considered suicide, and had her gun in her hands, but that her son was able to wrestle the gun away from her. Other persons also testified to the mental and emotional effects the defendants’ actions had on Williams. Williams’s right to recover damages from USM for mental anguish and emotional distress springs only from the breach of contract, not from the tortious conduct of Stamper. Issue 3: Tort Claims Act USM and the professors argue that the Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy for the damages sought by Williams and that the trial by jury was manifest error. There was a total absence of any effort or intent on behalf of Williams to comply with the Tort Claims Act. No notice of claim as required by section 11-46-11 was ever filed. Thus, the statute of limitations has long since run, and any recovery under the tort claims act is barred. Issue 4: Remittitur USM asks for a remittitur to the $50,000 damage cap which would be the maximum available had this matter been tried under the Tort Claims Act, or in the alternative, a new trial. The damages awarded were too speculative based upon the evidence presented at trial. Damages may only be recovered when the evidence presented at trial removes their quantum from the realm of speculation and conjecture and transports it through the twilight zone and into the daylight of reasonable certainty. Therefore, the judgment awarding damages is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial limited to the sole issue of Williams’s damages arising from USM’s breach of contract.


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