Stockstill v. Gammill, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-02193-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-02193-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-26-2006 Opinion Author: CARLSON, JUSTICE Holding: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Validity of deed - Exclusion of testimony - Statute of limitations - Section 95-5-10 - Section 95-5-29 - Section 15-1-49 - Attorney’s fees - Prejudgment interest Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., DIAZ, EASLEY, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): COBB, P.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-07-2004 Appealed from: Pearl River County Chancery Court Judge: Johnny Lee Williams Disposition: Chancellor entered final judgment confirming title in the subject land to Appellee Case Number: 99-0365GN-TH |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | HUEY STOCKSTILL AND GAYLE B. STOCKSTILL |
O. STEPHEN MONTAGNET, III |
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| Appellee: | LYNN CROSBY GAMMILL, STEWART GAMMILL, III, STEWART GAMMILL, IV, LUCIUS OLSEN CROSBY GAMMILL AND JENNIFER LYNN GAMMILL McKAY | PAUL NORMAN DAVIS |
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| Topic: | Real property - Validity of deed - Exclusion of testimony - Statute of limitations - Section 95-5-10 - Section 95-5-29 - Section 15-1-49 - Attorney’s fees - Prejudgment interest |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Gammills conveyed to the Stockstills approximately 650 acres of land in Pearl River County. The two families primarily communicated through licensed real estate agent and appraiser Glen Ford. The Gammills attempted to except a 60-acre portion of the land by including a description in the warranty deed identifying the subject land as lying “north of Telley Road” and west of Interstate 59 in Section 26. The Stockstills cut timber on the 60-acre portion which had been purportedly excepted by the Gammills in the warranty deed. Lynn Gammill filed suit against Huey Stockstill and his wife, Gayle Stockstill, in chancery court, seeking to confirm title in the land and seeking statutory damages for the cutting of trees on the property. The Stockstills filed a separate suit against the Gammill family in circuit court, asserting claims of fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, breach of covenants in the warranty deed, and unjust enrichment. The Stockstills’ circuit court suit was transferred to chancery court and the chancellor subsequently ordered that these two cases be consolidated for all purposes. The chancellor found that the Gammill-to-Stockstill warranty deed was valid, including the 60-acre exception retained by the Gammills. The Gammills filed a Motion to Award Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. The chancellor entered an order denying the Gammills attorneys’ fees. In the final judgment, the chancellor cleared title in favor of Lynn Crosby Gammill, and awarded damages against the Stockstills for the wrongful cutting of timber; awarded to Gammill and against the Stockstills the sum of $65,526.50 [representing the value of the cut timber ($50,026.50), and the reasonable cost of reforestation ($15,500.00)]; assessed post-judgment interest against the Stockstills; assessed all costs against the Stockstills; and, denied Gammill’s claims for attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and pre-judgment interest. The Stockstills appeal, and Gammill cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Validity of deed Because one part of the road identified as Telley Road in the exception in the deed had been renamed, a disputed issue in this case is whether the description in the warranty deed adequately described the 60-acre portion of the land in dispute as to make the exception effective. The chancellor found that because of extrinsic evidence presented at trial, the deeds from the Gammills’ predecessors in title and the numerous exhibits referring to the road as Telley Road, as well as the testimony that proved others were familiar with the area, one would have no difficulty from the deed description in determining where the subject land lay, and that though inaccurate, the description of the land was still sufficient to allow one to locate the property “with some certainty.” The chancellor found that this description was adequate to put the Stockstills on constructive inquiry/notice in any case of what was intended in this conveyance. Where the description of land in a deed is wrong, but still adequate for one to locate the land on the ground through reasonable inquiry and research, a purchaser is deemed to be on constructive notice or inquiry. The Stockstills recognized the description as wrong but made no efforts to determine the grantors’ real intent, and testimony at trial proved that, though the Stockstills argue no land fits the description in question, discovering the true intent of the grantors could have been easily accomplished. Based on testimony at trial that Huey Stockstill was aware of the exception, discussed it with real estate agent Ford, and considered it a mistake or a typographical error, a finding of constructive notice by the chancellor was not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Issue 2: Exclusion of testimony The chancellor heard testimony from real estate agent Glen Ford, a portion of which was heard strictly as an offer of proof on testimony and documents not allowed into evidence by the chancellor. The Stockstills argue that the chancellor erred in not admitting the testimony of Ford because Ford was a “dual agent,” acting in the interest of both parties. Given the testimony from both parties that Ford was not expressly given actual authority, the findings of the chancellor were not manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Issue 3: Statute of limitations Section 95-5-10(1) makes liable anyone who wrongly cuts trees of others and provides damages owed for so doing; and, section 95-5-10(2) provides for an additional award by way of penalties when the wrongful cutting is done willfully, or in reckless disregard. At the time of the accrual of the cause of action in today’s case, section 95-5-29 provided for a one-year limitations period from the time an injury was committed in which to commence an action for any specific penalty. The Stockstills argue that the trial judge erred in holding that the one-year statute of limitations prescribed in section 95-5-29, as applied to section 95-5-10, did not bar Gammill’s claim for damages, since the trial judge noted that the Stockstills cut the trees on the land more than one year before Gammill filed suit. The Stockstills rely on the case of McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co., 725 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1998). Gammill argues that McCain should be overruled since the legislative revision to section 95-5-29 specified portions of section 95-5-10 as remedial, and portions of it as penal, thus making the statute subject to varying limitations periods. In light of the legislative revisions to section 95-5-29, the Court finds that McCain should be overruled to the extent that the remedies provided in section 95-5-10(1) are subject to the limitations period set out in section 15-1-33 and to the extent that section 95-5-29 would apply to a claim for the fair market value of the trees cut or the cost of reforestation. Since the 1999 legislative amendment to section 95-5-29 does not apply to today’s case, the practical effect of today’s decision is that Gammill’s claims for the fair market value of the trees cut and reforestation costs were governed by section 15-1-49, which provides for a three-year limitations period. Therefore, in applying section 15-1-49 to Gammill’s claims for the fair market value of the trees cut and the cost of reforestation, these claims were not barred. Thus, the chancellor was not in error in entering a judgment in favor of Gammill and against the Stockstills for the sum of $65,526.50, representing the reasonable value of the timber cut ($50,026.50), and the reasonable cost of reforestation of the subject land ($15,500.00). Issue 4: Attorney’s fees Since no punitive damages were awarded in this case, and because the record supports a finding that the cutting of the timber was done by mistake, the trial judge in his discretion decided not to award attorneys’ fees to Gammill, notwithstanding the fact that judgment was entered in her favor. Gammill argues that the word “shall” in section 95-5-10(3) means that awarding attorneys’ fees is absolutely required. However, when this subsection is viewed in its entirety, the only logical interpretation which can be afforded is that the court has discretion in determining whether to award expert witness fees and attorneys fees, and if so, in what (reasonable) amount, but if such fees are awarded by the court, in the exercise of discretion, such fees shall be assessed as court costs. Issue 5: Prejudgment interest Gammill argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in choosing not to award prejudgment interest. Under Mississippi law, prejudgment interest may be allowed in cases where the amount due is liquidated when the claim is originally made or where the denial of a claim is frivolous or in bad faith. While it is true that the Stockstills were on constructive notice that further research was needed and they, as reasonably prudent people, should have been on inquiry, charged with facts which could be revealed in a diligent and careful investigation, this does not mean they acted in bad faith. They simply made the assumption, albeit erroneously, that the exception was superfluous. |
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