Champluvier v. Beck


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Docket Number: 2003-CP-01472-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Date: 12-09-2004
Opinion Author: Randolph, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Legal malpractice - Statute of limitations - Conversion to summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 12
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Graves and Dickinson, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Carlson, JJ.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - LEGAL MALPRACTICE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-09-2003
Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court
Judge: George B. Ready
Disposition: The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Beck because statute of limitations had run.

Note: Nature of Case: Legal Malpractice

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: DEBORAH M. CHAMPLUVIER




PRO SE



 

Appellee: SIDNEY F. BECK, JR. PRO SE  

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Topic: Legal malpractice - Statute of limitations - Conversion to summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 12

Summary of the Facts: Deborah Champluvier filed a legal malpractice action against her former attorney, Sidney Beck, Jr. Beck filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the statute of limitations had run. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Beck, and Champluvier appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Statute of limitations Champluvier argues that the statute of limitations did not start running until August 22, 2000, because this is the day that the chancery court entered the order allowing Beck to withdraw as her attorney and that filing her complaint on March 14, 2003, was timely. Beck argues that the statute of limitations began running when she terminated his employment on August 16, 1999, or at the latest, when she filed a complaint with the Mississippi Bar on September 1, 1999. The three-year statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action properly begins to run on the date the client learns or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should learn of the negligence of his lawyer. Champluvier either knew or should have known of her lawyer’s deficient performance by she terminated Beck on August 16, 1999, and filed a bar complaint on September 1, 1999. Beck did not provide any services to Champluvier following the termination letter of August 16, 1999, so any misconduct would have occurred prior to this date. Issue 2: Notice Champluvier argues that she should have been granted the appropriate notice that the motion to dismiss was to be converted into a motion for summary judgment. The language of M.R.C.P. 12 granting a respondent to a motion to dismiss subsequently converted to a summary judgment motion an opportunity to present further material is not self-executing. A litigant desiring to avail herself of the right to present more evidentiary material has an affirmative duty to timely raise the issue with the trial court or be deemed to have waived objection to the court proceeding on the motion. This issue is barred, because Champluvier did not raise this issue with the trial court.


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