Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Gregory, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2003-IA-01795-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-17-2005 Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Joinder - M.R.C.P. 20(a) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ. Dissenting Author : Graves, J. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-24-2003 Appealed from: Tunica County Circuit Court Judge: Kenneth L. Thomas Disposition: ICRR filed a Motion to Transfer and/or Dismiss, which the circuit court denied. Case Number: 01-0282 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY |
GLENN F. BECKHAM |
||
| Appellee: | LEON GREGORY, M. W. STEINHAUER, ERVIN LEWIS, CARL F. BOSHERS, NATHANIEL FINLEY, ROY LEE CHRISTOPHER, HOWARD E. CRAWFORD, LUTHER STEVISON AND JOHNNY WILSON, JR. | ANDREW M. W. WESTERFIELD ALVA A. HOLLON, JR. |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Personal injury - Joinder - M.R.C.P. 20(a) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The plaintiffs are nine present and/or past employees of Illinois Central Railroad, who filed suit against ICRR. The plaintiffs allege that they suffered injuries during the course and scope of their employment with ICRR as a result of the negligent acts and omissions by ICRR. They claim that they suffered occupational lung disease due to exposure to toxic substances including asbestos, asbestos-containing products, diesel exhaust, silica rock dust and coal. ICRR filed a Motion to Transfer and/or Dismiss, which the court denied. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | ICRR argues that joinder is improper for these plaintiffs because their employment consisted of work in different crafts at different work sites during different periods of time; plaintiffs have made no specific allegations concerning the work history or exposure of each; and there is no transaction or occurrence or distinct litigable event common to all plaintiffs. A court’s determination of whether two or more plaintiffs' claims arise from a distinct, litigable event is very much fact dependent. This determination includes, among other things, whether a finding of liability for one plaintiff essentially establishes a finding for all plaintiffs, indicating that proof common to all plaintiffs is significant. The appropriateness of joinder decreases as the need for additional proof increases. If plaintiffs allege a single, primary wrongful act, the proof will be common to all plaintiffs; however separate proof will be required where there are several wrongful acts by several different actors. The need for separate proof is lessened only where the different wrongful acts are similar in type and character, and occur close in time and/or place. A rule of thumb is that when an act or omission of a defendant does not affect all plaintiffs in much the same way, then there is probably not a distinct litigable event. Here, the plaintiffs have not alleged any specific wrongful acts or omissions by any specific actor. Plaintiffs worked under different supervisors, had different jobs, in different locations, were exposed to several different substances at different times, and have different injuries. Thus, the alleged injuries are not close in time or location. The amount of evidence that would have to be introduced to prove all these in one trial would certainly overwhelm a jury. M.R.C.P. 20(a) imposes two specific requisites to the joinder of parties: a right to relief must be asserted by or against each plaintiff or defendant relating to or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, and some question of law or fact common to all the parties will arise in the action. As to the out-of-state plaintiffs with causes of action accrued out-of-state, these claims should be dismissed. If claims were brought separately, individual venue would be proper in Tunica County for only four of the plaintiffs - those who resided in Tunica County when the alleged cause of action accrued, or those whose cause of action accrued in Tunica County. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
