Cash Distributing Co., Inc. v. Neely
| Docket Number: | 2004-CT-01124-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-01124-COA ; 2004-CT-01124-SCT ; 2004-CA-01124-COA |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-25-2007 Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J. Holding: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Age discrimination - Burden of proof - Rebuttal requirement Judge(s) Concurring: COBB, P.J., DIAZ, GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): EASLEY, J. Dissenting Author : CARLSON, J. Dissent Joined By : SMITH, C.J., AND WALLER, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER Writ of Certiorari: Yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-27-2004 Appealed from: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: JURY AWARDED PLAINTIFF $120,000 IN BACK PAY. Case Number: 2000-0153-CV1 |
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| Note: | The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' conclusion in this case, but granted certiorari to address the appropriate allocation of the burdens of proof (both production and persuasion) to be followed in our trial courts in employment discrimination cases. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | CASH DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC. |
KATHERINE S. KERBY |
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| Appellee: | JAMES NEELY | J. DOUGLAS FORD RODNEY A. RAY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Age discrimination - Burden of proof - Rebuttal requirement |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Neely sued his former employer, Cash Distributing Company, Inc., claiming he was dismissed because of federally prohibited age discrimination. The jury returned a verdict in Neely’s favor. Cash appealed, and Neely cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision as to Cash’s appeal and affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part as to Neely’s cross-appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | In bringing an ADEA claim, the plaintiff must follow a precise scheme, or allocation, of the burdens of proof (both production and persuasion). Cash argues that Neely failed to rebut every nondiscriminatory reason offered for his termination. Under Cash’s view of the rebuttal requirement, once Cash asserts it terminated Neely because he refused to fill out certain forms, Neely must come forward with some proof that he actually did fill out the forms. This view of the rebuttal requirement is unduly restrictive and without foundation in any employment discrimination decision from the United States Supreme Court. The fact finder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant does not require the factfinder to disbelieve a particular event occurred, but rather requires the factfinder to find that – even if it did occur – it was not the motivating reason for the dismissal. Stated another way, binding Supreme Court precedent requires only that Neely rebut Cash’s nondiscriminatory reasons for the dismissal by persuading the jury that, true or not, the reasons offered by Cash were not the motivating reasons for his termination. Thus, Neely was free to admit that some or all of the wrongful acts attributed to him by Cash were true but were not the real reason for his dismissal. In light of this precedent, the Fifth Circuit’s view that an ADEA plaintiff must specifically rebut each and every nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer its adverse employment action is rejected. Instead, the test to be used in our state courts for determination of ADEA claims is as follows. First, an ADEA plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing (1) he or she was a member of the class protected by the ADEA (“individuals who are at least 40 years of age,” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)), (2) he or she was otherwise qualified for the position, (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) he or she was replaced by a substantially younger person. Once an ADEA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case (assuming the factfinder believes the facts establishing the prima facie case are true), a presumption arises that the employer engaged in impermissible discrimination, and absent some response by the employer, judgment must be entered for the plaintiff. If the employer responds by proffering nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision, the employee must be afforded an opportunity to submit additional evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the employer were pretextual, and that the employment decision was motivated by impermissible discrimination. In responding to a particular nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer, the plaintiff may claim either that the event never happened at all, or that the event did, in fact, happen, but was not the true reason for the adverse employment decision. In either case, the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff may offer additional evidence of discrimination. Even though several factors may have contributed to the adverse employment action, if the jury finds that the employee would not have been terminated or subjected to the adverse employment decision absent impermissible discrimination, the plaintiff should prevail. To the extent the Court in Columbus Paper & Chemical, Inc. v. Chamberlin, 687 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Miss. 1996) held that the employee was required to rebut each and every nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer for the termination, it is overruled. In the present case, the jury obviously credited Neely’s account of his dismissal and the evidence supporting it over explanations supplied by Cash. There is no basis to disturb that decision on appeal. The jury was free to find that even if, as Cash claimed, Neely had been insubordinate, that justification was pretextual based on evidence of unequal treatment, age-related statements made by Cash’s CEO, and the impeachment of Cash’s witnesses. |
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