Webb v. Town Creek Master Water Mgmt Dist. Of Lee County, etc.
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-02270-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-02270-SCT ; 2003-CA-02270-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-07-2005 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: REVERSED AND REMANDED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Eminent domain - Water management district - Notice - Section 51-29-39 - Due process - Appraisal - Claims Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - EMINENT DOMAIN |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-13-2003 Appealed from: Lee County Chancery Court Judge: Woodrow Wilson Brand, Jr. Disposition: Granted Town Creek's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Webbs' claims. Case Number: 46,077 |
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| Note: | Nature of Case - Eminent Domain | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | DENTON WEBB, RUBY WEBB, RACHAEL WEBB
AND DAN W. WEBB |
PAUL NATHAN JENKINS, JR. |
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| Appellee: | TOWN CREEK MASTER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT OF LEE, PONTOTOC, PRENTISS AND UNION COUNTIES; AND JOHN MORGAN, JIMMY BUCY, KENNETH OSWALT AND HOUSTON PANNELL IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TOWN CREEK MASTER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT OF LEE, PONTOTOC, PRENTISS AND UNION COUNTIES | THOMAS HENRY FREELAND, III, DAVID R. SPARKS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Eminent domain - Water management district - Notice - Section 51-29-39 - Due process - Appraisal - Claims |
| Summary of the Facts: | Town Creek Master Water Management District filed a petition for approval of appraisement of damages of easement, naming as respondents Dan Webb and his wife Rachael Webb. The petition sought to acquire a permanent easement on which to construct a water retarding structure. Dan and Rachael owned a remainder interest in the property, with Denton Webb and Ruby Webb owning a life estate in the property on which the proposed dam was to be located. On the same day that Town Creek filed its petition, the chancery court entered an interlocutory decree allowing the taking of the property and directing that a hearing for the approval of the appraisal be set down on a date to be set by the Chancellor. The Webbs were neither served with the petition nor the interlocutory decree. Dan and Rachael moved to set aside the interlocutory decree contesting personal jurisdiction. After construction of the dam had begun, Dan and Rachael and Denton and Ruby Webb, filed a complaint against Town Creek seeking damages for the destruction of their property. The Webbs sued for actual, consequential, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and for cancellation of the easement and destruction of the dam. Town Creek moved for the consolidation of the two causes which the court granted. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and the court granted Town Creek’s motion for summary judgment. The Webbs appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Notice The court held that section 51-29-39 does not require notice of a taking of land, when there are no issues regarding public use. Section 51-29-39, which sets out the procedures to be followed by a water management district taking easements for completion of its plans and specifications, requires (1) a filing of a petition of appraisement; (2) the court or chancellor shall enter an order designating the date, the time, and place for the hearing of objections to such appraisement; (3) that the clerk shall issue a summons for each landowner or other interested person commanding them to appear at the hearing; (4) after being served, the owners may then file written objections to the appraisement; (5) or if no written objections are filed, a decree confirming the appraisement shall be entered. Town Creek failed to follow these clear procedures. Denton, Ruby, Dan, and Rachael all had an interest in the property, but not one of them were served. Furthermore, the only two individuals who had a present possessory interest in the property were not made parties to the petition. The chancellor granted the easement without entering an order setting a time and date for a hearing on objections, and no summons had been issued. Because section 51-29-39 notice is required regardless of whether or not there is an issue regarding public use, the court erred in holding that no notice was required to the Webbs. Issue 2: Due process The Webbs argue that their due process rights were violated because they were never given notice, were not served, and Denton and Ruby were not even named in the petition. The power of eminent domain must be exercised in satisfaction of due process, including adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard. The Webbs were given neither adequate notice nor an opportunity to be heard before the interlocutory decree was granted which was in violation of their constitutional due process rights and Mississippi’s statutory scheme. To satisfy the requirements of procedural due process, either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful pre-deprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking is required. There was no necessity of quick action by the State in this case considering the easement was granted in 1993 and the construction on the site did not start until 1995. Furthermore, there was no impracticality of serving process on the Webbs. Issue 3: Appraisal The Webbs argue that the appraisal on which Town Creek based its easement is invalid and void. Because the amount of compensation to be awarded the Webbs is a matter that has yet to be tried, the issue should be decided on remand. Issue 4: Claims The trial court held that because Town Creek was not guilty of violating any rights of the Webbs, that they had no cause of action by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also found that because the taking of the Webb property was not tortious, the Webbs could not recover under section 95-5-10. Because the court erred in ruling that the Webbs’ due process rights were not violated, the Webbs are entitled to pursue their claims, subject to the requisite applicability, proof and damages. |
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