COHO Resources, Inc. v. Chapman
| Docket Number: | 1999-CA-01825-SCT Linked Case(s): 1999-CA-01825-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-21-2005 Opinion Author: Smith, C.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Directed verdict - Project owner’s right of control - Weight of evidence - Apportionment of fault - Comparative negligence - Jury instruction - Section 85-5-7 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Dissenting Author : Graves, J. Concurs in Result Only: Dickinson, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-04-1999 Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court Judge: Billy Joe Landrum Disposition: The jury found for Chapman and awarded damages. Case Number: 98-3-30 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | COHO Resources, Inc. |
CLAYTON E. BAILEY, DOUGLAS G. MERCIER |
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| Appellee: | Marion C. Chapman | GERALD PATRICK COLLIER, LARRY STAMPS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Directed verdict - Project owner’s right of control - Weight of evidence - Apportionment of fault - Comparative negligence - Jury instruction - Section 85-5-7 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Marion Chapman, an employee of independent contractor V.A. Sauls, Inc., sued Coho Resources, Inc., the oil well owner, another independent contractor hired by Coho and two individuals employed by the other independent contractor for negligence in connection with injuries he sustained when the tong line broke and collapsed the rig’s floor. Chapman’s wife asserted a loss of consortium claim. At the end of the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, the judge granted a directed verdict for the two individuals on the ground that they did not owe a duty to Chapman. The court also dismissed the other independent contractor on the same grounds. After a jury trial, the jury found for Chapman and awarded $1,653,930 in damages against Coho. The court granted Coho’s motion to alter or amend the verdict and final judgment and for a remittitur. Chapman agreed to the remittitur, and the jury’s award was reduced to $853,930. Coho appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Directed verdict Coho argues that the court erred in denying the motions for direct verdict and JNOV because Coho did not exercise control over the work; Chapman’s injuries were sustained while performing work the contractor agreed to perform for Coho; the evidence proves that Chapman had actual and constructive knowledge that his conduct would create the dangerous condition that led to his injuries; and the evidence showed that Chapman was in the best position to eliminate the dangerous condition he created while misusing Sauls’ equipment. Where a party such as Coho contracts with another such as Sauls to perform the repair work, the owner has no liability for injuries experienced by the contractor’s workers where those injuries arose out of or were intimately connected with the work. The critical question is whether the project owner maintains any right of control over the performance of that aspect of the work that has given rise to the injury. Under its contract with Coho, Sauls assumed full and complete responsibility for the conditions pertaining to the work, the site of the work, and the care and maintenance of the work. The contract clearly stated that Sauls was an independent contractor, and Coho had no direction or control over Sauls or its employees. Although the control of the workover had been vested in Sauls in one part of the contract, clearly Coho retained the ultimate authority for safety. The testimony at trial was contradictory on the issue of whether Coho retained substantial de facto control. The owner is liable to employees of an independent contractor for his own negligence when they are under a duty to provide proper supervision. Here, the contract stated that Coho could stop any work that was not being performed safely, and Chapman’s expert testified that Coho’s representative should have supervised the job and stopped it once he determined that the proper tools were not being used. However, there was also testimony that anyone could shut the operation down, including Chapman and any of Sauls’ employees. Some testimony at trial demonstrated that Coho at times retained substantial control, but there was also testimony that was in direct conflict and demonstrated that Coho did not retain substantial control. Because the contract and the contradictory testimony at trial sufficiently created a jury question as to whether Coho retained substantial control over the workover site and whether it was Coho’s duty to shut down the job if it was not being done safely or if anyone at the site could shut down the operation to eliminate the dangerous condition, the court did not err in denying Coho’s motion for directed verdict. Issue 2: Weight of evidence Coho argues that the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. There is contradictory evidence regarding the issue of control and this contradictory testimony sufficiently created a jury question. However, when looking at the weight of the evidence, it is clear that the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. The testimony at trial was contradictory as to whether Coho retained substantial control over the workover job, but the weight of the evidence shows that Coho did not retain substantial control. First of all, Chapman presented testimony that he was instructed to use the 36-inch pipe wrench. However, there was ample testimony by several witnesses that using the 36 inch pipe wrench was the standard and common practice in industry and was also Sauls’ practice to use the 36-inch pipe wrench for this type of tubing. Furthermore, Chapman used the 36-inch pipe wrench on several occasions and always used it for 3 ½ inch tubing. There was also testimony that Coho’s representative was there at the beginning of the job but was not there at the time of the accident and that Coho never instructed Sauls as to the method of the work. The only evidence that was presented to show that Coho had control was that of Chapman’s expert witness who admitted that he did not know what the responsibilities were between Coho and Sauls because he never spoke to Coho. The fact that Coho had authority over safety and the contract specified a day or hourly rate is not substantial control. The two facts that go towards control are not substantial when compared with the evidence that shows Coho did not retain control over the operation. Issue 3: Comparative negligence The jury found Coho was fully responsible and did not apportion any fault to Chapman. Coho argues that this finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Where negligence by both parties is concurrent and contributes to injury, recovery is not barred under such doctrine, but plaintiff's damages are diminished proportionately, even to the extent that negligence on the part of the plaintiff was ninety percent and on the part of the defendant was ten percent, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover theoretically that ten percent. Therefore, a plaintiff, though himself negligent, may still recover from a defendant whose negligence contributed to his injuries. Here, the judge acknowledged that Chapman was negligent but the jury failed to apportion any fault to Chapman. However, even after noting this on the record, the judge failed to grant a new trial, but instead reduced the damages that had been awarded to Chapman. The verdict in this case, as to the negligence of Chapman, was substantially against the weight of the evidence. Chapman’s own expert testified that Chapman misused the pipe wrench and the way he tried to free it was dangerous, which caused the accident. The fact that Chapman was misusing the pipe wrench in a dangerous fashion was uncontradicted. Issue 4: Jury instruction Coho argues that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury to consider Sauls’ negligence in apportioning fault for Chapman’s injuries. Section 85-5-7 requires that the fault of all participants to the occurrence, including any absent tortfeasors, must be considered in the apportionment of fault. Even a party which is immune from liability, including an employer which is immune by virtue of workers’ compensation law, may be assessed fault under the allocated fault statute. Therefore, the judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to allocate fault to Sauls. |
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