Alexander v. Daniel
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-02751-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-16-2005 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Conveyance of homestead property - Section 89-1-29 - Adverse possession - Reimbursement of money - Section 29-1-87 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Graves, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-17-2003 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: The trial court entered a final judgment cancelling the forfeited tax land patent issued by the State of Mississippi conveying title to property which was purportedly the homestead property of Ella Daniel. Case Number: 00-8-1247L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Effort Alexander |
WANDA TURNER-LEE ABIOTO |
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| Appellee: | Ella Daniel | LUCIUS EDWARDS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Conveyance of homestead property - Section 89-1-29 - Adverse possession - Reimbursement of money - Section 29-1-87 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Effort Alexander bought a parcel of land which had been sold to the State of Mississippi because of delinquent taxes. Alexander received a Forfeited Tax Patent from the State of Mississippi and filed a complaint to confirm the state land patent in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. The chancellor entered an order declaring that Alexander was the owner of the land and that he was entitled to lawful and peaceful possession of the property. Ella Daniel filed a complaint in the DeSoto County Chancery Court seeking to set aside the forfeited tax land patent and a confirmation of title in Ella’s name. The court set aside the Forfeited Tax Land Patent from the State, divested Effort Alexander of title to the land and vested title to this property in Ella Daniel. Alexander appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Title to property The record and the applicable law undergird the chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ella was married to Sam Daniel (now deceased). At the time of their marriage, Sam was 26 years older than Ella. Sam took care of the business transactions, quite often without telling Ella. The parcel of land in question was the homestead property of Ella and Sam. As so found by the chancellor from the testimony, somewhere along the way, the Tax Assessor’s office removed the parcel as part of the Daniels’ homestead property, and listed this property in the name of Freddie Henderson. Upon losing its tax exempt status, taxes on the parcel began to accumulate, and these taxes went unpaid by Henderson. Prior to the state tax sale, notice was given not to Ella but to Henderson, who failed to pay the back taxes and failed to redeem the property. Section 89-1-29 provides that a conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust or other incumbrance upon a homestead exempted from execution shall not be valid or binding unless signed by the spouse of the owner if the owner be married and living with the spouse. Sam conveyed the parcel of land which was the Daniels’ homestead property to Henderson without Ella’s knowledge and consent by way of her signature on the deed. This unilateral conveyance of the property without Ella’s signature on the deed was invalid. Therefore, the chancellor did not err in vesting title to this property in Ella. Issue 2: Adverse possession Anderson argues that the court erred in finding that Ella owned the property by adverse possession. There is only one reference to adverse possession where the court made an alternative finding in ruling on Alexander’s motion to dismiss made at the close of Ella’s case-in-chief. Nothing in the chancellor’s bench opinion or written orders or judgments indicates that he relied on adverse possession as a basis for ruling that the tax deed should be set aside. Issue 3: Reimbursement of money Alexander argues that he should be reimbursed for monies expended and fees incurred. A review of the pleadings reveals that certainly Alexander wanted to recoup whatever monies he could, but he made that demand of Ella, not the State. Section 29-1-87 may have afforded Alexander relief, had he chosen in his pleadings and at trial to avail himself of this statute as against the State of Mississippi. However, Alexander never put the State of Mississippi on notice that if the chancellor divested him of title to the property, he, as a patentee, was seeking a warrant in the amount of the monies he paid for the property at the time that he received the forfeited tax land patent from the State. His pleadings are silent as to this issue as clearly evidenced by the chancellor’s ruling. Matters raised for the first time on appeal need not be considered. |
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