Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-01350-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-04-2003 Opinion Author: Smith, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Insurance - Definition of “insured” - Primary insurer - Legal standard - “Other insurance” clauses Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., McRae, P.J., Waller, Cobb, Easley and Carlson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - INSURANCE |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-09-2002 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Granted summary judgment requiring the Appellant to pay the Appellee $40,909. Case Number: 251-97-1172CIV |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Grange Mutual Casualty Company |
STEVEN D. SLADE |
||
| Appellee: | United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company | JAN F. GADOW JAMES HOWARD THIGPEN |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Insurance - Definition of “insured” - Primary insurer - Legal standard - “Other insurance” clauses |
| Summary of the Facts: | While driving the vehicle of a friend, Chrisann Coker was involved in an accident in which a small child was killed. The vehicle was insured under a Farm Bureau liability policy with limits of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident. Chrisann was also insured, along with her mother and grandmother, under a policy from USF&G with a limit of $300,000 per person. A third policy issued by Grange Mutual Casualty Company in the names of John and Kathy Coker, Chrisann’s father and stepmother, had a limit of $250,000 per person. Each policy has a clause in which the insurer agrees to provide liability coverage only in excess of any other collectible insurance as to a vehicle not owned by the insured. After USF&G reached a tentative settlement agreement with the parents of the deceased child for $100,000, Grange and USF&G debated as to whether Grange was responsible for providing any liability coverage to Chrisann under its policy and whether it was responsible for contributing towards the settlement. Grange’s claims attorney eventually wrote to USF&G concluding that Chrisann was an insured under her parents’ policy and stating that Grange had no objection to reimbursing USF&G for Grange’s share of the settlement. After the court approved the settlement, Grange voided a draft issued to USF&G and refused to contribute towards the settlement. USF&G filed suit to force Grange to contribute to the settlement and was granted summary judgment. Grange appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Definition of “insured” Grange argues that the court erred by concluding Chrisann was covered under John and Cathy’s insurance policy. Although only John and Cathy are named as insured in Grange’s policy, the policy also includes a clause insuring “any family member” defined as a person related to the named insured by blood and whose principal residence at the time of the accident was the location listed on the policy’s declaration page. The law in this state is that an unemancipated minor is considered a household resident of both the custodial parent and the noncustodial parent for the purposes of automobile insurance. In addition, Grange’s own statements indicate its belief that Chrisann is a resident of John and Cathy’s household. Therefore, the court was correct in ruling Chrisann was a resident of John and Cathy’s household under Grange’s insurance policy. Issue 2: Primary insurer Grange argues that USF&G has a higher duty to pay any settlement, i.e., is a primary insurer in relation to Grange, because Chrisann is named in the USF&G policy while she falls under the “member of the household” clause in Grange’s policy. The same duty is owed to an unnamed party to a contract and a named party. As an insured pursuant to the terms of the Grange policy, Chrisann is entitled to the same coverage as her father as a named insured. Issue 3: Legal standard Grange argues that the court erred by improperly placing the burden of proof on it to disprove allegations made by USF&G that Chrisann was an insured. As stated before, for the purposes of evaluating automobile coverage, an unemancipated minor is a resident of both parents’ households. The court correctly recognized the law of this state and pointed out that Grange had offered no authority contradicting that holding. Issue 4: “Other insurance” clauses Grange argues that the court erred in not granting its motion for summary judgment. Where two “other insurance” clauses would cancel each other out and leave the insured without coverage, the clauses are considered mutually repugnant and are ignored, and benefits under the two policies are pro rated according to the coverage limits of each policy. Therefore, the court correctly refused to grant Grange’s motion for summary judgment. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
