Busick v. St. John
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-01011-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-02-2003 Opinion Author: Smith, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Weight of evidence - Health insurance - Collateral source rule - Comparative negligence instructions - Exclusion of testimony - Directed verdict Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Easley and Carlson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller and Diaz, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Cobb, J. Concurs in Result Only: McRae, P.J., and Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-14-2002 Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: Entered a take nothing judgment for the Appellant. Case Number: 2000-248 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Beverly D. Busick |
BILL WALLER, SR. |
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| Appellee: | Susan I. St. John | WILLIAM W. McKINLEY, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Weight of evidence - Health insurance - Collateral source rule - Comparative negligence instructions - Exclusion of testimony - Directed verdict |
| Summary of the Facts: | Beverly Busick filed an action against Susan St. John after the two were involved in an accident. The jury found that St. John was not negligent, and Busick appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Weight of evidence Busick argues that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence based on the physical facts and the evidence offered by both parties. An essential part of the claim in a personal injury tort case is to demonstrate that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury. Causation is generally to be determined by the jury. Here, the jury chose to believe St. John’s evidence which indicates that she acted in a reasonable manner when she pulled forward to gain an unobstructed view of traffic. Issue 2: Health insurance Busick argues that the court erred when, over objection, it admitted evidence related to facts and coverage of her health insurance at the time of the accident. The collateral source rule provides that compensation or indemnity for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the defendant in mitigation or reduction of damages. The evidence related to Busick’s health insurance was admitted to impeach her testimony that she suffered permanent injuries as a result of the accident, and was not solicited for the purposes of mitigating her loss or reducing damages owed to Busick. In addition, Busick’s attorney failed to make both a timely objection and a timely motion for a mistrial. Therefore, there was no reversible error by the court in allowing this testimony with an appropriate limiting instruction. Issue 3: Comparative negligence instructions Busick argues that the court erred in granting two comparative negligence instructions which were confusing. The jury was told that if Instruction 20 was found confusing, then it could substitute Instruction 20A. An appellant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors which he invited or induced. Busick offered the instructions. In addition, the court recognized the potential confusion by the jury and further instructed the jury with Jury Instruction Number 20A. The jury was thus informed that the apportionment of fault must equal 100% when added together and was provided with an opportunity to assess fault based on principles of comparative negligence, even though neither party pled or argued such a defense. Busick also argues that the court erred in granting a such large number of instructions in a case involving a simple two-vehicle collision resulting in the jury’s inability to apply the law to the facts and enter a verdict on the merits. She specifically lists six instructions. Of the six instructions complained of, St. John offered only four. Of those four, one deals with foreseeability and hindsight; two deal with negligence and the proper verdict if finding Busick the sole proximate cause of the collision; and one deals with limitation of damages to those sustained during the accident. There is no reversible error in the jury instructions. St. John had the right to embody her theories of the case in the jury instructions. Issue 4: Exclusion of testimony Busick argues that it was error for the court to exclude the testimony of three witnesses whom she claims were identified in her supplemental discovery response and where she claims to have made four offers to St. John to produce the witnesses for depositions. The witnesses were her mother, husband and daughter. The court did not err when refusing to allow the witnesses to testify to damages. Busick was both deposed and testified as to her injuries. There was surely no knowledge that these witnesses possessed about Busick’s damages that Busick did not know personally. Issue 5: Directed verdict Busick argues that the court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict which was made at the end of the evidence presented by both parties. Busick’s contention that she was traveling on a throughway is not undisputed so that the court should have directed a verdict in her favor by finding that St. John should have yielded the right-of-way. The evidence indicates that a reasonable juror could easily conclude that St. John’s view was obstructed the first time she stopped at the intersection so that she chose to creep up to get a better look at oncoming traffic and stopped again. |
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