Doe v. Miss. Dep't of Corrections
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-00135-SCT Linked Case(s): 2002-CA-00135-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-06-2003 Opinion Author: Waller, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Liability of state - Negligent supervision - Negligent acceptance - Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision - Section 47-7-71(1) - MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 37.01.01 & 37.02.01 - Statute of limitations - Accrual of action - Section 11-46-11(3) Judge(s) Concurring: Pittman, C.J., Smith, P.J., Easley, Carlson and Graves, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Cobb and Diaz, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: McRae, P.J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-26-2001 Appealed from: Lafayette County Circuit Court Judge: R. Kenneth Coleman Disposition: Entered summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. Case Number: L-00-157 |
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| Note: | The Motion to Withdraw Opinion and Substitute New Opinion, for Instructions to the Clerk of the Court and for Related Relief is granted, the original opinion issued herein is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted in its place. McRae, P.J., does not agree with the double publication of this case. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jane Doe |
RON L. WOODRUFF
JIM WAIDE
BRENT HAZZARD |
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| Appellee: | The State of Mississippi, acting through The Mississippi Department of Corrections and The State Parole Board | LAWRENCE LEE LITTLE DION JEFFERY SHANLEY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Liability of state - Negligent supervision - Negligent acceptance - Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision - Section 47-7-71(1) - MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 37.01.01 & 37.02.01 - Statute of limitations - Accrual of action - Section 11-46-11(3) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Motion to Withdraw Opinion and Substitute New Opinion, for Instructions to the Clerk of the Court and for Related Relief is granted, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Jane Doe sued the State of Mississippi, acting through the Mississippi Department of Corrections and the State Parole Board, for damages sustained when she was raped by a parolee accepted into Mississippi for supervision from the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and Doe appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Immunity of state Doe argues both negligent acceptance and supervision as a basis for establishing the State’s liability. The general rule for the existence of a private right of action under a statute is that the party claiming the right of action must establish a legislative intent, express or implied, to impose liability for violations of that statute. The Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision does not create a private right of action. Therefore, Doe’s negligent acceptance claim must fail absent violation of a specific statutory or regulatory directive. Doe argues that her action was based upon violations of statutes and not the exercise of discretionary duties for which the State would be immune. Whether governmental conduct is discretionary requires consideration of whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment and if so, whether the choice or judgment in supervision involves social, economic or political policy alternatives. Doe asserts two statutory violations by the State in its acceptance of the parolee. He did not meet the six-month residency requirement under the Uniform Act and the State improperly accepted him for supervision when he was ineligible for parole in Illinois. Under section 47-7-71(1), a probationer or parolee can be sent from the sending state to the receiving state if he is in fact a resident of or has his family residing within the receiving state and can obtain employment there. Here, the parolee’s parents are residents of Etta and he indicated he had a job waiting for him. The fact that the parolee’s parents were willing to take him in apparently satisfied the Illinois authorities as he was paroled in Illinois and ordered to report for supervision in Mississippi. The State’s acceptance of the parolee was proper. Doe also argues that Mississippi should have initiated actions to send the parolee back to Illinois because of his failure to report within 72 hours of his release from Illinois and that the State's failure to supervise him once he did report was causally related to the rape. The only Mississippi statutory or regulatory authorities concerning the handling of a parolee's failure to contact a Field Officer are MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 37.01.01 which provides that the Interstate Compact Office shall be notified in writing if the offender does not make contact within 120 days of the initial acceptance date and MDOC Standard Operating Procedure 37.02.01 which provides that the initial personal contact between the parolee and the supervising Field Officer should take place as soon as possible, but no more than three work days after the parolee's release from custody. Here, the parolee made contact within the 120-day window but not within three days. While his parole could have been revoked and he could have been sent back to Illinois for failing to report within 72 hours, there is nothing in the Compact or applicable MDOC regulations requiring that. Therefore, the decision not to revoke his parole is necessarily an exercise of discretion. Doe also argues that applicable state regulations required the State to conduct at least one home visit of the parolee per month. While the supervision procedures appear to be ministerial in nature, the Field Officer's responsibilities to monitor and supervise a parolee should be immune from suit in cases such as this one where the State had no indication of a specific threat on the parolee’s part to harm Doe. Holding the State liable for the negligent supervision of parolees would likely force parole officers to become overly restrictive and overbearing in their supervision and become more apt to revoke paroles out of fear they could be held liable for the acts of third parties which they have no reason to believe would occur. Issue 2: Accrual of action Section 11-46-11(3) provides that all actions brought under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act shall be commenced within one year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based. Doe argues that the one-year period did not start running until January 26, 1999, the date she was raped. The State contends that the period started running on either September 16, 1998, the date the parolee was initially accepted, or December 16, 1998, the date he reported for supervision. Doe's negligent supervision claim which is based on the State's alleged negligence in supervising the parolee after he reported to the Field Officer is independent of the negligent acceptance claim which was based upon the provisions of the Compact. Doe could not have filed suit on her negligent supervision claim until she was raped on January 26, 1999. Therefore, the one-year window to file a notice of claim did not begin to run until that date, and her notice of claim and complaint on the negligent supervision claim were filed timely. |
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