Dampier v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-01792-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-24-2008 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder - Jury venire - Photographs - M.R.E. 403 - Lesser offense instruction - Inference instruction - Expert witness instruction - Refused instructions - Closing argument Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Lamar, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-01-2006 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: Conviction of capital murder and sentence to serve a term of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. District Attorney: David Byrd Clark Case Number: 165-82 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Deandre Dampier |
KELSEY LEVOIL RUSHING,
RAMEL LEMAR COTTON |
|
|
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Capital murder - Jury venire - Photographs - M.R.E. 403 - Lesser offense instruction - Inference instruction - Expert witness instruction - Refused instructions - Closing argument |
| Summary of the Facts: | Deandre Dampier was convicted of capital murder during the commission of a robbery. The circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Dampier appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jury venire At trial, Dampier argued that the jury venire lacked fair representation, as there was only one African-American among its thirty-eight members. On appeal, Dampier argues that the discriminatory effect alone was prejudicial and the case should be reversed. This issue is procedurally barred, because Dampier failed to cite authority in support of his argument. The venire from which the jury was selected was produced by a computer which randomly selected names from the voter rolls of Rankin County. Furthermore, Dampier objected only to the results of the selection process, not the manner in which the jury was drawn. As such, Dampier has failed to make a showing of any of the prima facie elements of discrimination. Issue 2: Photographs Dampier argues that the crime scene photographs were overly prejudicial. So long as a photograph has probative value and its introduction serves a meaningful evidentiary purpose, it may still be admissible despite being gruesome, grisly, unpleasant, or even inflammatory. In this case, the photographs failed to exhibit elements of gruesomeness. The circuit court applied the test of M.R.E. 403 to each of the photographs and determined that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The circuit court also noted a meaningful evidentiary purpose and probative value of each specific photograph. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in their admission. Issue 3: Lesser offense instruction Dampier argues that the court erred in refusing to grant a lesser offense instruction on accessory after the fact. The evidentiary standard for lesser offense instructions is the same as for lesser-included offense instructions. To be entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, the defendant must point to evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find him not guilty of the crime with which he was charged and at the same time find him guilty of the lesser included offense. One cannot be both a principal in the crime and an accessory after the fact. Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as such. The evidence presented in this case raises only the issue of Dampier’s role as a principal, not an accessory after the fact. Whether Dampier was ignorant, as he alleges, or was a principal by statute, an accessory-after-the-fact instruction lacked an evidentiary basis. Therefore, this issue is without merit. Issue 4: Inference instruction Dampier argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing the State to argue that possession of a stolen vehicle gives the inference, but not allowing Dampier the opportunity to argue that all inferences have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the instructions which were given fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. The reasonable-doubt standard was adequately addressed in another instruction, which required each capital murder element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the court did not err in refusing Dampier’s instruction as cumulative. Issue 5: Expert witness instruction Dampier argues that the court erred in granting an instruction and refusing his instruction on the weight given to expert witness testimony. Since the instruction which was given fairly announces the law of the case on weighing expert testimony, this issue is without merit. Issue 6: Refused instructions Dampier argues that the court erred in denying ten of the eleven jury instructions he offered. This issue is procedurally barred as Dampier fails to cite any authority in support of his argument. In addition, because the granted instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Issue 7: Closing argument Dampier argues that comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper. In closing argument, the wide latitude allowed attorneys extends not only to the facts presented in evidence, but also to deduction and conclusions he may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts. However, arguing statements of fact which are not in evidence or necessarily inferable from facts in evidence is error when those statements are prejudicial. Dampier’s failure to object to the comments in closing argument creates a procedural bar, as those comments did not infringe upon Dampier’s constitutional rights. In addition, the disputed comments were well within the wide latitude extended to attorneys in closing argument. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
