Ford Motor Co., et al. v. Tennin


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Docket Number: 2003-IA-02546-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2003-IA-02546-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-05-2007
Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful death - Discovery violations - General objections - M.R.C.P. 34(b) - M.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) - Continuance - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 37
Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.
Dissenting Author : DIAZ, J.
Dissent Joined By : GRAVES, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 08-01-2003
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Winston Kidd
Disposition: Jury returned verdict in favor of Appellant. Court denied Appellee's Motion for JNOV but granted its Motion for a New Trial & awarded attoreneys' fees to Appellee
Case Number: 251-02-96CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: FORD MOTOR COMPANY AND WORLD RENTAL CAR SALES OF MISSISSIPPI, LLC




MICHAEL B. WALLACE REUBEN V. ANDERSON REBECCA HAWKINS BARRY W. FORD WALKER (BILL) JONES, III BRADLEY WITHERSPOON SMITH ROBERT F. WALKER



 

Appellee: JULIA TENNIN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF L. C. TENNIN, III, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES; AND PATRICIA ALEXANDER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ANTOINE ALEXANDER, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES FELECIA PERKINS  

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Topic: Wrongful death - Discovery violations - General objections - M.R.C.P. 34(b) - M.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) - Continuance - Attorney’s fees - M.R.C.P. 37

Summary of the Facts: After L.C. Tennin and Antoine Alexander died in an automobile accident when a fire started somewhere within the Ford Explorer in which they were passengers, representatives from the two men’s estates filed suit against Ford Motor Company alleging that a defective fuel system caused the men’s deaths because it failed to perform properly under the circumstances of the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford. The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial based on deceitful and false representations and intentional omissions by Ford. Plaintiffs’ counsel also submitted an affidavit of her attorney’s fees in the amount of $326,362.50 and an itemization of expenses for a total of $177,829.21. The trial court entered an order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting their motion for a new trial. The order also awarded the plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees against the defendants. The court later entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $144,600 in attorney’s fees and $57,262.99 in expenses representing the fees paid to experts testifying at trial. Ford appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Discovery violations The plaintiffs argue that throughout the discovery process, and through the trial itself, Ford intentionally withheld relevant documents in violation of numerous court orders. However, the record contains only a few orders of the court concerning discovery matters, and only one order violated by Ford. Although plaintiffs’ counsel asked the company to withdraw its general objections, at no point did the trial court order Ford to withdraw its specific objections to all of the plaintiffs’ discovery requests. In fact, the trial court could not have taken such an action. When objections to discovery of specific documents are made, the trial court should deal with each on an item-by-item basis, carefully considering each objection, deciding whether to allow discovery, and stating the rule or exception which provides the basis for the decision. With regard to general objections to discovery requests, like those proffered by Ford in its initial response to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for production, such general objections applicable to each and every interrogatory or request for production are clearly outside the bounds of M.R.C.P. 34(b). If a party wishes to lodge an objection to a question or request submitted by the opposition, that party must make such objection to that specific question or request. Where the plaintiffs disagreed with a specific objection proffered by Ford, the proper course of action was to timely file a motion to compel and subsequently seek to obtain an order to compel. When a party is aware of an incomplete or evasive discovery response, that party should take affirmative action by seeking an order compelling discovery pursuant to M.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). It is the movant’s burden to ensure that the motion is heard, ruled upon, and an appropriate order is entered by the trial court. When the plaintiffs followed the procedure contemplated by Rule 37 just days before and during trial, Ford produced the ordered documents. A party should not be punished because the other party opted to continue complaining to the trial court about perceived discovery abuses rather than request and pursue specific action earlier in the litigation. Ford violated a single order of the court concerning the time frame for the submission of documents, and the documents were submitted two days late. Thus, Ford is not absolved of all fault for the discovery disputes in this case. While the trial court’s frustration with the discovery process is understandable, ordering a new trial after a unanimous jury verdict for the defendant, based on a perceived violation of court orders which were never placed of record, was an abuse of discretion. The plaintiffs chose not to move for a continuance after receiving thirty plus boxes of discoverable documents during trial. If they were genuinely concerned about needing the information produced during trial, then the proper procedure was to request a continuance or mistrial and a claim for expenses and costs. The plaintiffs should not get a second bite at the apple based on their questionable trial strategy. Issue 2: Attorney’s fees Where the basis for the award of attorney’s fees is itself a product of abused discretion, so too is the award. In this case, the trial court’s finding of multiple, intentional discovery violations was erroneous, so the award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiffs (presumably under Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(e)) was consequently an abuse of discretion. Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4), once a trial court has entered an order granting a motion to compel, as the trial court did in this case, the trial court, after a hearing, could have assessed Ford the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in bringing the motion to compel. Likewise, under M.R.C.P. 37(b), a trial court may impose sanctions for the failure to comply with an order. The only order not fully complied with by Ford was the trial court’s order to submit allegedly privileged documents for in camera review by the start of trial. Ford ultimately complied with the order two days late. Therefore, the trial court could have assessed Ford the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiffs caused by its compliance with the court’s ruling two days later than ordered. Any award of attorney’s fees and expenses should be supported with factual determinations by the trial court.


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