Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Hall
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00206-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-12-2007 Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Federal Employer’s Liability Act - M.R.C.P. 36 (b) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I) - M.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B) - Contributory negligence - Jury instructions - Lay witness testimony Judge(s) Concurring: DIAZ, EASLEY AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): WALLER, P.J., AND GRAVES, J. Dissenting Author : SMITH, C.J. Dissent Joined By : COBB, P.J., AND CARLSON, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-22-2004 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: Jury found Appellant liable & awarded damages to Appellee Case Number: 251-02-988CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL
RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION |
CHARLES HENRY RUSSELL, III,
CHARLES T. OZIER |
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| Appellee: | JAMES WESLEY HALL | ROBERT M. FREY , CHRISTOPHER ALLEN KEITH |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Federal Employer’s Liability Act - M.R.C.P. 36 (b) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I) - M.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B) - Contributory negligence - Jury instructions - Lay witness testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | While working for Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Company, James Hall fell and sustained serious leg injuries. Hall filed suit pursuant to FELA, claiming that Illinois Central failed to provide him with a reasonably safe work environment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hall in the amount of $1,501,907.97, with no reduction for contributory negligence on the part of Hall. Illinois Central appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: FELA To prevail under the FELA, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; he was employed by the defendant with duties advancing such commerce; his injuries were sustained while he was so employed; and his injuries resulted from the defendant’s negligence. The FELA supplants an employer’s common law duty with a far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer’s negligence. Under the Act, the plaintiff’s burden of proving causation is significantly relaxed compared to the burden in an ordinary negligence action. In this case, the jury considered Hall’s claim that Illinois Central failed to provide a reasonably safe work environment by allowing employees to mount moving equipment; allowing Hall to mount moving equipment when it had been raining; and allowing the Yard to accumulate mud and oil on its walkways. Hall’s evidence sufficiently created a question of fact as to whether Illinois Central failed to provide a reasonably safe work environment. Illinois Central argues that Hall’s admission during cross-examination that he did not know what caused his foot to slip was fatal to his claims that Illinois Central was negligent in allowing employees to mount moving equipment in the rain and in maintaining slippery and unsafe walkways. Hall admitted during cross-examination that he was speculating as to whether his boots contained the slippery substance at the time of the accident. This admission, however, is not fatal to Hall’s claim. Evidence in the record clearly established that, on the day of the accident, it had been raining and the muddy substance was on the ground. The evidence further established that Hall was walking in the Yard during this period of time, and that there was no facility to clean his boots. These facts created sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to find that Hall’s boots indeed had mud on them at the time of the accident. Where a party admits a matter in response to a request for admissions, that matter is conclusively established under M.R.C.P. 36 (b), but that is not the case here. Issue 2: Expert testimony Illinois Central argues that the court erred in admitting testimony from Hall’s expert. Under M.R.E. 702, the court must examine both the relevance and the reliability of expert testimony. Illinois Central argued that the expert’s work experience as a claims investigator did not involve any experience as a conductor, brakeman or switchman and that the expert had essentially self-educated himself regarding the safety of mounting moving equipment by reading safety rules and studying information compiled from the Internet. The expert started a railroad safety consulting business in 1982 and has worked with attorneys, insurance companies, state transportation departments, and private industries on the topic of railroad safety regulations since then. Furthermore, he indicated that he had been qualified as an expert to testify as to the application of railroad safety rules and accident prevention in various states throughout the country and that he is a founding member of the National Association of Railroad Safety Consultants and has attended and given presentations at various educational seminars. Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the witness to testify as an expert in the field of operating and safety rules. Illinois Central also argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing the expert to reference certain material not provided in discovery. Illinois Central failed to properly object to the expert’s testimony regarding reasons why the major railroads were amending their safety rules and to the expert’s reference to statistical information from the FRA booklet. Thus, Illinois Central is now procedurally barred from arguing on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing this evidence to be admitted. In addition, the subject matter contained in the expert report (that major railroads were changing their safety rules regarding the mounting and dismounting of moving equipment) included the subject matter to which the expert testified at trial (reasons why major railroads were amending their safety rules). Thus, there was no violation of M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(I) and 37(b)(2)(B). Illinois Central also argues that the expert’s testimony and opinions were not relevant. However, Illinois Central never objected to the relevance of the testimony. Issue 3: Contributory negligence Illinois Central argues that the jury’s failure to attribute contributory negligence to Hall was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Illinois Central had the burden of proving that Hall failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. The evidence produced at trial was not overwhelmingly in favor of either side. Thus, the jury’s rejection of Illinois Central’s contributory negligence claim was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Issue 4: Jury instructions Illinois Central argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning fact-specific claims of contributory negligence and in instructing the jury that they could find for Hall on multiple claims of negligence. Illinois Central’s theory of the case was adequately presented when viewing the jury instructions in toto. Reading the jury instructions as a whole, Illinois Central’s theory of Hall’s contributory negligence was adequately presented to the jury through various other jury instructions. With regard to a proposed instruction which asked the jury to consider whether Hall violated T-740, which instructed employees not to mount equipment moving at an unsafe speed, the instruction was properly denied because there was no testimony that the train in question was moving at an unsafe speed at the time of the accident. Illinois Central also argues that the court erred by granting a jury instruction which allowed the jury to find for Hall on other claims of negligence, specifically, Hall’s claims that Illinois Central was negligent in failing to provide safe walkways and walking conditions. However, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial in support of Hall’s other claims of negligence. Issue 5: Lay witness testimony Illinois Central argues that the court committed reversible error by allowing Hall’s lay witness to testify as to the safety of the locomotive. FLIA preempts state law regulations and common law actions regarding locomotive design. The witness’s testimony in this case that a switch engine is an engine specifically built to switch cars, as opposed to a road engine, which is built differently and that sometime in the nineties, Illinois Central stopped using switch engines and started using road engines in the yard, did not violate FLIA. |
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