City of Jackson v. Powell
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-01013-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-10-2005 Opinion Author: Cobb, Kay B Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Assault & battery - Tort Claims Act - Criminal activity - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Reckless disregard - Excessive force - Malice - Section 11-46-5(2) - Section 11-46-7(2) - Discretionary functions - Attorney’s fees - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ., Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Dickinson, J., Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, P.J., Diaz and Graves, JJ Concurs in Result Only: Randolph, J., Easley, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-04-2003 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: Find for plaintiff Case Number: 251-97-1531 CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | CITY OF JACKSON |
BARBARA A. BLUNTSON |
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| Appellee: | FREDERICK POWELL | CHOKWE LUMUMBA, ALI MUHAMMAD SHAMSIDDEEN |
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| Topic: | Assault & battery - Tort Claims Act - Criminal activity - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Reckless disregard - Excessive force - Malice - Section 11-46-5(2) - Section 11-46-7(2) - Discretionary functions - Attorney’s fees - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Frederick Powell filed suit against the City of Jackson claiming that certain Jackson Police Department officers committed on him acts of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Two separate orders were entered by the trial court. In one, the judge found that Powell had proved his claim against all defendants and was entitled to $100,000 in compensatory damages from the City of Jackson and the two officers, jointly and severally. He further found that the two officers were jointly and severally liable to Powell for an additional $50,000 in punitive damages. The judge also found that, pursuant to section 11-46-7(3) the city was responsible for all damage awards against the two officers. Thus, judgment was entered against the city for $150,000. In the second order, the judge cited 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (a), (b) and (c), and granted Powell $31,350 in attorney’s fees and $3,300 in litigation costs, and again ordered that the City of Jackson was responsible for all costs, attorney’s fees and money damages in the suit as a result of the action of the officers. The City appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Criminal activity The city argues that the court committed reversible error by failing to find it immune from liability under section 11-46-9(1)(c) because Powell was contemporaneously engaged in criminal activity. In order to prove that a victim is engaged in criminal activity it must be shown that the criminal activity has some causal nexus to the wrongdoing of the tortfeasor. Where an officer has probable cause to arrest and proceeds to do so, there is the requisite nexus between criminal activity and the action causing injury. In the present case, there was widely contradictory evidence presented to the trial court. Powell and six witnesses testified that Powell’s injuries occurred after the officers subdued and handcuffed him. It is undisputed that Powell violated several laws, including resisting arrest, but when the officers subdued and handcuffed Powell, his criminal activity had ceased. Powell’s offenses that led to his arrest and subsequent escape attempt did not cause the officers to continue to beat and kick Powell after he had been subdued and handcuffed. The crimes for which Powell was charged and convicted ceased prior to the delivery of the offensive blows by the officers. His attempt to resist arrest ended, at the latest under the facts of this case, when he was handcuffed. Therefore, the city is not immune from suit due to Powell’s previous criminal activity and escape attempt. Issue 2: Reckless disregard The city also argues that it is immune from liability under section 11-46-9(1)(c) because the trial judge failed to make a finding that the officers acted in reckless disregard of Powell’s safety and well-being at the time of his injury. In order to recover under the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff must prove that the officer acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Reckless disregard embraces willful or wanton conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act. In the present case, the judge found the officers’ conduct as “intentional and malicious” as well as “callous and willful.” Since the judge also described the officers’ conduct as “intentional” and “willful” in a portion of his opinion where he determined whether the city and the officers where immune to suit under section 11-46-9(1)(c), that is sufficient to show that the judge evaluated the evidence under the correct standard for reckless disregard. Issue 3: Excessive force The city argues that the court erred by finding that the officers violated Powell’s constitutional rights by using excessive force in arresting him. The police may exert physical force in overcoming resistence during an arrest, but they may only use that force which is reasonably necessary to respond to the resistence encountered. The officers continued to use force on Powell after he was subdued and handcuffed; as a result, their actions were grossly disproportionate and malicious. The exercise of the degree of force necessary to knock out several teeth from the mouth of an individual who was handcuffed and unable to offer physical resistence to the police does shock the conscience and supports the trial court’s finding of excessive force. Therefore, the trial judge did not err. Issue 4: Malice The city argues that the court erred by holding it liable under the Tort Claims Act for the actions of the officers despite the fact that the court found the officers’ actions “malicious.” According to sections 11-46-5(2) and 11-46-7(2), the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions have not waived sovereign immunity for employees that act beyond the course and scope of their employment, and employees act beyond that scope when they act with malice. Because the officers acted with malice the City of Jackson is immune from liability for their actions. It appears from the record that the trial court acknowledged that the officers acted with malice but still held the city liable because it negligently supervised the officers. The court found that the City of Jackson was aware of one of the officer’s history of using excessive force and being abusive toward minorities. Therefore, the trial court surmised that the city’s liability was not premised on the actions of the officers but on its own actions. This is an incorrect statement of the law. A State may not be sued except by its consent. For its own actions the State and its political subdivisions have retained immunity for discretionary functions. The manner in which a police department supervises, disciplines and regulates its police officers is a discretionary function of the government and thus the city is immune to suit under section 11-46-9(1)(d). Therefore, the judgment of the trial court regarding the city’s liability to Powell is hereby reversed and rendered. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (a), (b) & (c), the judge awarded Powell attorney’s fees and cost of litigation, totaling $34,650. In order for a trial court to have authority to decide a case under § 1983, it must be adequately pled in the complaint. Powell’s complaint does not specifically cite § 1983, and nowhere in the pleadings is it mentioned. However, Powell’s complaint does allege that the officers acted “under the color of law” and that Powell suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. Such conclusory language, unsupported by specific factual allegations, is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate supervision by the City of Jackson. Further, the absence of factual support or evidence in the complaint makes this pleading insufficient on its face. In addition, there was not a scintilla of evidence presented to indicate that the city had either an on-the-books or off-the-books policy which encouraged the type of activity that the officers engaged in. |
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