Glover v. Jackson State Univ.


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Docket Number: 2005-CA-02328-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-02328-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-06-2007
Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J.
Holding: The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor. Reversed and Remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Proximate causation - Foreseeability
Judge(s) Concurring: DIAZ, P.J., AND RANDOLPH, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): GRAVES, J.
Dissenting Author : EASLEY, J., with Separate Written Opinion J.
Dissent Joined By : SMITH, C.J., AND CARLSON, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Lamar, J.
Concurs in Result Only: Waller, P.J., Concurs in Result Only With Separate Written Opinion Joined in Part by Randolph, J.
Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY; Motion for Rehearing

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 09-23-2005
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Bobby DeLaughter
Disposition: Granted appellee's motion for summary judgment
Case Number: 251-96-1190CIV

Note: On Motion for Rehearing. Original opinion withdrawn & this opinion substituted therefor

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: MALIKAH GLOVER, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT OF KIN, GREGUICK GLOVER AND SANDRA GLOVER




ROBERT FARLEY WILKINS, BARRY W. HOWARD, JENNIFER PAIGE WILKINS



 

Appellee: JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY BARRY DOUGLAS HASSELL, MICHAEL WAYNE BAXTER  

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Topic: Personal injury - Proximate causation - Foreseeability

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is denied, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. After being raped on the campus of Jackson State University, Malikah Glover filed suit against numerous defendants, all of whom have been dismissed by summary judgment and collateral estoppel, with the exception of JSU. In Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 755 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 2000), the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment granted to JSU, and remanded the case to the trial court. Five years later, JSU filed a new motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. Glover appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: JSU argues it was entitled to summary judgment because Glover’s injuries were not foreseeable; JSU’s alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Glover’s injuries; and the criminal acts of the two boys who raped the victim were superceding, intervening causes of Glover’s injuries, thereby absolving JSU of any responsibility. On motion for rehearing, JSU argues that the Court is now bound by both collateral estoppel and the “law of the case,” which prohibits the Court from finding that Glover’s rape was foreseeable to Luster (the driver for the NYSP program), because in Glover I, the Court held itself bound by the federal court’s ruling that the rape was unforeseeable to Luster. Whether Luster should have foreseen a rape is not the issue. Rather, the Court is required to determine whether a fact-question exists as to JSU’s negligence. For a particular damage to be recoverable in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the damage was proximately caused by the negligence. In order for an act of negligence to proximately cause the damage, the fact finder must find that the negligence was both the cause in fact and legal cause of the damage. The cause in fact of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. In satisfying the requirement of foreseeability, a plaintiff is not required to prove that the exact injury sustained by the plaintiff was foreseeable; rather, it is enough to show that the plaintiff’s injuries and damages fall within a particular kind or class of injury or harm which could reasonably be expected to flow from the defendant’s negligence. On the day the rapes occurred, JSU’s bus driver, Luster, knew that both boys had violent tendencies. Furthermore, Luster was aware of accusations that Glover had been inside the boys’ rest room, suggesting some kind of sexual activity. Given JSU’s knowledge of both the boys’ violent tendencies, coupled with the sixty-three crimes which were reported to have occurred on the JSU campus during the three months prior to the rape – a fact-finder could find that JSU failed to provide adequate supervision and security on its premises. In addition, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that, because of inadequate security and supervision, JSU should have foreseen that some harm could come to Glover, and that the type of harm was sexual activity and/or violence. Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate. JSU’s argument that the rape was an intervening, superceding cause of Glover’s damages has no merit. Because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that JSU was fully aware that the boys both had violent tendencies, and that Glover had been in the boys’ restroom having sex with one of the boys in the program, summary judgment based upon the doctrine of intervening, superceding cause is inappropriate.


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