Methodist Hosp. of Hattiesburg, Inc. v. Richardson
| Docket Number: | 2003-IA-00088-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: |
Opinion Date: 02-03-2005 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed and remanded |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Notice - Timely joinder of real party in interest - M.R.C.P. 17(a) - M.R.C.P. 12(b) - M.R.C.P. 15(a) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., and Easley, J. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Dissenting Author : Randolph, J. Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-16-2002 Appealed from: Lamar County Circuit Court Judge: R. I. Prichard, III Disposition: Denied summary judgment. |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | METHODIST HOSPITAL OF HATTIESBURG, INC.
NOW KNOWN AS WESLEY HEALTH CENTER |
MATTHEW D. MILLER
J. ROBERT RAMSAY |
||
| Appellee: | LINDA RICHARDSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH HEIRS OF VIVIAN WHEELESS, DECEASED, AND THE ESTATE OF VIVIAN WHEELESS, BY AND THROUGH LINDA RICHARDSON, ADMINISTRATRIX | J. ANDREW PHELPS MARK THOMAS FINCH |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Wrongful death - Notice - Timely joinder of real party in interest - M.R.C.P. 17(a) - M.R.C.P. 12(b) - M.R.C.P. 15(a) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Linda Richardson filed a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim against Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, which is now known as Wesley Health Center, for the death of Vivian Wheeless, her mother. The complaint alleged the wrongful death beneficiaries to be Richardson and Vivian’s sons, Harlea Wheeless, Herman Leon Wheeless, Robert Wheeless, and Luther Wheeless. There was no separate claim asserted by the Estate of Vivian Wheeless. Wesley filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment as to the issue of wrongful death, but remanded the case in order that a jury could decide the pain and suffering claim. Upon remand, Wesley filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment arguing that the Estate of Vivian Wheeless, the real party in interest, was not a party to this action. The court granted Wesley’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Richardson petitioned the chancery court to open an estate for Vivian Wheeless and to appoint her as administratrix of the estate. The chancery court entered an order granting letters of administration to Richardson as administratrix of the Estate of Vivian Wheeless and acknowledging the only possible asset of the estate was whatever interest the Estate may have as to pain and suffering and any other claims in the pending circuit court action against Wesley. Richardson then filed an amended complaint in the pending circuit court action. Wesley filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or Alternatively, its third Motion for Summary Judgment. The court entered an order dismissing the wrongful death claims but permitted Richardson to proceed with the survival claim. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Notice Wesley argues that proper and sufficient notice was not provided in the original complaint that the Estate of Vivian Wheeless was advancing a survival action. In resolving the original appeal and denying rehearing, the Supreme Court held that though the survival statute was not specifically cited in the complaint, the pleadings in this case delineate two specific causes of action and are sufficient under our system of notice pleadings. Today’s decision simply allows the pain and suffering element, which was specifically pleaded in the original complaint in the case sub judice, to remain viable. Issue 2: Timely joinder Wesley argues that the Estate’s attempt to intervene was not timely. M.R.C.P. 17(a) provides for a reasonable time upon objection for joinder of the real party in interest. The court granted Wesley’s M.R.C.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss, stating that the only party who could bring such a claim was the Estate of Vivian Wheeless. Pursuant to the express language of Rules 12(b) and 15(a), Richardson was then entitled to amend her pleadings. Three days later, Richardson began proceedings to open the Estate of Vivian Wheeless and to be appointed as Administratrix. Less than one month after the trial court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on an improper party, Richardson amended the complaint. Therefore, the real party in interest joined the suit within a reasonable time after objection. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
