Harmon v. Regions Bank
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-00453-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-00453-SCT ; 2006-CA-00453-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-07-2007 Opinion Author: DICKINSON, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Harassment - Defamation - Preemption - Fair Credit Reporting Act - 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) - Malice - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 - M.R.C.P. 56 - Amendment of complaint Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., AND CARLSON, J. Non Participating Judge(s): LAMAR, J. Dissenting Author : DIAZ, P.J., EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: RANDOLPH, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-19-2005 Appealed from: Chickasaw County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew K. Howorth Disposition: The Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, Regions Bank. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Entry of Summary Judgment and a Motion for Authority to File Amended Complaint, which were denied by the Circuit Court. Case Number: H-2003-082 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | MARTHA M. HARMON AND JAMES V. HARMON |
REX F. SANDERSON |
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| Appellee: | REGIONS BANK | L. BRADLEY DILLARD R. BRANNON KAHLSTORF |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Harassment - Defamation - Preemption - Fair Credit Reporting Act - 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) - Malice - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 - M.R.C.P. 56 - Amendment of complaint |
| Summary of the Facts: | Martha Harmon and James Harmon filed suit against Regions Bank. Regions Bank filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. The Harmons appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Preemption The Harmons argue that the court erred in finding the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts state law claims of defamation and harassment. Preemption is proper where Congress explicitly preempts state law; where preemption is implied because Congress has occupied the entire field; or where preemption is implied because there is an actual conflict between federal and state law. Regions Bank qualifies as an entity that furnishes information to consumer reporting agencies and its actions are therefore covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The FCRA includes two preemption provisions, one of which is 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). The tort list of § 1681h(e) is non-exhaustive and includes state law claims itemized and in the nature of those listed. Defamation as a cause of action is specifically enumerated by § 1681h(e). The Harmons’ harassment claim is closely affiliated with and can be deemed in the nature of an invasion of privacy claim. Therefore, both claims fit within the FCRA preemption provision. The Harmons argue they are excluded from preemption as their claim fits under the last line of § 1681h(e), i.e., the conduct of Regions Bank was performed with malice or a willful intent to injure them. The Harmons’ complaint outlines the facts surrounding their loan history but never alleges malicious conduct on the part of Regions Bank. In addition, no evidence of willful intent or malice on the part of Regions Bank was presented. Under M.R.C.P. 9(b), it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to plead fraud with particularity and present facts which would show malice in order to escape disposition on summary judgment. Here, no material facts were presented that called into question whether Regions Bank acted with malice in addressing the Harmons or reporting the false information. Issue 2: Findings of fact The Harmons argue that the court failed to make findings of fact in that the judge did not address the reasons why their claim did not fall within the exception to preemption in the FCRA. M.R.C.P. 52 only requires findings of fact in actions tried by the court without a jury and where a party files a motion no later than ten days after entry of judgment. Even though evidence may be received by way of sworn affidavits, deposition testimony, and other such evidence, a Rule 56 summary judgment hearing is not an action tried upon the facts without a jury so as to trigger Rule 52 applicability. Neither of those circumstances contemplated by Rule 52 are present here, therefore, findings of fact are not necessary. In addition, the findings were sufficient in this case. Issue 3: Amendment of complaint The Harmons requested leave to amend their complaint at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The judge granted them leave to file an amendment before a motion to reconsider and before a final order was entered. However, the Harmons did not file their motion to amend complaint until seven days after the entry of final judgment. A motion to amend is not timely where it is filed after summary judgment is entered. |
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