Jones, et al. v. Fluor Daniel Serv. Corp.


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Docket Number: 2005-CA-00825-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-21-2007
Opinion Author: SMITH, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed in Part, Reversed & Remanded in Part

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wrongful discharge - Federal law claims - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)
Judge(s) Concurring: WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: EASLEY, J. CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTE
Dissenting Author : EASLEY, J.
Concurs in Result Only: DIAZ, P.J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-22-2005
Appealed from: Jasper County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert G. Evans
Disposition: Granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case Number: 13-0036

Note: Appellants' Motion for Leave to Supplement Record is denied. Appellee's Supplemental Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record is granted. The record in this appeal is supplemented to include pages 24, 83 and 86-87 of the Deposition of Gene Jones; pages 12-20 and 23-24 of the Deposition of Hardy Gordon; pages 48-49 of the Deposition of Ashley Craft; and page 33 of the Deposition of James Williams, all as attached to the motion and certified by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Jasper County.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: GENE JONES, ASHLEY CRAFT, RALPH SCOTT, HARDY GORDON, JAMES WILLIAMS AND REGGIE WILLIAMS




THOMAS QUITMAN BRAME, JR.



 

Appellee: FLUOR DANIEL SERVICES CORPORATION STEVE J. ALLEN  

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Topic: Wrongful discharge - Federal law claims - Intentional infliction of emotional distress - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)

Summary of the Facts: The plaintiffs in this case, all black males, were employees of Fluor Daniel Services Corporation in the late summer and early fall of 2001. While under Fluor Daniel’s employ, the plaintiffs worked directly for a supervisor named Rudy Amaro. After being dismissed from Fluor Daniel for various reasons and at various times, the plaintiffs filed an action, complaining of alleged racially motivated actions on the part of Amaro and Fluor Daniel. Fluor Daniel moved for summary judgment which the court granted. The plaintiffs appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Wrongful discharge Where an employee is terminated because he or she has refused to participate in an illegal activity or he or she has reported an illegal activity of the employer to the employer or to anyone else, a suit for wrongful discharge may be maintained despite the at will status of the employee. The plaintiffs argue that they were discharged for reporting the illegal activities of Fluor Daniel. They claim that the conduct of Rudy Amaro violated section 97-35-15, a disturbance of the peace statute, and section 97-35-3, a provoking breach of peace statute. They argue that because each of them was terminated for reporting that conduct, the exception to the at-will employment doctrine should apply. The “reporting of illegal acts” exception to the at-will employment doctrine has been applied only when the illegal act actually had something to do with the business itself. Even if it was found that Amaro had violated one of the statutes cited by the plaintiffs, this issue does not rise to the level necessary to fit into the very narrow exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. The alleged “breach of the peace” had nothing to do with the business of Fluor Daniel. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Amaro’s conduct was reported because it was illegal. The deposition testimony makes very clear that Amaro’s comments and behavior merely bothered the plaintiffs, not that they ever considered the conduct to be criminal. Issue 2: Federal law claims The plaintiffs’ argument that the court erred in dismissing their federal law claims is raised for the first time on appeal and will not be addressed. Issue 3: Intentional infliction of emotional distress The plaintiffs argue that a number of acts by Fluor Daniel warrant recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Where there is something about the defendant’s conduct that evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionally–or even unintentionally yet the results being reasonably foreseeable–courts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional distress even though there has been no physical injury. The question in this case is whether a reasonable juror could find that Amaro’s comment to a group of black workers (“you monkeys can go to work or go to the rope”) was patently a racial slur constituting outrageous and revolting conduct. Fluor Daniel claims that the plaintiffs have offered no admissible evidence of vicarious liability on the part of Fluor Daniel for the comment made by Amaro. However, the plaintiffs claim that, immediately after making the comment, Amaro said that someone in the main office had told him to make the statement. Fluor Daniel argues that Amaro’s statement is hearsay and would not be admissible at trial. However, Amaro’s statement would be admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D) as an admission by a party opponent. Therefore, this evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on this issue. The allegations of segregation of black and Mexican workers also present an issue to be considered. The plaintiffs also testified that they were forced to work harder jobs than the Mexican workers. If this is true, this also could rise to the level of outrageous conduct. Therefore, the plaintiffs should be afforded their day in court on this issue.


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