Tentoni, et al. v. Slayden
| Docket Number: | 2005-CT-00529-SCT Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00529-COA ; 2005-CA-00529-COA ; 2005-CT-00529-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-08-2007 Opinion Author: CARLSON, J. Holding: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Peremptory instruction - Closing argument Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ. Dissenting Author : DIAZ, P.J. Dissent Joined By : GRAVES, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY Writ of Certiorari: Yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-30-2004 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: Jury Verdict in favor of Slayden |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstates and affirms the trial court judgment entered in favor of Slayden and against Tentoni, consistent with the jury verdict. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | JACKIE TENTONI, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS NEXT
FRIEND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN, MELANIE TENTONI, JOHNATHAN
TENTONI AND PHILLIP TENTONI |
JOSEPH S. GATLIN, III |
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| Appellee: | WARREN W. SLAYDEN | SHELLY G. BURNS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Peremptory instruction - Closing argument |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jackie Tentoni sued Warren Slayden, alleging negligence and gross negligence due to bodily injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident. The court entered a final judgment after a trial resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Slayden and against Tentoni. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and rendered as to liability and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Peremptory instruction The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in not granting a peremptory instruction (or a directed verdict) as to liability against Slayden and in favor of Tentoni, and thus remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial to assess the proper damages. Tentoni argues that she was entitled to a peremptory instruction because she presented evidence which proved each and every element set out in the “elements” instruction given by the court, and that she also established that Slayden was negligent as a matter of law. She argues that Slayden breached his duty by violating four specific statutes and that the proximate cause of Tentoni’s car leaving the roadway was clear and uncontradicted, as Slayden testified that he hit the Suzuki twice, which “shot her off to the right.” However, Tentoni’s own testimony contradicts this argument, as she testified that there was a third impact. The disputed testimony as to whether there were two or three impacts is of no moment, because extensive evidence was before the jury as to the conduct of the parties and the circumstances with which they were confronted as the parties’ vehicles and the eighteen-wheeler were southbound on I-55. It was for a properly-instructed jury to determine the traditional tort issues of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. It can reasonably be inferred from the evidence, the jury instructions given, and the jury verdict, that the jury deemed Slayden’s hydroplaning to have been unavoidable on his part, thus exonerating him of all liability for any resulting injuries allegedly suffered by Tentoni and her children, notwithstanding the first and second impacts which Slayden admitted had occurred. The record reveals that Slayden may have been trailing Tentoni for as many as fifty to sixty miles, presumably at a fairly constant rate of speed, without incident. Under the circumstances then and there existing, there was no reason for Slayden to believe he suddenly would hydroplane. Given the other options of either speeding up to what he believed to be an unsafe speed in order to pass Tentoni, or dropping back behind the eighteen-wheeler and enduring the heavy spray generated by the tractor trailer rig, Slayden’s decision to maintain the status quo and remain beside Tentoni in the left-hand, south-bound lane of Interstate 55 was not an unreasonable act, as obviously found by the jury in its verdict. Thus, the trial judge did not err in denying the plaintiff’s peremptory instruction on the issues of negligence and liability. Issue 2: Closing argument Tentoni argues that the jury was distracted from fairly and impartially deciding the issues presented because of certain improper and prejudicial statements made by Slayden’s counsel during closing arguments that Slayden has been the object of Tentoni’s fixation and her obsession for six years. In order to determine if a lawyer has made remarks in arguments to the jury which are so egregious as to require reversal, the test is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument creates an unjust prejudice against the opposing party resulting in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. While the comments made by counsel would have been better left unsaid, any error in making these statements to the jury was harmless since the trial judge instructed the jurors as to their solemn oaths to follow the law as given by the trial court via the instructions that it was to base its decision on the evidence and the law. |
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