Brown v. State
Docket Number: | 2007-KA-01330-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-01330-COA ; 2007-CT-01330-SCT |
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Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-16-2008 Opinion Author: CHANDLER, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Seizure of truck - Probable cause - Circumstantial-evidence instruction - Lesser-included offense instruction Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-08-2007 Appealed from: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Isadore Patrick Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: G. Gilmore Martin Case Number: 06-0122CRP |
Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
Appellant: | WILLIAM PRESLEY BROWN, II |
JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK |
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Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
Synopsis provided by: If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
Topic: | Murder - Seizure of truck - Probable cause - Circumstantial-evidence instruction - Lesser-included offense instruction |
Summary of the Facts: | William Brown II was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals. |
Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Seizure of truck Brown argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers unlawfully seized his vehicle without probable cause. The State argues that Brown lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the truck on Fourth Amendment grounds because no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing regarding the issue of ownership. There is no direct evidence in the trial record about whether Brown was lawfully in possession of the truck. But, the State never presented any evidence that he was not in lawful possession of the vehicle. Therefore, there is no indication from the record that Brown lacked standing. Where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. If the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself is contraband to a crime, it may be seized from a public place without a warrant. In this case, police officers were called to investigate the death of a woman whose body was found near a dumpster at the Vicksburg Hotel. Blood smears were found near her body in the parking lot. All of this information led officers to conclude that a vehicle had more than likely been used to transport the body from where she was killed to the dumpster. Less than eight hours after the discovery of the body, an officer was asked to check on a suspicious vehicle parked two blocks away from the Vicksburg Hotel. The officer observed a substance that appeared to be blood smeared on the tailgate, in the bed, and on the front seat. These facts were sufficient to justify a person of average caution in the belief that a crime had been committed and that this particular vehicle had been used in its commission. Issue 2: Jury instructions Brown argues that the court erred in refusing his circumstantial-evidence jury instruction. A circumstantial-evidence instruction must only be given when the State does not present direct evidence at the trial in the form of an eyewitness or a confession by the defendant. Additionally, an admission by the accused on an important element of the offense obviates the need for a circumstantial-evidence instruction. Viewed in connection with the other facts showing Brown’s involvement in the crime, Brown’s statements to a witness tend to prove his guilt. Brown admitted that he was at the crime scene and that he might have killed someone. Thus, he was not entitled to a circumstantial-evidence instruction. He also argues that the court erred in denying his accessory-after-the-fact jury instruction. A lesser-offense instruction should only be granted by the trial judge when an evidentiary basis exists in the record to support such an instruction. The crime of accessory after the fact requires that the defendant act with the intent to help the felon escape detection. There was no evidence put on at trial that Brown acted with the intent to enable another man to escape or avoid arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment for the murder. Thus, a reasonable jury could not have found Brown guilty as an accessory after the fact. |
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