Smith v. Smith
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-01356-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-01356-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-18-2008 Opinion Author: CARLTON, J. Holding: Affirmed in Part, Remanded in Part |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Nonmarital property - Ferguson factors - Fault-based divorce - Award of firearms - 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Chandler, J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-17-2007 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Denise Owens Disposition: FINAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE ENTERED Case Number: G2005-151 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | ALFRED RANDOLPH SMITH, JR. |
JOHN DENVER FIKE |
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| Appellee: | BRENNA D. SMITH | HARRY JONES ROSENTHAL |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Cruel and inhuman treatment - Equitable distribution - Nonmarital property - Ferguson factors - Fault-based divorce - Award of firearms - 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Alfred Smith, Jr., was granted a divorce from Brenna Smith on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Aggrieved by the distribution of the property, Alfred appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Alfred argues that certain property was separate property and should not have been subject to division. When equitably distributing marital property, a chancellor should consider the well known factors established by Ferguson v. Ferguson. All monetary awards are ultimately to be considered together. The obligation of a chancellor is not to follow some precise formula as to each individual component of distribution, alimony, and other support, but to provide equitably between the spouses in the final outcome. The chancellor awarded Brenna $5,000 as her share of improvements and labor put into the Prassel Street rental property. Testimony supports that Brenna did make improvements to the property, and the value of the property increased by approximately $30,000 during the course of the marriage. The chancellor found that property was titled solely in Alfred’s name but, nevertheless, found that it was proper to make an award to Brenna in recognition of the work she put into the property. Such an award was within the chancellor’s discretion. There is also no error with the chancellor’s decision to award one-half of the value of the Chrysler van and the Chevrolet pickup truck to each party. By dividing them as such, the chancellor clearly regarded them as marital property. This is supported by the trial testimony, which revealed that the vehicles were owned and used during the marriage. Alfred argues that the chancellor failed to make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law that are required under Ferguson. Upon reading the chancellor’s bench ruling and the final judgment, it is clear that she did apply the Ferguson factors. She determined the value of each item and evaluated the contributions that each party made to the accumulation of the assets. The chancellor also took into account the size of the award that the parties would receive and noted any dissipation of the assets by either party. Where appropriate, the chancellor also noted any non-monetary attachment that the parties had to the property. All of these findings relate to the Ferguson factors. Alfred argues that the chancellor failed to take into account the fact that he was granted a fault-based divorce as a factor in dividing the property. The chancellor granted Alfred a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, but it was based on a single incident of abuse. There was no error in the chancellor’s decision not to place more emphasis on Brenna’s single incident of conduct. Although the parties did not raise this issue, the chancellor awarded Brenna two pistols even though she had pleaded guilty to misdemeanor simple assault for stabbing her husband. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it is unlawful for an individual who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Because it appears that the statute makes Brenna’s possession of a firearm under particular circumstances illegal, the case is remanded to the chancellor for the narrow purpose of reconsideration of the distribution of the firearms owned by the parties in light of the statute. |
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