Teston v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00353-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00353-COA2007-KA-00353-COA2007-CT-00353-SCT2007-CT-00353-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 07-29-2008 | |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-18-2008 Opinion Author: KING, C.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: DUI & Negligently causing death - Double jeopardy - Motion to suppress - Section 63-11-8 - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Sufficiency of evidence - Recorded statement - M.R.E. 106 - Motion in limine - M.R.E. 401 - Comments on failure to testify - Circumstantial evidence instruction - Disproportionate sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, and Carlton, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Griffis, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-22-2007 Appealed from: Harrison County Circuit Court Judge: Stephen Simpson Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNTS I, II, AND III - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND NEGLIGENTLY CAUSING THE DEATH OF ANOTHER, AND COUNT IV - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND NEGLIGENTLY CAUSING SERIOUS INJURY TO ANOTHER, AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS FOR EACH COUNT, WITH THIRTY YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Cono A. Caranna, II Case Number: B2402-2005-0096 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | KRYSTAL MARIE TESTON |
TIM C. HOLLEMAN |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOHN R. HENRY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | DUI & Negligently causing death - Double jeopardy - Motion to suppress - Section 63-11-8 - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Sufficiency of evidence - Recorded statement - M.R.E. 106 - Motion in limine - M.R.E. 401 - Comments on failure to testify - Circumstantial evidence instruction - Disproportionate sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Krystal Teston was convicted of three counts of driving under the influence and negligently causing death to another and one count of driving under the influence and negligently causing serious injury to another. Teston was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of fifteen years on each count, for a total of sixty years, with thirty years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Double jeopardy Teston argues that her indictment subjected her to double jeopardy, caused substantial prejudice to her defense, and violated her constitutional right to be informed of the charges filed against her. Double jeopardy allows a defendant to be protected against multiple punishments for the same offense. If the offenses contain the same elements, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. In Counts I, II, III, and IV, Teston was specifically indicted for driving under the influence of hydrocodone and negligently causing the death or serious injury of another, with one count for each victim. Counts V, VI, VII, and VIII charged Teston with the same crime. However, these four counts did not specifically name any substance that Teston was allegedly driving under the influence of. The trial court granted Teston’s motion for a directed verdict in regard to Counts V through VIII, stating that there was no evidence that Teston was impaired by any substance other than hydrocodone. Teston was only convicted of one count of driving under the influence of hydrocodone and negligently causing the death or injury of another for each death or injury so caused. Therefore, her argument is without merit. Issue 2: Motion to suppress Teston argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her blood test results because her blood was not drawn until three hours after the accident, in violation of section 63-11-8. The provision to draw blood within two hours of an accident is not an unyielding mandate. Rather, the statute requires substantial compliance. In this case, there is no evidence of deliberate delay. The evidence shows that the officer was not immediately aware that Teston was under the influence, and he was not immediately aware of her involvement in the accident. Further delay was caused by the time it took for the tow truck to arrive, the travel time to the police station, and the travel time to the hospital. Also, there is no evidence that Teston was prejudiced by the lapse in time. Issue 3: Expert testimony Teston argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding Teston’s level of impairment, because the expert’s opinions were obtained based upon an inaccurate and incomplete hypothetical, and his testimony was not based on credible, scientific evidence. Under M.R.E. 702, the trial court must determine whether the expert testimony is relevant, meaning that it must assist the trier of fact; and the trial court must determine whether the proffered expert testimony is reliable. Teston argues that the State obtained the testimony with an inaccurate and incomplete hypothetical. She argues that the State omitted facts showing that Teston remained in control of her vehicle. However, defense counsel posed a hypothetical to the expert during cross-examination, asking whether someone under the influence of hydrocodone would be able to safely operate a vehicle. Therefore, the hypothetical was based on sufficient and accurate facts. Teston also argues that there is no credible, scientific basis for retrograde extrapolation of hydrocodone. The trial judge questioned the expert extensively during the Daubert hearing. Based on his credentials, he was qualified to be an expert in the field of forensic toxicology and pharmacology. His testimony was sufficient to pass the Daubert test for reliability. Teston’s expert witness also testified that there were no studies testing retrograde extrapolation of hydrocodone. In fact, he stated that there are not many studies at all testing hydrocodone because “this drug is just so old that those reports are not available.” It is apparent that no scientists have been interested in the subject matter. Therefore, it has not been subject to peer review. The trial court is in the best position to determine relevancy and reliability of expert testimony, and in this case, the trial court determined that the expert’s testimony was relevant and reliable. Based upon a review of the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the expert testimony. Issue 4: Sufficiency of evidence Teston argues that the State failed to prove that she was impaired at the time of the accident. Teston argues that the testimony of two witnesses that she was driving aggressively was contrary to the testimony that she was driving the same speed as the other vehicles and that she was able to stop and return to the scene of the accident safely. One of the witnesses testified that Teston was driving faster than the other vehicles on the road. Both witnesses testified that Teston was driving in an aggressive manner. Despite Teston’s ability to remain in control of her vehicle, the jury found that Teston was impaired at the time of the accident, and the evidence supports this finding. Teston argues that the officer’s testimony proves that she was not impaired at the time of the accident because he did not notice any signs of impairment during his initial contact with her. The jury could have decided that Teston was not impaired at the time of the accident. However, the jury accepted as true that the officer was not able to properly observe Teston’s behavior during his initial contact with her and determined that Teston was impaired at the time of the accident. The evidence supports this finding. Teston argues that the expert’s testimony failed to prove that she was impaired at the time of the accident, because his analysis did not account for multiple dosing. However, he agreed that multiple doses could affect peak levels. Essentially, this was a battle of the experts. Based on the verdict, it is clear that the jury gave more weight and credibility to the State’s expert testimony. The evidence supports this decision. Issue 5: Recorded statement Teston argues that the trial court erred by refusing to admit her recorded statement taken at the police department into evidence, because the statement she made at the scene of the accident and the statement she made at the police department are one statement and should be admitted under M.R.E. 106. It is obvious that Teston attempted to introduce her recorded statement into evidence as a self-serving statement. A defendant has no right to introduce a self-serving statement into evidence in lieu of taking the stand. Teston has no right to introduce such a statement into evidence in lieu of taking the stand to testify to the matter herself. Issue 6: Motion in limine Teston argues that the trial court erred by reversing its ruling on her motion in limine, which would have prohibited the State from introducing evidence of her arrest for driving with a suspended driver’s license. The evidence of Teston’s arrest was relevant under M.R.E. 401, not only in regard to why a field sobriety test was not performed, but also to explain the sequence of events leading up to Teston’s blood test. Issue 7: Comments on failure to testify Teston argues that the trial court erred by denying her motions for a mistrial because the State improperly commented on her failure to testify during its opening statement and closing statement. Attorneys are prohibited from making a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The prosecutor’s comment made during opening statement did not directly or indirectly refer to Teston’s failure to testify. The prosecutor simply commented on Teston’s lack of a defense to the crime. In closing argument, the prosecution did not comment on Teston’s failure to testify but was responding to the comments that defense counsel made during closing argument. Issue 8: Circumstantial evidence instruction Teston argues that the trial court erred by denying the circumstantial-evidence instruction because the State did not present any direct evidence that she was driving the black Honda that caused the accident. A circumstantial-evidence instruction is warranted where the State cannot produce an eyewitness to the crime or cannot get a confession from the alleged perpetrator. The officer testified that Teston identified herself as the driver of the black Honda. Teston argues that although she identified herself to the officer as the driver of the black Honda, he did not ask her if she was driving at the time of the accident. This is of no consequence. Based on the record, the State presented direct evidence identifying Teston as the driver of the black Honda, and there is no evidence in the record that would refute this fact. Issue 9: Disproportionate sentence Teston argues that her sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime because other defendants received less time for the same offense. Teston’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed because the trial court sentenced her within the guidelines provided by the statute. |
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