Jamison v. Barnes


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00765-COA
Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-00765-COA ; 2007-CT-00765-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-04-2008
Opinion Author: MYERS, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Negligence - Duty of driver following another vehicle - Visibility - Negligence per se - Section 63-7-81 - Comparative negligence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee, P.J., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee, and Roberts, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Barnes, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-04-2007
Appealed from: NOXUBEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr.
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF BARNES
Case Number: 2006-053

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: WAYNE JAMISON




R. GREGG ROGERS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: GREGORY C. BARNES J. NILES MCNEEL  

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    Topic: Personal injury - Negligence - Duty of driver following another vehicle - Visibility - Negligence per se - Section 63-7-81 - Comparative negligence

    Summary of the Facts: Wayne Jamison was seriously injured while operating a tractor when he was struck from behind by the vehicle of Gregory Barnes. Jamison brought a personal injury suit against Barnes, citing negligence as the proximate cause of his injuries. Following the close of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Barnes’ motion for summary judgment and denied Jamison’s. Jamison appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Jamison argues that he produced sufficient evidence of Barnes’ negligence to defeat summary judgment, through his own testimony and the affidavit of a witness who came upon the accident scene several minutes after the collision. The driver of a vehicle following along behind another, and not attempting to pass, has a duty encompassing four interrelated functions: he must have his vehicle under proper control, keep a proper look-out ahead, and commensurate therewith drive at a speed and sufficient distance behind the preceding vehicle so that should the preceding vehicle stop suddenly, he can nevertheless stop his vehicle without colliding with the forward vehicle. A driver must keep a proper lookout and be on alert for vehicles, objects and persons ahead in the highway. A driver is also required to have his car under proper control, to be on the alert on the highway, and avoid striking plain objects. To make a prima facie case of Barnes’ negligence, Jamison was required only to show that Barnes should have seen the tractor in time to avoid or mitigate the collision. Jamison argues that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not it was too dark for Barnes to have avoided the collision. Barnes argues that Jamison’s deposition was internally inconsistent because Jamison admitted that, had the lights on his tractor been working, he would have had them on at the time of the collision. Barnes argues that this contradiction precludes Jamison from now arguing that the remaining daylight was sufficient for Barnes to have avoided or. It is undisputed that the accident occurred some time after “sunset” but before “complete darkness.” Our law generally requires a driver to operate his vehicle with lights on from the time of “sunset,” even though “complete darkness” does not occur until some time after the end of “civil twilight,” a span of almost half an hour on the day of the accident. Because lights are often used or required when visibility is nonetheless sufficient to avoid a collision like the one in the instant case, Jamison’s admission that he would have had his lights on, had they been working, is not an admission that it was too dark for Barnes to have seen the tractor in time to avoid the accident. Jamison’s deposition testimony and the affidavit of the witness both describe the daylight remaining at the time of the accident as sufficient for Barnes to have seen Jamison’s tractor in time to avoid the collision. Jamison also testified that the road was straight and that Barnes’s view was unobstructed, and it is uncontroverted that Jamison’s tractor was equipped with a large, reflective triangle facing to the rear and that Barnes was operating his vehicle with its headlights on. Giving Jamison the benefit of all reasonable inferences from these facts, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barnes was negligent because he should have seen the tractor in time to avoid or mitigate the accident. Barnes’ summary judgment motion also alleged that Jamison was negligent per se for violating two provisions of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law. Even if Jamison were negligent per se, it would not bar his recovery if he could show that Barnes was also negligent, under the familiar doctrine of comparative negligence. Had Jamison been negligent per se under section 63-7-81, it would not preclude his recovery as long as he could show Barnes was also negligent.


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