Bougard v. Bougard


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00835-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-23-2008
Opinion Author: King, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Temporary support order - Division of marital property
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, and Carlton, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Roberts, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-16-2007
Appealed from: MARSHALL COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: Edwin Hayes Roberts, Jr.
Disposition: GRANTED DIVORCE BASED ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND APPROVED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Case Number: 04-0402

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: CHARLES BOUGARD




KAREN WILSON TYLER



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: MARY BOUGARD AMANDA WHALEY SMITH  

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    Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Temporary support order - Division of marital property

    Summary of the Facts: Charles and Mary Bougard were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The parties initially agreed to all the terms of the divorce, including the property division. However, Charles subsequently became aggrieved by the property division and appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Temporary support order Charles appeared at a hearing on temporary support, without an attorney, and requested additional time to obtain representation. The trial court denied the request and proceeded with the hearing. Charles argues that he was denied his right to counsel and that the chancellor failed to hear all the relevant evidence. A party in a civil action does not have a right to counsel. Counsel should only be appointed when, if the unrepresented party loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. If Charles lost the temporary support hearing, he would not lose his physical liberty; therefore, his right to have counsel would not be triggered. Charles also argues that the chancellor completely ignored the fact that he implicated his wife in possible fraudulent activity. However, the chancellor specifically addressed this allegation during the temporary support hearing. Also, Charles would have had an additional opportunity during the final divorce hearing to delve into this matter. Issue 2: Division of marital property Charles argues that the chancellor erred by failing to take the proper steps to equitably divide the parties’ property. The division of the assets and the amount of alimony were set by an agreement of the parties. The agreement was made between the parties on the day of the divorce hearing and was read into the record. The parties agreed to be bound regardless of whether they signed a written copy of the agreement read into the record. Therefore, there was no need for the chancellor to apply the Ferguson or Armstrong factors. Charles also argues that the chancellor held the threat of incarceration over him if he did not agree to the terms read into the record. Nothing in the record supports the idea that the chancellor coerced Charles into the agreement with the threat of incarceration. Upon questioning by the chancellor, Charles acknowledged that this was his agreement, and he intended to abide by it.


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