Trotter v. State


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Docket Number: 2005-KA-00379-COA
Linked Case(s): 2005-KA-00379-COA ; 2005-CT-00379-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-23-2008
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Murder - Victim’s statement - Dying declaration - M.R.E. 804(b)(2) - Prejudicial remarks - Admission of statements - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Cruel and unusual punishment
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, and Carlton, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-16-2004
Appealed from: Humphreys County Circuit Court
Judge: Jannie M. Lewis
Disposition: CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: James H. Powell, III
Case Number: 5797

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: LEON LAMAR TROTTER




LISA M. ROSS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS  

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    Topic: Murder - Victim’s statement - Dying declaration - M.R.E. 804(b)(2) - Prejudicial remarks - Admission of statements - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Cruel and unusual punishment

    Summary of the Facts: Leon Trotter was convicted of murder. Trotter received a sentence of life. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Victim’s statement The defense moved ore tenus to exclude the hearsay testimony of the officer who found the victim regarding the victim’s statements about who shot him. The court admitted the testimony into evidence as a dying declaration exception to hearsay under M.R.E. 804(b)(2). A statement will qualify as a dying declaration if the wounded person is in extremis and dies after making the statement, the person realizes that he is mortally wounded, and he has no hope of recovery. Trotter argues that no evidence was introduced which proved the victim knew he was mortally wounded and had no hope of recovery. The evidence in the record indicates that the victim could have known of his impending death and that he had no hope of recovery even if not specifically expressed by him. When the officer found the victim, he told the officer: “Man, I need some help. I’m cold.” When he asked the victim where he had been shot, the victim moved his arm so the officer could see the bullet wound in his upper left chest, near his heart. The victim’s consciousness of his own death can be reasonably inferred from these facts. Issue 2: Prejudicial remarks Trotter argues that the prosecutor’s remarks during voir dire about sentencing so prejudiced him that he was denied the right to a fair trial. The prosecution was merely advising the potential jurors that they would not be called upon to decide a death-penalty case. Any time jurors learn they will be hearing a case that involves murder, they could have legitimate concerns about the possible imposition of the death penalty. There was no prejudice to Trotter in this case. The prosecutor made no effort to advise the jury as to the different sentences or number of years under each sentence for the crimes of murder or manslaughter – the two crimes the jury would be considering. Issue 3: Admission of statements Trotter argues that the court committed reversible error in admitting his two statements, primarily because of the fact he was only seventeen years old at the time law enforcement questioned him and he was not informed that his mother had a right to be present. Whether there was an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver is a factual question to be determined by a trial court from the totality of the circumstances. This totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. The prosecution met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Trotter’s confession was properly obtained. Two officers stated Trotter was given, read, and signed a Miranda waiver of rights form, which was introduced into evidence. Additionally, the voluntary statement form on which Trotter’s handwritten statements appear also had a Miranda waiver printed on it. Further, Trotter never claimed his statements were coerced, threatened, or forced. Even at trial, Trotter maintained that his handwritten statements were “the truth” and were voluntarily given. Age is just one factor in the totality of the circumstances test and is not conclusive of an improper waiver of rights. Trotter’s testimony at trial was articulate, showing his intellectual capacity to understand the waiver. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Trotter argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because there is no affirmative showing of ineffective assistance rising to constitutional dimensions within the record and no related stipulation between the parties, Trotter may raise this claim in post-conviction-relief proceedings. Issue 5: Cruel and unusual punishment Trotter argues his sentence, in comparison to his co-defendant’s sentence for manslaughter for twenty years, violates the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Trotter’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum; the only available punishment for murder is life in prison.


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