Morgan v. Stevens


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00872-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-19-2008
Opinion Author: King, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Statute of limitations - Section 75-3-118(b) - Section 15-1-29 - Section 15-1-49 - Negotiable instrument - Section 75-3-104
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, and Carlton, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Chandler, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-10-2007
Appealed from: Clay County Circuit Court
Judge: Lee J. Howard
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF THE STEVENSES.
Case Number: 2005-0014

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: IRVIN MORGAN, JR.




WILLIAM PAUL STARKS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: HARRY STEVENS, JR. AND GAYLE J. STEVENS JIM WAIDE, LUANNE STARK THOMPSON, RON L. WOODRUFF  
    Appellee #2:  

    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Contract - Statute of limitations - Section 75-3-118(b) - Section 15-1-29 - Section 15-1-49 - Negotiable instrument - Section 75-3-104

    Summary of the Facts: Irvin Morgan, Jr. filed an action against Harry Stevens, Jr. and Gayle Stevens, seeking the collection of several delinquent loans. The court held the action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted summary judgment to the Stevenses. Morgan appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Morgan argues that the dishonor of a written demand note is governed by section 75-3-118(b), the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides a six-year statute of limitations, and not by section 15-1-29, covering open accounts and unwritten contracts, or section 15-1-49, the general statute of limitations, both of which provide for a three-year period of limitations. Chapter 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, of which section 75-3-118(b) is a part, applies only to negotiable instruments. Section 75-3-104 provides that an instrument is negotiable if it: (1) contains an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount, (2) is payable to the bearer or to order, (3) is payable at a definite time or on demand, and (4) contains no other undertaking or instruction. The recap statements prepared by Morgan do not satisfy the definition of a negotiable instrument. First, there was no written document that contained an unconditional promise by the Stevenses to pay Morgan. Second, with the exception of the checks written by Morgan to either Gayle or Lincoln Furniture Company, none of the documents that Morgan alleges to comprise a written demand note contain the words “payable to bearer” or “payable to order.” Thus, his claims were not covered under the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 75-3-118(b). The action to collect on these delinquent loans was filed in January 2005. The action to collect on these delinquent loans was filed approximately three years and ten months from the date of default. The claims are therefore time barred by the three-year statute of limitations.


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