In re Estate of Summerlin v. Summerlin


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Docket Number: 2007-CA-00055-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-19-2008
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Confidential relationship - Legal description - Reformation
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, and Carlton, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-14-2006
Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
Judge: William Joseph Lutz
Disposition: CHANCELLOR DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S PETITION TO SET ASIDE CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY AND GRANTED DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR REFORMATION OF DEED.
Case Number: 2004-434

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GROVER S. SUMMERLIN, DECEASED: BARBARA ANN LYNCH




JAMES MORTIMER CREWS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: CURTIS SUMMERLIN DURWOOD EARNEST MCGUFFEE  

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    Topic: Wills & estates - Confidential relationship - Legal description - Reformation

    Summary of the Facts: Grover Summerlin executed a quitclaim deed conveying a parcel of land situated in Madison County to his son, Curtis Summerlin, to the exclusion of his daughter, Barbara Lynch. The legal description of the land attached to the quitclaim deed was different from the legal description contained in Grover’s original warranty deed. Upon Grover’s death, Lynch filed a petition to set aside the conveyance of the land on the grounds that the quitclaim deed was the product of undue influence; she later amended her petition to allege that the conveyance was void due to an inaccurate legal description. Curtis filed a counterclaim seeking reformation of the quitclaim deed. The chancery court denied Lynch’s petition on the ground that there was no confidential relationship between Grover and Curtis and granted Curtis’s petition to reform the quitclaim deed. Lynch appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Confidential relationship Lynch argues that the chancellor erred in finding that there existed no confidential relationship between Grover and Curtis such that a presumption of undue influence arose with regard to the execution of the quitclaim deed. When a confidential relationship is shown to have existed between the grantor and the grantee at the time of the conveyance, the conveyance will be scrutinized by the courts. A confidential relationship arises whenever there is a relationship between two people in which one person is in a position to exercise dominant influence upon the other because of the latter’s dependency on the former arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust. To overcome the presumption of undue influence, the proponents must show good faith on the part of the beneficiary, the grantor’s full knowledge and deliberation of the consequences of her actions, and the grantor’s independent consent and action. As the chancellor in this case found, the testimony of all witnesses established that Grover’s physical health was not good and that he needed physical assistance; however, the testimony was also very clear that most of that help was provided by his wife and then by Lynch. Curtis did not assist Grover with his personal business or in managing his money, such as paying bills or writing checks. Although Grover relied on Curtis to find an attorney to draft the quitclaim deed and to drive him to the attorney’s office, the chancellor found that the testimony was clear that until the last few years, Curtis did not spend much time with his father. Even assuming that the relationship between Grover and Curtis at the time of the execution of the quitclaim deed could have been described as “close,” again, there was no evidence indicating that Curtis controlled Grover in any way as a result of that relationship. It is uncontested that Grover and Curtis held no joint accounts and that there existed no power of attorney between Grover and Curtis. Based on these facts, the chancellor’s finding that there was no confidential relationship between Grover and Curtis was supported by substantial evidence. Issue 2: Legal description Lynch argues that the chancery court erred in reforming the legal description in the quitclaim deed to coincide with the legal description contained in the original warranty deed in the land records. The party asserting reformation must prove a mistake on the part of both parties; or a mistake on the part of one party with fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the other party; or an error on the part of the scrivener. The mistake that will justify a reformation must be in the drafting of the instrument, not in the making of the contract. A scrivener’s error may be sufficient to warrant the reformation of an instrument. Here, as the chancellor noted, the attorney testified that he strongly believed that the inconsistency was the result of an “error in his office” and that it was Grover’s intention to convey all of the land that he owned, described in the original warranty deed, by way of the quitclaim deed the parties executed. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that the inconsistency in the legal description in the quitclaim deed was the result of a scrivener’s error.


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