Wiggins v. Perry
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01126-COA Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01126-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-22-2008 Opinion Author: GRIFFIS, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Subject matter jurisdiction - Miss. Const., art. 6, § 159 & § 160 - Amendment of pleading - M.R.C.P. 15(a), (c) - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), (c) - M.R.C.P. 56 - M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3) - M.R.C.P. 54(b) - M.R.A.P. 3(c) - M.R.C.P. 58 - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.C.P. 60 Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ. Dissenting Author : MYERS, P.J., without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-26-2006 Appealed from: Bolivar County Chancery Court Judge: William Willard Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARDED TO DEFENDANT Case Number: 2004-0366 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | JAMES ALBERT WIGGINS |
CHRISTOPHER E. KITTELL |
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| Appellee: | BILLY RAY PERRY | LINDSEY C. MEADOR | ||
| Appellee #2: | ||||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Subject matter jurisdiction - Miss. Const., art. 6, § 159 & § 160 - Amendment of pleading - M.R.C.P. 15(a), (c) - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), (c) - M.R.C.P. 56 - M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3) - M.R.C.P. 54(b) - M.R.A.P. 3(c) - M.R.C.P. 58 - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - M.R.C.P. 60 |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Wiggins borrowed money from Billy Ray Perry. Wiggins signed deeds of trust as security for the loans, but he was not able to repay the loans. Wiggins executed a warranty deed to Perry and conveyed his home to satisfy the debt. Perry claimed that there was a verbal agreement to allow Wiggins to remain in the home as a tenant. This arrangement continued for a number of years until Wiggins began to fall behind in his rent payments. As a result, Perry filed suit against Wiggins. Perry filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. Wiggins appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The chancellor concluded that Wiggins could only raise equitable defenses to challenge Perry’s petition and that the dispute in this matter was and is over purely equitable issues, the jurisdiction of which would be vested in chancery court. Wiggins argues that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Miss. Const., art. 6, § 159 and Miss. Const., art. 6, § 160 define the parameters of the chancery court’s jurisdiction. The petition requested a “mandatory injunction directing Mr. Wiggins to quit the premises and surrender them to Mr. Perry” plus the unpaid rent or, in the alternative, “a mandatory injunction directing Mr. Wiggins to execute one of the new written leases tendered to him by Mr. Perry” plus an agreement to pay the unpaid rent. As a general rule, mandatory injunctions are considered equitable matters. In such cases, however, jurisdiction is determined by the substance of the relief sought and not the terms of art with which a plaintiff chooses to draft his petition. Perry’s first claim in the petition was nothing more than an eviction proceeding in disguise. Subject matter jurisdiction for eviction proceedings is vested in the county court. Perry’s alternative prayer for relief is a request for the court to force Wiggins to enter into a lease contract. This request for relief is legally impermissible. On its face, Perry’s petition did not state a claim over which the chancellor could assert subject matter jurisdiction. In the judgment, the chancellor contended, however, that Perry’s “Motion to Dismiss Anticipated Pleadings” and Perry’s motion for summary judgment both constituted amendments to the pleadings that the chancellor could rely on to grant Perry’s motion for summary judgment. According to the record, the chancellor closed the time to file responsive pleadings on November 16, 2004. Accordingly, Perry’s opportunity to amend his pleading as a matter of course under M.R.C.P. 15(a) expired on that date. Likewise, an amendment would not be permitted pursuant to a dismissal under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c), as that situation also is inapplicable to this case. Based on Rule 15, Perry could only amend his pleading by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party. Neither the chancellor nor Wiggins granted Perry permission to amend his petition. Moreover, even if leave to amend had been granted, Perry’s “Motion to Dismiss Anticipated Pleadings” would not constitute an amendment to the petition. Perry did not request additional relief or raise additional claims. Finally, there is no provision in M.R.C.P. 56 that would allow a motion for summary judgment to constitute an amendment to a pleading. Because Perry did not comply with Rule 15, there was no amendment to the pleadings that could relate back to the date of the original filing under Rule 15(c) to convey subject matter jurisdiction to the chancery court. Thus, the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Under the Mississippi Constitution, however, the Court may not reverse a final judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction absent some other error that warrants reversal. Although the only issue raised by Wiggins’s briefs was subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may notice plain error pursuant to M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3). Under M.R.C.P. 54(b), a party may only appeal a final judgment. M.R.A.P. 3(c) requires that the notice of appeal state the judgment or order appealed from. In this case, the order granting summary judgment was not a final judgment under Rule 54. By stating that it “reserves ruling,” the chancellor’s decision was at most a partial summary judgment under Rule 56(d). It was not a final appealable judgment under M.R.C.P. 54(b) or 58, and the chancellor was in error to treat it as such. Also, the order granting summary judgment adjudicated claims that were not properly before the court. The chancellor committed plain error in granting summary judgment on issues not raised in Perry’s petition. Thereafter, the court entered final judgment with no trial, hearing, or presentation of evidence that would support the monetary damages awarded. As the order granting summary judgment was not an appealable final judgment, there was no judgment from which Wiggins could file a motion to alter or amend the judgment or to set aside the judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 59(e) or 60. Without proper notice and compliance with the provisions of Rule 56, the final judgment may not add relief to the order granting summary judgment. Therefore, the final judgment is reversed and on remand, the chancellor is instructed to transfer the case to the proper court having subject matter jurisdiction. |
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